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ABSTRACT/RÉSUMÉ 
Policies and International Integration: Influences on Trade and Foreign Direct Investment 
This paper assesses the importance of border and non-border policies for global economic integration. The focus 
is on four widely-advocated policies: removing explicit restrictions to trade and FDI; promoting domestic 
competition; improving the adaptability of labour markets; and ensuring adequate levels of infrastructure 
capital. The analysis covers FDI and trade in both goods and services, thus aiming to account for the most 
important channels of globalisation and dealing with most modes of cross-border services supply. It first 
describes trends in trade, FDI and the four sets of policies using a large set of structural policy indicators 
recently constructed by the OECD, including the new summary indicators for FDI-specific regulations 
described in Golub (2003). It then estimates the impact of policies on bilateral trade and bilateral and 
multilateral FDI. The results highlight that, despite extensive liberalisation over the past two decades, there is 
scope for further reducing policy barriers to integration of OECD markets. Remaining barriers have a significant 
impact on trade and FDI, with anticompetitive domestic regulations and restrictive labour market arrangements 
estimated to curb integration as much as explicit trade and FDI restrictions. Simulating the removal of such 
barriers suggests that the quantitative effects of further liberalisation of trade, FDI and domestic product and 
labour markets on global integration could be substantial. 
 
JEL classification: F15, F13, F16, F21, C23, L50 
Keywords: International trade, foreign direct investment, services, liberalisation, regulation, panel data 
 
*********** 
Politique économique et intégration internationale: impact sur les échanges et les investissements 
directs à l'étranger 
 
Cette étude évalue l’importance des politiques frontalières et non-frontalières pour l’intégration internationale. 
L’accent est placé sur quatre mesures largement préconisées: suppression des restrictions explicites aux 
échanges et à l’IDE ; encouragement de la concurrence au plan interne ; amélioration de la capacité 
d’ajustement des marchés du travail; et mise en place de niveaux adéquats d’équipements d’infrastructure. 
L’analyse, qui couvre l’IDE et les échanges de biens et de services, prend ainsi en compte les principaux 
mécanismes de mondialisation et traite de la plupart des modes de fourniture de services transfrontières. L’étude 
analyse d’abord les tendances du commerce, de l’IDE et des politiques dans les quatre domaines examinés, en 
utilisant un vaste ensemble d’indicateurs de politiques structurelles récemment assemblé par l’OCDE, qui 
comprend les nouveaux indicateurs de restrictions à l’IDE décrits par Golub (2003). Elle estime ensuite l’impact 
de ces politiques sur les flux de commerce bilatéraux et sur les IDE bilatéraux et multilatéraux. Les résultats 
indiquent que, malgré une libéralisation généralisée des transactions internationales au cours des deux dernières 
décennies, il est possible de réduire encore les obstacles qui s’opposent à l’intégration des marchés de l’OCDE. 
Les barrières qui demeurent ont un impact significatif sur le commerce international et l’IDE. Notamment, les 
estimations suggèrent que les régulations visant a réduire la concurrence interne et les arrangements restrictifs 
du marché du travail compriment l’intégration internationale dans la même mesure que les restrictions explicites 
au commerce et à l’IDE. La simulation de scénarios dans lesquels ces barrières seraient levées fait penser que 
les effets quantitatifs d’une libéralisation ultérieure du commerce, de l’IDE et des marchés de produits et du 
travail sur l’intégration internationale pourraient être substantiels. 
 
Classification JEL: F15, F13, F16, F21, C23, L50 
Mots clé: Commerce international, investissement direct étranger, services, liberalisation, régulation, 
données de panel 
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POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION: INFLUENCES ON TRADE AND 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT1 
by 
Giuseppe Nicoletti, Steve Golub, Dana Hajkova, Daniel Mirza and Kwang-Yeol Yoo 
 
1. Summary and conclusions 
1.1. Introduction 
1. The beneficial effects of foreign trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) on efficiency and 
growth are generally recognised, and there is a wide consensus that policy should aim at reducing or 
eliminating hindrances to global trade and FDI integration (Box 1). Successive multilateral trade rounds, 
regional trade agreements and bilateral and multilateral investment accords have reduced formal barriers to 
trade and FDI. The current World Trade Organization (WTO) trade negotiations aim at continuing this 
trend. However, border barriers are still significant in some countries and industries, in particular in the 
form of restrictions to FDI. Moreover, there is growing recognition that policies aimed at non-border-
related objectives may have a significant impact on the extent of trade and activities of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs). Thus, unnecessarily restrictive product and labour-market regulations can act as 
barriers to trade and FDI. The state of the domestic physical infrastructure can also influence countries’ 
capacities to participate in the globalisation of economic activity.  
                                                     
1. Giuseppe Nicoletti, Dana Hajkova and Kwang-Yeol Yoo work in the OECD Economics Department; Steve 
Golub and Daniel Mirza are, respectively, Professor of Economics at Swarthmore College (United States)  
and Research Fellow at University of Nottingham (United Kingdom), and were consultants to the OECD 
Economics Department when this paper was written. The authors wish to thank Sveinbjorn Blondal, Jorgen 
Elmeskov, Michael Feiner, Nigel Pain and the many colleagues in the OECD Economics Department and 
other OECD directorates which contributed to improve this paper with their useful comments. Martine 
Levasseur and Janice Gabela provided excellent statistical and editorial assistance. The opinions expressed 
are personal and do not engage the OECD or its Member countries. 
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Box 1. International integration and growth 
Trade, foreign direct investment and the related activity of multinational enterprises are the main channels through 
which global economic integration is achieved. Maximising such integration is not necessarily the objective of policy. 
For instance, certain barriers to global integration may serve legitimate policy purposes or would be too costly to 
remove. However, to the extent that integration may improve global welfare, the elimination of unnecessary policy 
barriers to trade and investment appears to be desirable. This paper is based on the assumption that, aside from their 
beneficial effects on the efficient allocation of world resources, both trade and the internationalisation of production 
are also likely to enhance economic growth. Trade openness increases competitive pressures and stimulates imitation, 
adoption and innovation, fostering productivity improvements and technical progress (OECD, 2000). 
Internationalisation of production also increases competitive pressures in OECD markets because, in manufacturing, 
FDI is closely related to goods trade and, in non-manufacturing, commercial presence is one of the main modes of 
cross-border service supply. Moreover, FDI is also an important vehicle for technology transfer and a stimulus to 
innovative activity. Through all these channels (resource reallocation, competition, trade, technology transfer), FDI is 
considered to be an increasingly important driver of growth (OECD, 2002a, 2002b). 
2. This paper assesses the importance of certain border and non-border policy measures for global 
economic integration. The analysis covers FDI and trade in both goods and services, thus aiming to 
account for the most important channels of globalisation and dealing with most modes of cross-border 
service supply.2 The aim of the paper is threefold:  
• First, it describes trends in goods trade, services trade and FDI, as well as border and non-
border policies that are likely to affect them. To this end, a large set of policy indicators 
constructed by the OECD is used, including the new summary indicators for FDI-specific 
regulations described in Golub (2003). Indicators of tariffs, non-tariff barriers and 
participation in free trade areas are also used to gauge the stance of policy toward trade 
openness. 3  
• Second, the paper estimates the impact of these policies on trade and FDI in a framework in 
which trade flows and the activity of MNEs are seen to be determined jointly and respond to 
the same market and policy influences.4 The empirical analysis focuses on bilateral trade and 
FDI patterns, including bilateral trade in services, but also looks at the determinants of 
multilateral inward FDI to explain the overall ability of individual OECD countries to attract 
international investment.  
                                                     
2. The other important channel of globalisation is movement of people. For a discussion of migration trends, 
determinants and policies see OECD (2002c). Temporary movement of personnel is also an important 
mode of service supply that is not covered in this study. 
3. The willingness of businesses to expand cross-border activity and their localisation decisions are likely to 
depend to some extent also on the taxation of profits of foreign subsidiaries. Patterns of FDI taxation are 
studied in a companion paper (Yoo, 2003). 
4. This is in line with recent economic research (OECD, 2002a; Markusen and Maskus, 2001a, 2001b) that 
stresses the joint determination of trade and FDI flows. However, it is important to note at the outset that, 
due to the level of aggregation at which the analysis is performed, the long-standing issue concerning the 
substitutability or complementarity of trade and FDI is only dealt with tangentially in this document. This 
issue has been recently (and repeatedly) addressed elsewhere in the OECD by means of literature surveys 
(OECD 1995, 2002a) and empirical analyses using sectoral (OECD 1996, 1997a) and aggregate data 
(OECD 1998a).  
 ECO/WKP(2003)13 
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• Third, using the results of the empirical analysis, the paper discusses and quantifies the 
effects on global integration of policies targeted at removing border and non-border barriers 
and levelling the playing field for FDI in the OECD area. In this context, the focus is on four 
widely-advocated policies: removing explicit restrictions to trade and FDI; promoting 
domestic competition; improving the adaptability of labour markets; and ensuring adequate 
levels of infrastructure capital. It should be noted at the outset that the results of the 
simulations are only suggestive of what could happen under different policy scenarios, 
notably because the empirically-estimated models on which they are based are partial 
equilibrium, reduced-form models that are unable to account for the general equilibrium 
interactions between policy changes and trade and FDI flows. 
3. The paper is structured as follows. The next section documents recent trends in foreign trade and 
internationalisation of production. Section 3 discusses the main factors that are likely to jointly affect trade 
and FDI patterns in OECD countries, focusing on the role of policy. Section 4 presents econometric 
evidence on the impact of these factors on trade and FDI. Finally, in Section 5, the results of this analysis 
are used to perform policy simulations. Details about empirical results (including their sensitivity to 
changes in empirical specifications) and the construction of the underlying data sets are provided in the 
Annex. The remainder of this section provides a summary of the main findings. 
1.2. Main findings and policy implications 
4. The analysis in this paper highlights that, despite extensive liberalisation of international 
transactions and international policy co-ordination (e.g. within the European Union) over the past two 
decades, there is scope for further reducing policy barriers to integration of global markets. The results of 
the empirical analysis suggest that border openness to trade and investment and competition-oriented 
domestic policies have important implications for OECD trade and FDI patterns. The main conclusions in 
each of the broad policy areas examined in the paper are reviewed below under four headings.  
1.2.1. Openness: formal trade and FDI restrictions 
5. Border barriers to manufactured goods trade are generally low in OECD countries, but remaining 
barriers continue to exert a negative influence on trade flows. The empirical results obtained in this paper 
suggest that eliminating remaining tariff and non-tariff barriers could increase exports of goods within the 
OECD by around 14 and 7 per cent, respectively. There is also some evidence that, in manufacturing, non-
tariff barriers may motivate so-called “tariff-jumping” FDI, aimed at bypassing those barriers while at the 
same time enjoying the protection that they ensure in the sheltered local markets. However, on balance the 
removal of border barriers in existing free-trade areas, such as the European Union (EU) Single Market or 
the North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA), is estimated to have boosted both goods trade and 
overall FDI flows among participating countries. Likewise, simulations suggest that prospective EU 
membership may be associated with trade flows increasing by around 10 per cent and inward FDI positions 
doubling for new EU members. By contrast, free-trade areas do not seem to have increased significantly 
cross-border supply of services, suggesting either that border barriers persist for such products or that 
border barriers play a minor role relative to the non-border barriers still hindering trade in services. 
6. FDI restrictions have declined substantially in most OECD countries over the past two decades 
but a number of countries (especially outside the European Union) still have a relatively restrictive 
environment in some important non-manufacturing industries, such as electricity, transport and telecoms. 
These restrictions often take the form of explicit limits on the foreign ownership of domestic firms and are 
estimated to curb significantly FDI stocks in protected countries. Aligning FDI restrictions on those of the 
most liberal country (the United Kingdom according to the indicators presented in this study) would 
ECO/WKP(2003)13 
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increase the OECD-wide inward FDI position by over one-sixth relative to baseline, with gains for 
individual countries proportional to the extent of current restrictions. 
7. There is some limited evidence that stable exchange-rate arrangements may favour market 
integration by positively affecting the inward FDI position of participating countries. Through this channel, 
countries that are member of currency unions (such as the European Monetary Union) experience further 
integration of their markets in both the union itself and globally. The complexity of the relationship 
between FDI and exchange-rate variability suggests, however, that this aggregate result may mask a 
variety of different responses of MNEs to the establishment of currency unions. 
1.2.2. Product market reforms 
8. Domestic product-market regulations that impose unnecessary costs on businesses and create 
barriers to entry exert a distinct negative influence on FDI. With potential foreign investors allocating their 
portfolio on the basis of expected relative returns, the countries with relatively restrictive and costly 
product-market regulations will tend to have lower stocks of foreign capital. Thus, product-market reforms 
that reduce the relative restrictiveness of regulations are likely to increase the level of inward FDI in a 
given country. Clearly all OECD countries cannot simultaneously increase their share of global inward 
FDI in this fashion, because a uniform move towards reform would leave relative positions unaffected. 
However, OECD-wide product-market reform can raise the overall stocks of inward and outward FDI 
outstanding, thereby increasing global integration. For instance, simulations based on estimation results 
suggest that the alignment of regulations on those of the most liberal OECD country would increase the 
OECD-wide inward FDI position by over 10 per cent. 
9. Restrictive product-market regulations are also found to curb bilateral export flows. Exports are 
negatively affected by both home and destination country regulations. Home regulations may reduce both 
productive efficiency and the range and quality of goods supplied in foreign markets (e.g. through their 
negative effects on entry and innovation). The implied distortions in the allocation of resources may reduce 
the country’s ability to export. Thus, regulatory reform in the home country is likely to positively affect 
exports. Restrictive regulations in the destination (importer) country also curb exports from the home 
country by making access to markets more difficult for foreign suppliers. Clearly, if all OECD countries 
were to simultaneously implement identical regulatory reforms (e.g. a simplification in administrative 
procedures that lowers costs in the same way in all countries) export market shares would remain 
unchanged. However, even in this unlikely scenario, there would be absolute gains in trade integration 
from a concerted global move towards reform because trade intensity (i.e. the ratio of bilateral trade flows 
to GDP) can rise for all countries. In practice, all else equal, a general convergence of regulation in the 
OECD area towards the regulatory environment of the most liberal country is estimated to increase within-
OECD exports by over 10 per cent. These effects of regulatory reform on trade integration and their likely 
positive repercussions on welfare would come on top of the likely improvements in welfare, employment 
and growth highlighted elsewhere (OECD, 2001a, 2002d and 2002e). 
10. In services trade, the combined negative influence of restrictive regulations in the exporting and 
the importing countries is even stronger, because it affects for instance the ability of the exporting country 
to sell air transport, tourism or banking services to a trading partner. The reason is that for such services 
transactions to develop inputs from both countries are needed. This special feature of services may help to 
explain why the volume of their trade is so much lower than the volume of trade in goods, even though 
other determinants of bilateral transactions unrelated to policy (such as proximity or size) appear to have 
the same effects on the two kinds of products. With regulations in both trading partners having broadly the 
same effect, unilateral or concerted efforts by OECD trading partners to implement significant competition 
and efficiency-enhancing reforms at both ends of the transactions are likely to increase the global volume 
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of trade in services. Simulations suggest that such increase could be over 30 per cent for the volume of 
within-OECD exports. 
1.2.4. Labour-market reforms 
11. Labour-market arrangements also have a bearing for trade and FDI outcomes. For instance, 
estimates suggest that strict employment protection legislation (EPL) and high tax wedges on labour 
income may sometimes affect the labour market in the home country in ways that curb its exports, for 
instance by making the reallocation of labour across firms, industries and occupations difficult. Similarly, 
by raising the cost of investment in the host country, they tend to lower its inward FDI. There are, 
however, important interactions between EPL and the institutional set up in the labour market. When 
collective bargaining and other labour market arrangements favour wage adjustments that fully offset the 
costs of EPL, as may happen in the polar cases of decentralised bargaining systems or highly “corporatist” 
regimes (i.e. regimes where bargaining is co-ordinated and centralised), the potentially negative effect on 
exports can be neutralised. In other regimes where such compensation is difficult, as in the case of 
industry-level negotiation, strict EPL is associated with significantly lower exports. By contrast, the 
collective bargaining regime can hardly moderate the negative influence of strict EPL on FDI. If EPL 
increases the risk/return ratio on foreign investment (e.g. due to increased uncertainty regarding costs), 
foreign investors are likely to choose locations where this ratio is lowest, irrespective of the potentially 
offsetting effect of the collective bargaining regime. Empirical estimates suggest that labour market 
reforms easing employment protection legislation and lowering tax wedges on labour income would boost 
global economic integration. For instance, an alignment of labour tax wedges on those of the country with 
the lowest wedge is estimated to increase OECD-wide exports by over 10 per cent. 
1.2.5. Infrastructure 
12. Improving network infrastructure (e.g. in telecommunications, transport and electricity) has 
ambiguous a priori effects on FDI, because inadequate infrastructure may motivate foreign investment in 
these industries. However, good infrastructure conditions are likely to be important for reducing transport 
and communication costs and increasing trade, especially in some services where international transactions 
require such conditions to be good in both origin and destination countries (e.g. freight, tourism, finance). 
Thus, policies that improve infrastructure building, either by ensuring efficient public investment or 
encouraging private investment, can significantly increase both the bilateral and global volumes of service 
trade. For instance, according to simulations an upgrading of infrastructure in OECD countries to the level 
of the best-endowed country could increase OECD-wide services trade by around 60 per cent. 
2. Recent trends in trade, FDI and the internationalisation of production 
13. Focusing on the OECD area, Figure 1 depicts stylised facts on what is commonly called 
“globalisation”. Over the past decade, both the trade intensity (defined as the sum of exports and imports 
over GDP) and the foreign investment intensity (defined as the outward FDI position over GDP) have 
increased significantly in the average OECD country.5 The upward trend was particularly pronounced since 
the early 1990s for FDI and trade in goods, which remained significantly more intense than service trade. 
The aim of this section is to illustrate the main cross-country and cross-industry features of these trends 
and highlight some of the questions that need to be addressed to understand the economic factors that 
                                                     
5. Inward and outward positions are multilateral measures of FDI activity that cumulate for each investor 
country the bilateral stocks held in all FDI partner (host) countries (henceforth, outstocks) and for each host 
country the bilateral stocks held by all partner (investor) countries (henceforth, instocks). 
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underlie these phenomena as well as the role that policy can play in favouring the trend towards OECD-
wide integration.  
1. Trade in goods is defined as the sum of exports and imports of goods realised between a reporting  country and 
    the OECD area. 
2. Trade in services is defined as the sum of exports and imports of services realised between a reporting country and
    the world (due to the lack of OECD-specific data, services trade  cannot be defined  relative to the OECD area).
3. FDI stock is the sum of inward and outward positions of the average country in the OECD area.
4. FDI flow is the sum of yearly investment inflows and outflows of the average country to the OECD area. 
5. Simple average of the ratios of OECD countries.
Source:  OECD.
Figure 1.
 Trade and FDI patterns in the OECD 
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2.1. Trends in FDI 
14. Most global international investment activity goes on among OECD countries and takes the form 
of ownership changes in existing enterprises (mergers and acquisitions, privatisation), with so-called 
“green-field” investment playing only a minor role (OECD, 2002f).6 In 1999, the OECD accounted for 
                                                     
6. FDI activity can in principle be decomposed into i) mergers and acquisitions, ii) greenfield investments, 
iii) reinvested earnings, and iv) capital transfers between related enterprises. In practice, available data 
rarely allow such decomposition to be made. 
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around 91 per cent of world investment outflows and 74 per cent of world inflows (UNCTAD, 2001). Over 
the same period, EU countries combined were both the largest recipients and the largest suppliers of FDI in 
the OECD area, followed by the United States, Japan, Canada and Switzerland (Figure 2). 
1. The charts are based on bilateral data. As the method used for valuing FDI positions varies across countries, the resulting shares
    are undervalued for countries that report book values (e.g. the United States).
Source:  OECD.
Figure2. Distribution of OECD FDI positions  in 19981
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15. The average share of FDI inflows in total business investment went from little more than 3 per 
cent over the 1980s to almost 11 per cent in the 1990s, bringing about a significant increase in the outward 
and inward positions of most OECD countries. Given the way these data are constructed (Box 2), part of 
this increase may be due to a revaluation of existing positions reflecting the sharp increase in equity prices 
over the same period (OECD, 2002f). Nonetheless, the upward trend in FDI flows points to a rising 
internationalisation of production over the 1990s. FDI activity dropped sharply in recent years, but most 
observers attribute the decline to transitory causes rather than to a reversal of the earlier decade-long 
upward trend.7 
 
Box 2. Trade and FDI data 
The database used in this paper combines information on foreign direct investment and foreign trade. 
Foreign direct investment 
Foreign direct investment is a category of international investment made by a resident entity in one country 
(direct investor) with the objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another country (direct 
investment enterprise). ”Lasting interest” implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor 
and the enterprise and a significant degree of influence by the direct investor on the management of the direct 
investment enterprise. Direct investment involves both the initial transaction between the two entities and all 
subsequent capital transactions between them and among affiliated enterprises, both incorporated and unincorporated. 
A foreign direct investment enterprise is an incorporated enterprise in which a foreign investor owns a certain 
percentage or more of the ordinary shares or voting power or an unincorporated enterprise in which a foreign investor 
has equivalent ownership. The present study takes advantage of the existence of two qualitatively different sets of 
data on foreign direct investment, and can thus look at the international investment activity from two perspectives: 
from the viewpoint of (“financial”) investment flows and stocks, and from the viewpoint of “real” activities of foreign 
affiliates in the OECD countries. The two data sets differ mainly due to their different coverage: while FDI flows and 
stocks relate to ownership of 10 per cent or more of the shares or voting power, the data on the activities of foreign 
affiliates include only enterprises with foreign ownership of 50 per cent or more. 
Investment flows and stocks 
Statistics on FDI transactions and positions are based on the OECD database developed by the Directorate for 
Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs (published under the title International Direct Investment Statistics 
Yearbook). These statistics are compiled according to the concepts used for balance of payments (flows) and 
international investment position (stocks) statistics. Both data sets are available for inward and outward investment 
with further breakdowns i) by partner country and ii) by economic sector (according to ISIC Rev. 3 classifications). 
Generally, information on inward flows and stocks and on outward flows and stocks is available. The data set 
used in the empirical analysis covers 28 OECD countries (Luxembourg and Belgium report together; data for 
Slovakia are not included) over the 1980-2000 period and hence comprises 756 country-partner pairs per year for a 
potential of 15 876 observations. However, some countries are not yet able to provide complete sets of statistics and, 
therefore, the panel is unbalanced.1 An attempt has been made to restore some of the missing data by using available 
antipodal bilateral data. 
                                                     
7. For instance OECD (2002f) considers the drop as a “correction“ of the investment and stock market bubble 
occurred at the turn of the century. High levels of FDI flows were also partly related to a flurry of 
unprecedented privatisation activity. 
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Substantial progress has been made towards the agreed international standards for FDI data compilation 
established by the IMF and the OECD. However, some OECD countries still deviate from the standards in terms of, 
for instance, the elements included in the disseminated data (income on equity, reinvested earnings and income on 
debt), the treatment of indirectly-owned investment enterprises or, to a minor extent, definitions used to identify 
direct investment enterprises resident in the reporting country. The majority of countries report data on investment 
positions based on book values, but some measure the positions in market values. These issues make the cross-
sectional comparability of the data somewhat problematic. 
Real activity 
The complementary approach to measure foreign direct investment is to use “real” data. The data used in the 
descriptive part of this study are drawn from a database developed by the OECD Directorate for Science, Technology 
and Industry and published in Measuring Globalization: The Role of Multinationals in OECD Economies that stores 
information on the activities of foreign affiliates. These data are based on surveys of foreign-owned enterprises and 
are disaggregated by investing country and by industry.2 The reported information includes turnover, employment and 
value added. Research and development expenditures and intra-firm exports and imports are also reported, but their 
coverage is very limited. 
The cross-sectional coverage of this database is limited to 21 reporting countries, 18 of which can be used for 
multilateral and 12 for bilateral analysis. Each of these countries reports transactions with 28 partner countries. In 
general, data pertain to the 1990-1999 period. For most countries, however, data are available for only a few years or 
even just a single year. 
Foreign affiliates are included in the database if foreign investors have majority shareholdings in their capital. 
Hence, the activities covered represent a subset of all activities originated by “financial” foreign direct investment. 
Also, the information on real activities is collected at the level of the company and is classified accordingly (i.e. all 
activities of the affiliate are classified according to its main activity), while industrial statistics are usually based on 
establishment-level surveys. Therefore, direct comparability of employment, turnover and value-added in foreign 
affiliates to the corresponding sectoral or national account aggregates is impossible. Selected basic ratios relating 
these foreign affiliates’ statistics to industrial statistics are used for descriptive purposes only in this study. 
Foreign trade 
Information on international trade has been collected from three sources. Data on trade in goods come from the 
OECD publication International Trade by Commodity Statistics and match the same format as the financial FDI data, 
i.e. 28 countries and partners during the period 1980-2000. Information on trade in services with partner 
disaggregation has been taken from the OECD Statistics on International Trade in Services 1999-2000. Information is 
available for two years only, the data covering 20 countries and 27 partners. Data on trade in services by sector 
(bilateral information is not available) are based on the OECD Statistics on International Trade in Services 1990-
1999. These data have been so far used for descriptive purposes only. 
_________ 
1. For the period 1980-2000, no geographic breakdown is available for the stock data for the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic 
Union, Spain, Ireland and Turkey; for outward stocks for Hungary and Mexico; and for outflows for Greece and Mexico. 
2. Industries are coded according to ISIC Rev.3 classification 
 
 
16. The general move towards internationalisation has been matched by an increasing cross-country 
dispersion of the amount of FDI supplied and hosted relative to the size of the investor and host countries 
(Figure 3). By the year 2000, the variances of the instock and outstock as ratios to GDP among OECD 
countries were larger than two decades earlier, though less so for outstocks. Figure 3 also shows that a 
number of host countries have relatively large instock ratios, while outstock ratios tend to be more evenly 
distributed across investor countries. Focusing on inward FDI positions, Figure 4 shows the average 
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instock to GDP ratios of individual countries in the 1980s and 1990s. It suggests that the largest 
contribution to the increase in the cross-country dispersion of the OECD instock was provided by Ireland, 
Belgium and the transition countries, in which inward FDI surged during the 1990s. 
1. The box plot shows, in each year, the median OECD value of the inward or outward stock of FDI (the
horizontal line in the box), the third and second quartiles of the cross-country distribution (the edges of each
box) and the extreme values (the two whiskers extending from the box). Dots identify outlier observations.
2. Data in parentheses are unweighted average GDP ratios.
Source:  OECD.
Figure 3. Inward and outward FDI positions: trends and cross-country dispersion1
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1. Average values over the two periods. For countries where FDI position data are not available, values of bilateral stocks 
    reported by their OECD partners were summed up to obtain an approximate measure of multilateral FDI stocks.
Source:  OECD.
Figure 4. Inward FDI positions in OECD countries, 1980s and 1990s1
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17. The variance of the multilateral measures masks very different cross-country patterns at the 
bilateral level. First, in 1998 (the latest year for which bilateral data are reasonably complete) the number 
of host partners varied across investing countries, ranging from below 10 for Hungary and Turkey to 
above 20 for many EU countries, the United States and Canada. Second, the extent to which countries 
geographically specialise their FDI across a given number of partners also differs. While many countries 
tend to evenly distribute their FDI across partners, some of them (e.g. Canada, Korea, Denmark and the 
United Kingdom) tend to concentrate FDI on a few host countries. Similarly, some countries (Austria, 
Canada, the United Kingdom and Mexico) mostly host FDI originating from just a few countries.8 18. 
The indicators depicted in Figure 5 report patterns of geographical specialisation focusing on inward (and 
outward) FDI from (to) the European Union, the United States and Japan -- where specialisation is defined 
in terms of a country hosting (supplying) a share of FDI from an investor country (to a host country) larger 
than the share hosted (supplied) by the OECD. Geographical factors are clearly important in explaining 
patterns of FDI instocks (panel A): most European countries specialise in hosting FDI originating from EU 
countries; Canada, Mexico and Ireland specialise in hosting FDI from the United States; and Pacific shore 
countries specialise in hosting FDI from the United States and/or Japan. Interestingly, however, the degree 
of geographical specialisation varies significantly both within the same area and relative to countries 
located outside the area. For instance, Belgium, Spain and Ireland show a clear specialisation in 
hosting FDI from other EU countries, while Greece, Iceland and the United Kingdom appear to be less 
specialised. On the other hand, the United Kingdom, Spain, Belgium and Turkey seem better placed to 
receive FDI from the United States than Greece, the Czech Republic, Portugal, Iceland and Austria. On the 
                                                     
8. See the Annex for details on number of partners and geographical specialisation (based on the degree of 
kurtosis of the distribution of bilateral FDI). 
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whole, the dispersion of specialisation patterns suggests that geographical factors are important, but they 
cannot explain the entire variability in the data.9 
1. Inward geographical specialisation is defined as the revealed tendency of a country to host a share of FDI from an investor country (European Union,
    Japan, United States), which is larger than the share hosted by the OECD as a whole. 
    Outward geographical specialisation is defined as the revealed tendency of a country to invest a share of FDI in a host country (European Union, Japan, 
    United States), which is larger than the share  invested by the OECD as a whole.
    A country is "geographically specialised" in investing to (or in hosting from) another country if the indicator is above unity. 
    For computational details, see Annex.
* Data for FDI from Japan are for 1991-1994.
Source:  OECD.
Figure 5. Patterns of geographical specialisation in inward and outward FDI1
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9. Geographical specialisation indicators for FDI inflows and outflows are broadly characterised by the same 
patterns. However, inflows indicators suggest that a “catch up” phenomenon is taking place in some 
countries, such as Greece vis-à-vis the European Union and Korea vis-à-vis Japan; and outflow indicators 
show that several countries (including a few EU members, Canada, the United States, New Zealand and 
Korea) had developed a specialisation in investing in Japan over the 1995-1998 period. 
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2.2. Patterns in activities of foreign affiliates: employment and output 
19. The counterpart of FDI is the activity of foreign affiliates in host countries. Foreign affiliates can 
be aimed at replicating the production of some of the same goods and services in both the home and host 
countries (so-called “horizontal” FDI) or at fragmenting the production of a good or service into stages 
located in different countries (so-called “vertical” FDI). As noted above, FDI flows can finance the 
acquisition of a local firm by a parent located abroad, expand the activity of an existing foreign affiliate or 
create a new foreign-owned firm in the local market. However, the market targeted by the parent company 
is not necessarily located in the country (and industry) that reports the FDI transaction. For instance, FDI 
can be directed at affiliates of the parent company that act merely as financial intermediaries in redirecting 
the funds to a third country (or industry).10 Therefore, the share of economic activity accounted for by 
foreign affiliates in the local market (and in each industry) is ultimately the best indicator of the actual 
degree of internationalisation of production in OECD countries. 
20. Despite the limitations of available data in this area (Box 2), the information concerning total 
output of foreign affiliates in host countries suggests that the surge in FDI flows observed during the 1990s 
was indeed mirrored by a significant increase in the activity of foreign affiliates in the OECD area (OECD, 
2002f).11 This increase was particularly noticeable in the United States and the United Kingdom, in which 
both the value of foreign-affiliate production and its share in total OECD foreign affiliate production rose, 
more significantly so in the former country.  
21. To illustrate cross-country patterns in the activity of foreign affiliates, Figure 6 shows the shares 
of total foreign-affiliate turnover and employment in the manufacturing and service sectors of OECD 
countries for which the data are available. The statistics report the situation in the late 1990s, and the 
shares are computed relative to total business value added and employment to control for possible 
inconsistencies in the way foreign affiliate and domestic firms are classified in the two broad aggregates 
(see Box 2). The activity of foreign affiliates differs significantly across countries, with employment 
generally accounting for from 1 to 4 per cent of total employment and turnover being equivalent to 10 to 
25 per cent of total value added. Exceptions are Hungary, which has much higher shares of foreign 
affiliates in both manufacturing and services; Belgium, which has a much higher share in services 
(manufacturing is not covered in this country); and, at the other extreme, Japan, which has a particularly 
low presence of foreign affiliates in both manufacturing and services. The data suggest that in most 
countries the presence of foreign affiliates in services is either equivalent or higher than in manufacturing. 
This is not the case, however, in France, Poland and Hungary.  
                                                     
10. Consistent with international guidelines, statistics on FDI outstocks and outflows reflect the countries (and 
industries) with which the parent company has direct positions and transactions, rather than according to 
the countries (and industries) of the affiliates whose operations the parent ultimately owns or controls. 
Borga and Mataloni (2001) argue that the bias in U.S. statistics of the geographical (and industry) 
distribution of FDI outflows and outstocks implied by this reporting convention is rising over time, due to 
the increasing role played by such financial holdings located in strategic partner countries. 
11. Cross-country and time-series analysis of the activity of foreign affiliates is hampered by several 
limitations of the available data. For most countries, only a limited number of periods during the 1990s are 
covered. Moreover, differences in reporting conventions make cross-country comparisons difficult. Finally, 
the industry classification of foreign affiliates is often inconsistent with the reporting conventions of 
industrial statistics. Therefore, it is generally not possible to relate foreign-affiliate production or 
employment to total production or employment in a given industry. 
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1. Activities of foreign affiliates are classified into industries according to the principal activity of the affiliate. Data are means over available years.
   The country coverage in manufacturing and services is different.
2. Value added is total value added (gross domestic product) in the reporting country. 
3. Turnover and employment of foreign affiliates in manufacturing is an aggregate corresponding to Total Manufacturing (ISIC rev.3).
4. Turnover and employment of foreign affiliates in services is an aggregate corresponding to Total Services (ISIC rev.3).
Source:  OECD.
Panel A: Turnover as a per cent of business sector value added 2
Panel B: Employment as a per cent of business sector employment
Figure 6. Activity of foreign affiliates in selected OECD countries,1 1990s
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22. A closer look at the industry distribution of foreign affiliates within the manufacturing and non-
manufacturing industries of the countries for which data are available suggests that internationalisation 
tends to be concentrated in a few activities (Figure 7). In manufacturing industries, their presence is 
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particularly significant in ICT industries, petroleum products, chemicals and motor vehicles, while it is 
lower in food, textile and wood products and, not surprisingly, in industries traditionally sheltered from 
foreign influence by national governments (basic metals, heavy transport equipment). In the service 
industries, on average, foreign affiliates’ presence (measured by the employment share) is strongest in 
distribution, followed at a distance by business services and hotels and restaurants (i.e. tourism). In other 
industries -- such as utilities, construction, telecoms and, especially, transport -- the degree of 
internationalisation is generally low.  
1. Simple average. The data cover 19 OECD countries. Available years and sector coverage differ across countries.
2. Activities of foreign affiliates are classified into industries according to the principal activity of the affiliate. Sectoral
    employment is consistent with this classification.
Source: Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, OECD.
Figure 7. Percentage share of employment in foreign affiliates in selected industries
Panel A. Manufacturing2
Panel B. Non-manufacturing2
OECD average,1 1990s
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2.3. Trade developments: goods and services 
23. As pointed out in Figure 1, both goods and service trade flows rose faster than GDP over the past 
decade in the OECD area. At the same time, the intensity of trade in services remained much lower than in 
goods. Underlying these OECD-wide stylised facts are wide cross-country differences in export and import 
intensities and in the geographical specialisation of the exports of individual OECD countries.  
2.3.1. Goods trade 
24. Figure 8 shows average intensities of goods trade within the OECD area for individual member 
countries over the 1980s and the 1990s. The intensity of exports to OECD countries (defined as the share 
of exports in GDP) increased in all countries except Japan,12 partly reflecting a stronger propensity of the 
Japanese economy to export to non-member Asian countries over the past decade (panel A). The increase 
was particularly noticeable in Ireland and Mexico, which almost doubled their OECD export intensity 
between the two periods, but significant increases also took place in Canada and the northern European 
countries. It is also known that the increase in OECD export intensities over the 1990s has been marked for 
transition member countries. Developments in both European and North American countries suggest that 
free-trade agreements such as the EU Single Market and NAFTA may have borne their fruits over the 
1990s. A cursory view at the figure also suggests that both the location and the size of the countries are 
important factors determining the propensity to export. For instance, economies that are large, such as 
Japan and the United States, or geographically remote relative to major OECD markets, such as Australia, 
have a relatively low export intensity, reflecting either a wide internal market or high transport costs. By 
contrast, economies that are small and well-connected to large neighbouring countries, such as Belgium 
and the Netherlands, have high export intensities. However, location and size cannot fully explain the 
cross-country patterns of export intensities, because there are small countries with low intensities, such as 
Greece, and relatively remote countries with high intensities, such as New Zealand and Korea.  
Figure 8.
 Intensity of goods trade within the OECD area, 1980s and 1990s
Panel A: Export intensity1
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12. Data for the 1980-1990 period is incomplete or missing for transition countries and Korea. 
 ECO/WKP(2003)13 
 23 
 
1. Export intensity is defined as the ratio of exports to GDP.
2. Import penetration is defined as the ratio of imports to domestic absorption.
Source:  OECD.
Panel B: Import penetration2
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25. As with export intensities, part of the cross-country variation in import penetration rates (defined 
as the ratio of imports to domestic absorption) appears to be related to location and size, with small and 
well-connected countries tending to have higher penetration than large or remote countries (Figure 8, 
panel B). Again, Australia, the United States and Japan stand at the tail of the distribution, with their 
imports accounting for no more than around 10 per cent of domestic absorption, while some European 
countries and Canada show the highest penetration to foreign goods. 
26. The increase in trade intensities over the past two decades has probably been matched by rising 
intra-firm trade related to the widening role played by MNEs in the OECD area (OECD, 2002d). Indirect 
evidence of this is provided by the rising share of intra-industry trade, especially in transition countries, 
which parallels the sharp increase in FDI inflows over the same period. Direct measures of intra-firm trade, 
which are available for only a few countries (notably the United States, Japan and some Nordic countries), 
also point in this direction. The available data suggest that intra-firm trade among MNEs and foreign 
affiliates located in high-income OECD countries mainly involved the export of final goods for sale in 
local markets, reflecting horizontal-type FDI, while trade between MNEs located in high-income countries 
and their affiliates in middle-income OECD countries also involves imports of intermediate goods to be 
further manufactured and sold in the country of the parent company (or other countries), reflecting vertical-
type FDI. 
27. As with FDI, looking at the geographical distribution of bilateral trade flows within the OECD 
can provide clues on some of the factors determining the attractiveness of a country to its trading partners. 
Using the same indicator as for FDI, Figure 9 shows the patterns of geographical specialisation over the 
1990s in exporting to the European Union, Japan and the United States. The relative distance of each 
country from the three destinations seems to matter. Japan is the favourite destination of exports from 
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Australia, New Zealand and Korea; and the United States is the favourite destination of exports from 
Canada and Mexico. Exports from European countries are more uniformly distributed, though still biased 
towards EU destinations. Clearly, as neighbouring countries are often linked by free-trade agreements 
(such as the EU Single Market or NAFTA), the transport cost effect underlying these patterns is likely to 
act in parallel with a free-trade area effect (see below). 
1. Geographical specialisation in goods trade is defined as the revealed tendency of a country to export a share of exports of its 
    total exports to a partner country, which is larger than the share exported to that country by the OECD in total OECD exports.
    A country is "geographically specialised" when the indicator is above unity. For computational details, see Annex.
Source: OECD.
Figure 9. Patterns of geographical specialisation in goods exports to the
Average of the 1990s
European Union, Japan and the United States1
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2.3.2. Trade in services 
28. Figure 10 shows the average industry structure of OECD trade in services in 1999 as recorded in 
balance of payments statistics on multilateral trade, which cover only a subset of modes of cross-border 
services supply (notably excluding commercial presence and movement of individuals) (see Box 2).13 
According to these figures, most services trade, whether exporting or importing, relates to tourism (around 
30 per cent) and transport (around 25 per cent), followed by business services (12 per cent) and financial 
services (6 per cent). The composition of services trade is similar at the individual country level.14 In other 
words, a large share of trade in services is related to international movements of people and manufactured 
goods. Yet, the most striking feature of services trade is that trade intensity is much lower than for goods, 
with both goods exports and imports several times higher than the corresponding flows in services in all 
OECD countries for which data are available.15 Even though such gaps could be narrowed once cross-
border supply through commercial presence (i.e. FDI) is taken into account, differences in the trade 
intensities of goods and services are puzzling.  
29. Lower services trade intensities are often related to the cost of transport, which is, for some 
services, much higher than the cost of shipping manufactured goods.16 Also, the influence of geographical 
and structural factors, such as location and size of the economy, on trade in services and goods may differ. 
Cross-country patterns of export intensities and import penetration ratios suggest that these factors play 
partly the same role as for trade in goods (Figure 11). Trade is strong in relatively small and well-located 
countries -- such as Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Ireland -- and weak in relatively large or remote 
countries -- such as the United States, Japan and Australia. However, these patterns are less clear than for 
goods trade and, indeed, the cross-country correlation between export intensities in goods and services is 
relatively low (around 0.2), though the correlation of import penetration ratios is higher (around 0.6). This 
suggests that other forces are impinging on the openness of OECD economies to trade in services. 
                                                     
13. Balance of payments statistics on services cover cross-border supply (e.g. freight and communications) and 
consumption abroad (e.g. tourism). They exclude the exchange of services that take place through 
commercial presence (i.e. the activity of foreign affiliates) and movement of individuals (i.e. temporary 
presence of service suppliers). 
14. Unfortunately, no industry breakdown is available for bilateral service trade. 
15. The ratio of manufacturing to services trade flows generally ranged from 3 to 6 in most countries, but in 
some extreme cases, like Mexico, trade in manufacturing was even 10 times higher. See the Annex for 
more details. 
16. For instance, services provided by a barber are hardly tradeable between cities or regions within a country, 
not to mention across borders. However, the provision of many other services, including some of the most 
dynamic ones over the past two decades (such as communication, financial intermediation and business 
services) involves lower transportation costs, which are further decreasing as information and 
communication technologies (ICT) spread out. Moreover, ICT are also decreasing transportation costs for 
services that were traditionally not tradeable, such as retail distribution (see, for instance, OECD 2001b). 
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Panel A:
 Exports3
Panel B: Imports3
1. Service trade reported by balance of payments statistics includes only cross-border supply and 
   consumption abroad. Service supplied through commercial presence or movement of individuals
   are excluded.
2. Simple average.
3. Ratio of exports or imports in each industry to total exports or imports.
Source: OECD.
Figure 10. Composition of services trade in the OECD area,1 1999
OECD average2
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1. Export intensity is defined as the ratio of exports to GDP.
2. Import penetration is defined as the ratio of imports to domestic absorption.
Source: OECD.
Panel A: Export intensity1
Figure 11.
 Intensity of global trade in services, 1980s and 1990s
Panel B: Import penetration2
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2.4. Twin developments in FDI and trade 
30. The discussion of trends and patterns in FDI and trade offers prima facie evidence that the two 
phenomena are closely linked: both increased sharply over the past decade; both seem to be at least partly 
affected by factors related to distance, location and size of the economy; and in some cases trade openness 
seems to go hand in hand with high FDI and foreign affiliate activity, such as in Ireland and Belgium. 
Table 1 provides further evidence concerning this stylised fact at a finer level of detail. It reports the 
correlations between different measures of bilateral trade and bilateral FDI over the period 1980-2000 as 
well as in sub-period averages. All correlations are positive and significant at conventional levels, with 
particularly high coefficients between trade measures and FDI outstocks and instocks.  
Bilateral FDI measures Outward position
Inward 
position
Outward 
investment
Inward 
investment
Outward
position 
(% of GDP)
Outward 
investment
(% of GDP)
Bilateral trade measures
  A. All available years
Manufacturing exports 0.64 0.57 0.39 0.34
(5998) (5963) (7930) (7610)
Manufacturing imports 0.59 0.63 0.34 0.37
(5997) (5961) (7930) (7610)
Services exports b 0.81 0.83 0.50 0.58
(344) (347) (559) (498)
Services imports b 0.77 0.67 0.45 0.53
(344) (347) (559) (498)
Total exports 0.64 0.58 0.36 0.40
(manufacturing plus services) (344) (347) (559) (498)
Total imports 0.61 0.63 0.35 0.41
(manufacturing plus services) (344) (347) (559) (498)
  B. Average 1990-2000
Manufacturing exports (% of GDP) 0.73 0.71
(298) (321)
  C. Average 1998-2000
Total exports (% of GDP) 0.61 0.57
(67) (76)
a) Number of observations in parenthesis
    All correlations are significant at 5 per cent levels
b)  Balance of payments definition.
Source: OECD.
Table 1. Bivariate correlations between bilateral trade and FDIa
 
31. Although these correlations may imply a testable hypothesis that to some extent trade and FDI 
may be driven by the same set of economic factors, they are not necessarily evidence in favour of 
complementarity between FDI and trade. As discussed in the next section, at the firm or industry level the 
relationship between FDI and manufacturing trade crucially depends on whether FDI is aimed at accessing 
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foreign markets or fragmenting production in stages. Aggregate evidence concerning FDI and trade is, 
therefore, the result of conflicting influences and may only be interpreted as suggesting that, overall, one 
type of FDI dominates the other or, alternatively, that both FDI and trade are correlated to a third variable 
(e.g. income). By contrast, service trade and FDI can be expected a priori to be complementary, because 
establishing commercial presence abroad generally brings stronger service trade in terms of transport 
(e.g. supplying goods to foreign affiliates in the distribution sector), communications (e.g. data transactions 
with foreign affiliates in the financial, telecommunications or tourism sectors), etc. FDI in the services 
sectors indeed accounts for an increasing share of total FDI flows (up to 65 per cent at the end of the 
1990s).17 In this connection, it is interesting to note that, among the correlations in Table 1, those between 
FDI and services exports and imports (which due to lack of data focus on the most recent period) are the 
highest. 
2.5. Summing up 
32. The review of trends and cross-country patterns in FDI and trade in this section has provided 
some facts and, at the same time, opened up questions to be explored in the empirical analysis of the next 
sections. Trade and FDI are closely related and appear to be driven by largely the same set of geographical, 
structural and economic factors (such as size, income and location). However, neither the increase in the 
intensity and variance of trade and FDI intensities over time nor their patterns of geographical 
specialisation are fully explained by these factors. Differences observed in goods and service trade 
intensities, as well as cross-country patterns of services trade, can hardly be explained by transport costs 
and other structural and economic factors alone, which seem to have at least partially similar effects on 
both kinds of trade. Policies may, therefore, play an important role both directly and indirectly (e.g. 
through the effect of free-trade agreements on market size and trade and investment costs).  
3. Policy and other determinants of trade and international investment 
33. Two broad sets of factors jointly affect trade and FDI: non-policy factors -- including the effects 
of gravity (e.g. market size and distance) and factor proportions (i.e. relative endowments of different 
inputs) -- and policy factors. The influence of these factors (i.e. the sign of the relationship and its 
intensity) is not necessarily the same across FDI and trade. In particular, it may depend on whether FDI is 
of the horizontal or vertical type (Box 3). Moreover, their influence may also differ in some cases across 
trade in goods and trade in services.  
34. With an eye to the interdependency between trade and FDI, this section principally looks at key 
policy factors, grouping them into four categories: openness, product-market regulation, labour-market 
arrangements and infrastructure. Some of these policy channels restrict market access by exporters and 
foreign investors. For instance, non-tariff barriers and FDI restrictions raise border obstacles to trade and 
investment. Other border and non-border policies make trade and investment unprofitable, for instance by 
increasing the relative cost of foreign versus home goods (e.g. tariffs or regulations that raise production 
costs) or decreasing the net returns of MNEs when they invest abroad. Finally, policies can also raise the 
overall cost of the transaction by affecting the costs of inputs that both the exporter and importer must use 
in order to implement the exchange (e.g. transport or communication services). Alternatively, policies can 
facilitate trade and FDI, for example by creating areas of free trade, improving the business environment in 
which exporters and MNEs operate or reducing the cost of transactions through the development of the 
necessary infrastructure.18 This section shows by means of newly-developed indicators that approaches 
                                                     
17. See OECD (2002f). 
18. Policies can also affect trade and FDI indirectly, through their effect on factor proportions, for example by 
improving the quality of a country’s infrastructure capital or the skills of its labour force. 
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often differ across countries in each of the four policy categories and, when possible, offers prima facie 
evidence that these differences may be relevant for trade and FDI.  
 
Box 3. Trade and different types of FDI 
As pointed out by recent research, the interdependence of trade and FDI derives from the fact that the decision to 
export or invest abroad for producing locally is increasingly taken by the same unit, the multinational enterprise. This 
is clearest in the so-called “knowledge-capital” theory of the MNE (Markusen, 2002; Markusen and Maskus, 2001), 
which builds on previous work by Dunning (1981) and Buckley and Casson (1985). This theory notes that three types 
of firms exist in each country: purely domestic firms, which have headquarters and plants that produce only at home 
for local or export markets; the horizontal MNEs, which have headquarters at home and production plants both at 
home and abroad that produce the same goods; and the vertical MNEs, which fragment different stages of production 
by having headquarters at home and production plants in different foreign countries that produce different 
intermediate or final goods. Since the objective of the horizontal MNEs is to access foreign markets, trading or 
investing abroad are two substitute activities. They will choose one or the other depending on their relative returns, 
which depend among other things on the cost of trade, the cost of FDI and the firm-level economies of scale they can 
enjoy by duplicating production plants in foreign countries.1 By contrast, the objective of vertical MNEs is to take 
advantage of cross-country comparative advantage patterns by locating plants in different countries in order to 
specialise in different stages of production. Therefore, trade and FDI are complementary activities: vertical MNEs 
will typically export components to foreign affiliates and re-export to the home (or other) markets the goods produced 
abroad. Recent evidence suggests that horizontal MNEs may be prevalent in the OECD area, partly reflecting the 
increasing similarity in factor costs and endowments among member countries (OECD, 2002d). However, MNEs’ 
strategies have also been shown to vary across OECD countries, with horizontal strategies dominating in the United 
States (Markusen and Maskus, 1999) and vertical strategies dominating in Sweden (Mathä, 1999) and France 
(Soubaya Camatchy Ariguelou, 2002). See OECD (2002g) for a discussion of the relationship between trade and FDI. 
________________ 
1. Firm-level economies of scale arise when two-plant firms have fixed costs that are less than the double those of a single-
plant firm. Firm-level economies of scale and trade costs are crucial elements for explaining the existence of horizontal 
FDI, as first pointed out by Markusen (1984). 
 
3.1. Openness 
35. As noted above, openness of a country to trade and FDI is assessed here in terms of policies that 
create (or eliminate) border barriers for exporters or investors, measured by indicators of tariff and non-
tariff barriers, statutory restrictions to FDI and multilateral agreements that create areas of free trade 
among signatory countries. 
3.1.1. Tariff and non-tariff barriers 
36. Figure 12 reports the evolution of average (import-weighted) most-favoured-nation (MFN) tariff 
rates and import coverage of non-tariff barriers from 1988 to 1996, the latest year for which time-series 
data are available.19 The conclusion of global and regional trade agreements (Box 4) during this period was 
reflected in a decline of both non-tariff and, to a lesser extent, tariff barriers within the OECD area. 
                                                     
19. Non-tariff barriers include so-called “core” measures, such as price controls (voluntary export restraints, 
variable charges, anti-dumping and countervailing actions) and quantitative restrictions (non-automatic 
licensing, export restraints, quotas and prohibitions). See OECD (1997b) for details. 
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However, cross-country differences in average barriers still persist. Indeed, using a recent data set that 
includes a wider set of tariffs at the bilateral level, Figure 13 shows that in 2001 the dispersion of average 
(unweighted) applied tariff rates was indeed wide across OECD country pairs. This reflects tariff 
discrimination across trading partners, which may well contribute to explaining differences in bilateral 
trade intensities among OECD countries.20  
Box 4. Trade agreements 
Almost all countries participate in one or more regional agreements, either as regional members or by virtue of 
bilateral agreements between regional groups and individual countries. In addition, there are bilateral agreements 
between countries (e.g. the accord between the United States and Chile). These agreements involve preferential trade 
provisions. However, the degree of integration they imply varies considerably. The main agreements can be 
classified, in order of increasing integration, as follows: 
1. Agreements to consult and co-operate, without any binding harmonisation of policies, such as the Asia 
Pacific Economic Co-operation Group (APEC), signed in 1989, or the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), signed in 1967 (whose members are currently planning to create a free trade area). 
2. Free-trade areas, in which trade is liberalised within the group, but no common external tariff is adopted, 
such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), signed in 1994, the European Free Trade Area 
(EFTA), signed in 1960, and numerous bilateral agreements. Such arrangements require the establishment of 
rules of origin for imported products. They may cover different sets of transactions and imply different levels 
of integration among signatory countries. For instance, NAFTA includes both trade and FDI provisions. 
3. Customs unions, whose members agree to common external tariffs, such as Mercado Común del Sur 
(MERCOSUR), signed in 1995, and several other agreements in developing countries. 
4. Common markets, with free movement of labour and capital, and where economic integration transcends a 
customs union towards a fuller harmonisation of economic regulations, such as the 1992 European Single 
Market. 
5. Economic unions, involving full harmonisation across a range of economic policies, a direction taken in 
1998 by the European Union with the Maastricht treaty and the single currency. 
Economic theory suggests that preferential trade liberalisation can increase welfare when it results in “trade creation” 
-- trade that is consistent with comparative advantage -- or reduce welfare in the case of “trade diversion” -- when 
trade is diverted to less efficient partner countries. Dynamic gains resulting from scale economies and increased 
competition are also important, as is the potential for “deeper integration” amongst participating countries. On the 
other hand, complex rules of origin can lead to high administrative costs and possibly corruption. Another point of 
contention is whether regional blocs are “building blocks” or a “stumbling blocks” towards multilateral liberalisation. 
Regional integration is, in principle, contrary to the fundamental GATT/WTO principle of non-discrimination, but the 
WTO does allow such agreements in practice as long as substantially all trade is liberalised (art. XXIV). For more 
details, see OECD (2001c and 2002h), Panagariya (1999) and Hoekman and Schiff (2002) 
                                                     
20. Multilateral tariff and non-tariff barriers are derived from detailed data on ad valorem MFN tariff rates 
and the frequency of non-tariff barriers in 6-digit industries of the Harmonised System of Classification 
(UNCTAD, 1998). The data are aggregated using average 1998 OECD import weights up to the 2-digit 
ISIC Rev. 3 level and average 1998 OECD value-added weights thereafter. Information about cross-
country differentials in import shares for different goods (net of intra-EU imports) was exploited to 
differentiate trade barriers across EU countries. Bilateral tariffs are based on the new MacMaps data 
produced jointly by the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales and the 
International Trade Center (Bouet et al., 2001, 2002). The MacMaps data report information on MFN 
duties, other ad valorem duties, specific duties, preferential margins, prohibitions, tariff quotas and anti-
dumping (specific or ad valorem) duties. These are aggregated to the 2-digit ISIC Rev. 3 level using 
average import weights differentiated by group of trading partners. Despite the use of average import 
weights in aggregation, both the multilateral and the bilateral indicators may tend to underestimate the 
extent of trade barriers if import shares are depressed in industries with high barriers. See Annex 1 for 
details. 
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1. OECD calculations based on UNCTAD data. Aggregation from 2-digit level tariffs to national level using sectoral 
   value-added weights. See annex for details on sources and methodologies.
Source: UNCTAD, OECD.
Figure 12. Manufacturing trade liberalisation in the OECD area, 1988-1996
Panel A.
 Import coverage of non-tariff barriers1
Panel B. Import weighted MFN tariff rates1
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1. The box plot shows, for each country, the variation in the tariffs imposed on imports from partner countries. 
The median value of the tariff is depicted by the horizontal line in the box, the third and second quartiles of the 
cross-country distribution by the edges of each box, and the extreme values by the two whiskers extending from
the box. Dots identify outlier observations.
2. ISIC rev.3 two-digit industry-level tariffs were aggregated to national level using the weights of the OECD 
import product mix.
3. National levels represent a simple average of ISIC rev.3 two-digit industry-level tariffs.
Source:  International Trade Center, Geneva and CEPII, Paris.
Figure 13. Median and dispersion of bilateral applied tariffs by importing countries in 20011
Panel A. Dispersion reflecting the compound effect of regional preferences and OECD import product mix2
Panel B. Dispersion reflecting only regional preferences3
(Average values in parentheses)
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37. Trade agreements tend to match and accentuate the gravity forces (see below) that affect bilateral 
trade among signatory countries.21 The positive influence of free-trade areas on trade could be less 
pronounced for services, since non-border barriers may be more relevant for this kind of products. 
Suggestive evidence on the positive effects of regional agreements on bilateral goods trade flows among 
signatory countries is provided in Figure 14, which shows the change in geographical specialisation of 
exports to the European Union, the United States and Japan over the past two decades. With a few 
exceptions, EU countries have increased their specialisation towards the European Union, probably 
reflecting increasing market integration under the Single Market Programme. 
 
1. Geographical specialisation in goods trade is defined as the revealed tendency of a country to export a share of exports of its 
   total exports to a partner country, which is larger than the share exported to that country by the OECD. 
   For computational details, see Annex.
2. Change in the average value of the specialisation indicator in the two sub periods. A positive change implies an increase in
   geographical specialisation. 
   Data are ranked on the European Union figures.
Source: OECD.
Figure 14. Changes in the geographical specialisation of goods exports to the
 European Union, Japan and the United States, 1990s vs  1980s 1,2      
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38. In addition to influencing trade openness, tariff barriers can also affect bilateral FDI 
relationships. Vertical FDI aimed at re-importing to the home country or exporting to third-party countries 
                                                     
21. Moreover, by enlarging the size of the market accessed at equal trade cost by third-party countries, they 
could also tend to increase bilateral trade between the free-trade area and non-signatory countries, all the 
more so if non-signatory countries are themselves members of a different free-trade area (because the 
reverse phenomenon may apply). In particular, intra-industry trade may increase due to enhanced 
economies of scale. 
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the final or intermediate goods produced by foreign affiliates can be depressed by high bilateral tariffs 
between the host and investor country or between the host and third-party countries. On the other hand, 
high bilateral tariffs can generate so-called “tariff-jumping” behaviour by MNEs. Horizontal FDI that is 
prompted by tariff-jumping could be positively related to the level of tariffs in the host country. The same 
kind of relationship could a fortiori be expected between horizontal FDI and non-tariff barriers, since the 
latter often raise absolute barriers to market access (e.g. quantitative restrictions). Therefore, non-tariff 
barriers are likely to have a positive effect on FDI. 
39. The effect of free-trade agreements on bilateral FDI transactions is more complex.22 By 
substantially lowering trade costs among signatory countries, free-trade agreements make trade more 
advantageous than local production, tending to reduce horizontal FDI flows at any given level of fixed 
costs. However, by enlarging the overall size of the market in the free-trade area, these agreements also 
increase the scope for reaping firm-level economies of scale through horizontal FDI.23 Moreover, the 
reduction in trade costs tends to increase vertical FDI flows that are aimed at re-exporting products into the 
home country or into other signatory countries. Furthermore, free-trade agreements tend to have a positive 
effect on horizontal FDI flows from non-signatory countries, because they enlarge the size of the market 
that they can access by producing locally at any given level of trade costs.24 In conclusion, the effect of 
free-trade agreements on FDI flows among signatory countries is ambiguous, while it is presumably 
positive on FDI flowing from non-signatory countries. These effects are empirically tested in the next 
section. 
3.1.2. FDI restrictions 
40. Although formal international agreements on FDI have been far less extensive than on 
international trade, global negotiations and regional free-trade agreements often cover some aspects of 
international investment as well (e.g. capital market liberalisation within the European Union and 
provisions on commercial presence in the GATS), generally leading to lower barriers to FDI. Moreover, a 
number of bilateral investment treaties have been signed among OECD countries, aiming at curbing 
barriers to FDI. A new set of indicators of FDI restrictions was assembled by the OECD to summarise and 
quantify such barriers and their evolution over time. The indicators, which are described in detail in Golub 
(2003), cover mainly statutory barriers, ignoring most of the other direct or indirect obstacles impinging on 
FDI, such as those related to corporate governance mechanisms and/or hidden institutional or behavioural 
obstacles that discriminate against foreign firms.25  
41. According to these indicators (Figure 15), liberalisation of FDI flows has been substantial over 
the past two decades in all OECD countries except the United States and to a lesser extent Japan, both of 
                                                     
22. See Markusen (2002) for an extensive discussion of the conflicting forces acting on bilateral FDI flows as 
trade liberalisation is implemented. 
23. This could partly explain the wave of within EU mergers and acquisitions that followed the Single Market 
Programme. 
24. Neary (2002) argues that this tendency takes the form of consolidation of different plants into a single 
location within the free-trade area. He also notes that the increased competition from MNEs of signatory 
countries can have an opposite influence on third-party investors, leading them to reduce investment in the 
free-trade area. 
25. Non-statutory barriers to FDI are very difficult to ascertain and quantify. However, some of them were 
included in the indicators, such as the absolute barrier represented by full state ownership of business 
enterprises and hidden institutional or behavioural barriers documented in official reports. 
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which had relatively low statutory restrictions to begin with.26 Despite the easing of restrictions and their 
generally much lower level at the end of the 1990s, cross-country differences remain significant, with most 
EU countries showing greater openness than the United States and Japan, and a few OECD countries 
maintaining a relatively restrictive approach (Iceland, Canada and Turkey). In most countries, restrictions 
on control of domestic firms by foreign residents (through either ceilings on foreign-owned equity or 
limitations on management and business choices) dominate those related to screening procedures 
(e.g. economic benefits or national interest tests).27 On average, the bulk of restrictions are found in non-
manufacturing industries.28 FDI inflows into manufacturing are almost completely unrestricted, aside from 
economy-wide restrictions such as notification or screening requirements. Within non-manufacturing, 
electricity, transport and telecommunications are the most restricted industries, followed by finance, while 
the other service industries are on average relatively unrestricted. 
 
Figure 15. FDI restrictions in OECD countries,1 1980-2000
Panel A. Restrictions over time
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26. To a large extent, the generalised decline in restrictions reflects full liberalisation of capital flows within 
the European Union (completed in the early 1990s) and the concomitant extensive privatisations both in the 
European Union and elsewhere (e.g. Mexico), which have opened up previously sheltered public firms and 
monopolies to foreign capital. 
27. The indicators are unable to capture differences in the enforcement of restrictions, which might be 
particularly important for screening requirements. Also, several countries have further eased restrictions 
since the data were last collected. 
28. A simple count of restrictions affecting different industries shows that 67 per cent of all restrictions 
concern the services sector (Sauvé and Steinfatt, 2003). 
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1. The indicator ranges from 0 (least restrictive) to 1 (most restrictive). The most recent year for which data are available varies 
    across countries between 1998 and 2000.
Source: Golub (2003).
Panel B. Breakdown by type of restriction, 1998-2000
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42. Variable FDI restrictions across countries, industries and time are a natural candidate for 
explaining the dispersion observed in bilateral FDI transactions. These restrictions clearly raise barriers to 
foreign investment of MNEs and are likely to influence their choice among different investment locations. 
Some evidence of this is provided by Figure 16, which suggests that in very broad terms there is a weak 
but visible inverse relationship between the sectoral shares of employment in foreign affiliates and the 
level of FDI restrictions across a number of selected sectors.29  
 
                                                     
29. The simple bivariate correlation across countries between the sectoral indicators of FDI restrictions and the 
sectoral shares of employment in foreign affiliates is negative and significant. 
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1. For this figure, the indicator ranges from 0 (least restrictive) to 100 (most restrictive).
Source: Golub (2003) and OECD
Figure 16. Foreign affiliates and FDI restrictions in selected industries
 OECD average
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43. FDI restrictions may also be expected to influence bilateral trade much in the same way as tariff 
barriers are expected to influence bilateral FDI. By increasing the fixed costs of local production, they may 
make it ceteris paribus more profitable for horizontal MNEs to access local markets through exports. 
However, they also tend to decrease vertical FDI and the related export flows. Therefore, the aggregate 
effect on goods exports is ambiguous a priori. FDI restrictions represent an obstacle to services trade 
because they hinder service provision through commercial presence (through the establishment of foreign 
affiliates) and could also affect other modes of services trade because exports and commercial presence are 
complementary in certain industries, such as tourism. 
3.1.3. Currency unions 
44. Exchange-rate variability may increase the transaction costs involved in trading goods and 
services and the risk premia on the returns to FDI. By eliminating those costs and reducing investment risk, 
currency unions can be expected to increase trade flows and expand FDI. Theoretical and empirical 
research has shown, however, that the impact of exchange-rate variability on trade is uncertain (for 
reviews, see McKenzie, 1999, and Taglioni, 2002), though recent evidence tends to find a positive effect of 
currency unions (Rose, 2000). At the same time, as suggested by Cushman (1985), the effects of reduced 
exchange-rate volatility on FDI depend on whether the firm sells its output in the host country or abroad, 
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uses the host country or foreign inputs and finances its capital at home or abroad.30 Therefore, the effect of 
exchange-rate variability on FDI is ultimately an empirical issue. 
3.3. Product market regulation 
45. Using a summary indicator of regulatory reform that ranks regulations in seven non-
manufacturing industries from least to most restrictive of competition, Figure 17 suggests that OECD 
product markets have become increasingly open to competition over the past two decades. At the same 
time, the cross-country dispersion in regulatory approaches has increased, due to differences in initial 
conditions and/or in the scope and pace of reforms implemented by OECD countries. As a result, in 1998 
(the last year for which cross-country regulatory data are available) regulations still differed substantially 
both at the economy-wide level and, especially, at the industry-level in several non-manufacturing 
industries (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003).31 
 
1. The box plot shows, in each year, the median OECD value of the regulatory indicator (the horizontal line in the box),
the third and second quartiles of the cross-country distribution (the edges of each box) and the extreme values (the two
whiskers extending from the box). Dots identify outlier observations.
2. The indicator ranges from 0 (least restrictive) to 6 (most restrictive). It covers 25 OECD countries.
Source: Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003).
Figure 17. Regulatory reform in OECD countries,1 1980-1998
Summary indicator of regulation in seven non-manufacturing industries2
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30. Clearly the more these activities are centred in the host country, the less sensitive FDI is to changes in 
exchange-rate volatility. In Goldberg (1993) the effect of reduced volatility on FDI is ambiguous. On the 
other hand, Darby et al. (1999) stress the possibility of a negative impact.  
31. Details on the regulatory indicators shown in the figures can be found in Nicoletti et al. (1999), Nicoletti et 
al. (2001) and Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003).  
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46. Product market regulations can affect foreign trade and FDI in multiple and at times conflicting 
ways. Here, the focus is on regulations in the exporter (investor) country or the importer (host) country that 
curb market forces where competition is viable and/or impose unnecessary costs on the firms involved in 
the bilateral trade (or investment) transaction.32 Domestic regulation generally does not discriminate 
between local and foreign firms, but it may have distorting effects on bilateral trade and FDI flows by 
affecting the relative prices of different products (e.g. tradeable versus non-tradeable or home versus 
foreign) or the relative rates of return expected from investing in different locations.  
47. A way in which relative prices can be affected is when the introduction of anti-competitive 
regulation in one country increases its production costs, for instance by discouraging efficiency 
enhancements and productivity growth. In the short run, this tends to make the products exported by this 
country less competitive in foreign markets. Conversely, cost-increasing regulation in the importer country 
may tend ceteris paribus to make the products supplied by the exporter country more competitive. With 
wage, price or exchange-rate rigidities, these effects may tend to carry over to the medium to long run. 
Moreover, cost-increasing regulations (which usually differ across industries) may also induce a 
reallocation of resources in both the exporter and importer countries, affecting their respective abilities to 
trade. Another way in which regulations can affect trade patterns is by raising barriers to entry that reduce 
the number of suppliers, and hence the number of different goods offered, in an export market. This may 
have negative repercussions on intra-industry trade. Thus, strict product-market regulation in the foreign 
country potentially has conflicting influences on exports from the home country: on the one hand, it may 
stimulate exports through a competitiveness effect (at least in the short run); on the other hand, it may 
depress exports by limiting access to the foreign market.  
48. A joint negative influence on bilateral trade can be exerted, in both the source and destination 
countries, by cost-increasing or barrier-raising regulations that affect industries in which inputs from both 
countries are needed to produce the traded product. This is the case, for instance, of many traded services 
-- such as transportation, communications and business services -- in which capital and labour from both 
the exporter and importer country are used to supply the service. In these situations, it is the combination 
of regulations in the countries involved in the transaction that is likely to affect trade flows. Suggestive 
evidence of a negative correlation between anti-competitive service regulation and the intensity of service 
trade is provided in Figure 18, which plots the service export and import intensities of OECD countries 
against a summary indicator of regulation in non-manufacturing (which is increasing in restrictions to 
competition).33 
 
                                                     
32. While regulations that bar entry or raise costs may deter FDI, regulations that are aimed at protecting 
intellectual property rights (IPR) may increase the attractiveness of the host country for international 
investors, because protection of IPR makes it more difficult to imitate their firm-specific knowledge assets 
(e.g. through the movement of managers or employees from the foreign affiliate to local firms). See Smith 
(2001). 
33. The summary indicator is the GDP-weighted average of the indicators of regulation in twelve non-
manufacturing industries. 
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Correlation coefficient: -0.37 (excluding Austria)
t-statistic: -1.66
Correlation coefficient: -0.64  (excluding Austria)
t-statistic: -3.45
1. The position of Austria reflects the exceptionally high share of service trade accounted for by tourism.
2. Weighted average of regulatory indicators in 12 non-manufacturing industries.
    0-1 scale from least to most restrictive of competition.
Source: Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) and OECD.
Figure 18. Non-manufacturing regulation and trade in services, 1998   
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49. Product market regulations can also influence FDI by raising production costs or entry barriers, 
but their effect is more ambiguous: 
− Cost-increasing regulations in the host country can deter FDI by lowering its expected rate of 
return if the foreign subsidiary is used as a platform for re-exporting final or intermediate 
goods back home or to other less regulated countries (the case of the vertical MNE). 
However, if FDI aims at accessing the local market (the case of the horizontal MNE), cost-
increasing regulations in the host country may encourage FDI because the foreign affiliate 
can take advantage of the production structure of the parent firm, which may be more 
efficient than in local firms if regulations in the home country are more pro-competitive. 
Cost-increasing regulations in the home country may also stimulate outward FDI by 
favouring the delocalisation of production plants in countries with less costly regulations. On 
the other hand, the costs implied by these regulations may cripple the ability of home-country 
firms to internationalise production to the desired level.34  
− Similar conflicting influences can be exerted by regulations that raise entry barriers in host 
countries. Such entry barriers clearly deter “greenfield” FDI aimed at establishing new firms 
or creating new production plants. However, by endowing local firms with market power, 
they can actually encourage inward FDI aimed at acquiring (or merging foreign parents with) 
existing local firms.  
50. Despite the potentially conflicting linkages between regulation and FDI, prima facie evidence 
suggests that, on the whole, barriers to entry and cost-increasing regulations in the host country, as 
summarised by the product of the 1998 indicator of economy-wide regulation with the summary 1980-
1998 indicator of barriers to entry in seven non-manufacturing industries, are inversely related with the 
intensity of inward FDI in OECD countries (Figure 19). 
3.4. Labour market arrangements 
51. A wide set of policies and institutions affects the functioning of the labour markets that impinges 
on trade or FDI transactions. In this study, the focus is restricted to employment protection legislation 
(EPL), collective bargaining mechanisms and labour income taxation, for which comparable cross-country 
data are available.35 The OECD (1997c, 1999) has extensively documented cross-country differences in 
labour market policies and institutions (see the Annex for details). Both employment protection and labour 
income taxation are driven by important policy objectives, but could also have side effects on the level and 
geographical allocation of trade and FDI.  
                                                     
34. For instance, there is evidence that certain product market regulations can hinder firm growth and curb 
R&D spending (Nicoletti et al., 2001; Bassanini and Ernst, 2002). Both factors can constitute a handicap 
for internationalisation.  
35. Other important factors include, for instance, coverage of collective agreements, minimum wages and 
health and safety regulations, for which cross-country data are patchy or lacking. 
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1. Each point shows the combination of regulation and FDI in a given country and period. Some of these
country/period contributions are shown for illustrative purposes.
2. Product of the indicator of economy-wide regulation in 1998 and the indicator of barriers to entry in 
seven non-manufacturing industries over the 1980-1998 period. 0-1 scale from least to most restrictive
of competition.
Source: Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) and OECD.
Figure 19. Product market regulation and FDI, 1990-19981
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52. The main channel through which EPL and labour tax wedges can affect trade and FDI is the 
influence they may have on the adaptability of labour markets and on the cost of labour.36 In the absence of 
offsetting mechanisms, EPL and labour taxes can affect trade and FDI patterns for largely the same reasons 
as cost-increasing product market regulations do, i.e. by adversely affecting the relative prices of different 
products, or by adversely affecting relative returns from investing in the country that has stringent EPL or 
                                                     
36. EPL and the social expenditures that are financed through labour income taxation may also lower 
transaction costs in the relationship between workers and firms, reduce labour market frictions and smooth 
out the social costs associated with adverse labour market outcomes. Through these channels, EPL and 
labour income taxation can actually have positive repercussions for export prices and expected investment 
returns. However, these effects are difficult to measure and, in this study, the focus is on the role they play 
in pushing up production costs.  
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high wedges.37 However, the effects of EPL and labour income taxation on trade and FDI may also depend 
on the regime of industrial relations in place in each OECD country. Previous research has shown that 
some collective bargaining arrangements can provide an effective offsetting mechanism for the costs 
implied by labour income taxation and EPL. Specifically, regimes in which bargaining is done at the 
national (i.e. centralised) level and with a tight co-ordination among employers and unions operating in 
different industries may make it possible to shift the implicit costs of wedges and EPL onto wages, much in 
the same way as may happen in decentralised and uncoordinated labour markets, provided wage resistance 
is not encouraged through other arrangements (such as high income replacement rates in unemployment 
benefit systems).38 Thus, to the extent that this offsetting mechanism is operating, effects of EPL or tax 
wedges on trade and FDI should be found mainly in situations in which bargaining is neither co-ordinated 
nor decentralised, as it is found for instance in countries where negotiations are implemented at the 
industry level. 
53. The potential offsetting mechanism provided by certain bargaining institutions is likely to be 
effective for neutralising the adverse effects of high EPL and tax-related costs in the home country on the 
relative prices of tradeable vs. non-tradeable goods. Its offsetting effect on the tendency of international 
investors to divert investment towards locations in which risk-adjusted expected returns are relatively low 
is more doubtful. This is because strict EPL is likely to affect not only the returns expected from foreign 
investment (e.g. through effects on labour costs that can be offset by bargaining institutions) but also their 
variability (e.g. by influencing the capacity of foreign affiliates to respond to supply or demand shocks), 
thereby increasing the risk that investors face in the host country. Since MNEs can choose ex ante where to 
locate their investment, they may still tend to move where the risk/return ratio is lowest, independent of the 
features of bargaining institutions in potential host countries.39 Similarly, the potential for shifting the costs 
implied by labour taxation onto wages may be limited in MNEs whose highly-skilled employees and 
managers are likely to be more mobile across borders than their homologues in local firms. 
3.5. Infrastructure 
54. Trade and FDI may also be affected by factors that are, or have been, closely-related to 
government policies regarding transportation, communications and energy supply. Indeed, due to their 
public good and natural monopoly characteristics, some fixed network infrastructures are financed through 
public investment.40 Figure 20 uses a new set of indicators especially developed for this project to show the 
evolution of infrastructure endowments of OECD countries over the past two decades. The indicators are 
increasing in the quality and quantity of infrastructure and summarise information about transport, 
                                                     
37. Moreover, in the same way as product market regulations, stringent EPL and high wedges in the home 
country may also encourage firms to localise production in countries where labour market rules and 
taxation are more favourable to business, thereby stimulating outward FDI; but at the same time EPL may 
handicap firms that want to do so by hindering their potential for reorganising production or growing in 
size. Nicoletti et al. (2001) find that the average size of firms is negatively related to the stringency of EPL 
in a panel of OECD countries and industries. 
38. This idea was first put forth by Calmfors and Driffill (1988). See Elmeskov et al. (1998) for evidence on 
the interaction between EPL and bargining mechanisms and Daveri and Tabellini (2000) for the interaction 
between labour income taxation and bargaining mechanisms. 
39. It is also possible that foreign investors may find the implications of restrictive EPL provisions more 
difficult to ascertain than domestic investors (due to an asymmetry of information) and hence have to face 
higher costs. 
40. More importantly, government policies (e.g. access regulations) are crucial for ensuring a regulatory and 
business environment which is conducive to efficient private investment in infrastructure. See Gonenç et 
al. (2000) and OECD (2001b) for a detailed discussion of these issues. 
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communication and energy supply infrastructure (Box 5). There have been substantial increases in 
infrastructure capital over the period in all OECD countries. By the year 2000, the Nordic countries, the 
United States, Canada, Australia and other small European countries, such as Switzerland and, to a lesser 
extent, Ireland had the highest levels of infrastructure. New OECD members and transition countries, such 
as Mexico, Turkey, Poland and to a lesser extent Hungary, the Czech Republic and Korea, were estimated 
to have relatively low levels of infrastructure. 
 
 
1. The indicator is the crossing of the quality and quantity of infrastructure in transport, telecommunications and electricity.
It increases with infrastructure endowments and is expressed relative to the 1998 level of the indicator in the United States.
Source: OECD (see Annex).
Figure 20. Infrastructure endowments1
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Box 5. Infrastructure indicators 
The infrastructure indicator summarises on a 0-1 scale the quality and quantity of telecommunications, transport and 
electricity infrastructure. Items covered include mainlines per capita, mobile phones per capita, the share of digital 
lines in total lines, answer seizure ratios (e.g. the percentage of successful international phone calls) and fault rates 
(e.g. the percentage of faults repaired within 24 hours) in telecommunications; length of motorways per capita, length 
of paved roads per capita and aircraft departures per capita in transport; transmission losses, generating capacity per 
capita and reserve margins in electricity supply. The relevant data were drawn from the OECD, the European 
Conference of Ministry of Transportation, International Energy Agency and World Bank sources. Each sectoral 
indicator is a weighted average of the corresponding items. The overall infrastructure indicator is a weighted average 
of the three sectoral indicators. Weights assigned to items and sectors reflect judgements about the economic 
relevance of each component. A time-series of the indicator was calculated for the 1980-2000 period. Details on 
sources, methodologies and results are in the Annex. 
 
55. The provision of infrastructure may affect comparative and absolute advantage and, therefore, 
cross-country patterns of trade and FDI (Findlay, 1996). Infrastructure is likely to be particularly important 
for trade in services, because the main items traded (travel, freight, communications, banking and business 
services) depend heavily on the existence of high capacity and efficient networks in countries that are at 
both ends of the transaction. Thus, the combination of infrastructure conditions in the exporter and 
importer countries is likely to be relevant for service trade, much in the same way as for product market 
regulation (see above). The availability and the quality of infrastructure may also positively affect inward 
FDI because good infrastructure lowers transactions costs, facilitating international specialisation and the 
location choices of footloose industries (Jones, 2000).41 However, a possible complication is that FDI in 
infrastructure has increased in recent years. Thus, it is possible that countries with weaker infrastructure 
might attract FDI, implying a reverse relationship between FDI and infrastructure endowments. 
3.6. Geographical and economic factors 
56. As already mentioned, a number of factors unrelated to government policies can impinge on trade 
and FDI. Gravity factors are mainly related to market size and distance: the volume of transactions 
between two countries tends to increase as their incomes get larger, but decreases with the distance 
between them due to transport costs.42 Total and relative market sizes are also important determinants of 
horizontal FDI, because the returns from such investment depend on economies of scale at the firm level 
(see Box 3). On the other hand, factor proportions are important because they determine each country’s 
comparative advantage in trading goods and services, and also affect the extent to which vertical FDI is 
implemented.43 In general, geographical and economic factors are expected to affect trade and FDI in the 
following ways: 
                                                     
41. Yeaple and Golub (2002) attempt to test these hypotheses and provide some support for the effects of 
infrastructure on comparative and absolute advantage. 
42. Deardorff (1995) shows that this relationship emerges from virtually all models of trade. 
43. The role of factor proportions in explaining trade flows is clearest in Hekscher-Ohlin models of trade. 
Moreover, in a general gravity framework relative endowments of human and physical capital also provide 
information on the supply of differentiated goods, which are usually skill and capital intensive (Evenett and 
 ECO/WKP(2003)13 
 47 
• Exports and outward FDI both tend to be positively affected by the combined market size 
of the countries involved in the transactions, due to both gravity effects and economies of 
scale. 
• Exports and horizontal outward FDI also tend to be positively affected by the size 
similarity of the two countries. Size similarity stimulates intra-industry trade and favours 
firm-level economies of scale of horizontal MNEs, which have multiple production plants 
at home and abroad producing the same good (or service) (see Markusen, 2002).  
• Exports tend to be negatively affected by distance and transport costs. However, their 
effects on FDI are unclear because they also imply transaction costs for investors, and these 
costs could offset any advantage that FDI may have over trade when dealing with distant 
and ill-connected countries.44 
• Exports tend to be stimulated by differences in factor endowments of trading partners, 
because these make it possible to exploit comparative advantages. For broadly the same 
reason, dissimilarities in factor endowments also encourage vertical FDI. Conversely, 
horizontal FDI is discouraged by factor dissimilarities because they may make production 
of the same good in different countries difficult. 
3.7. Summing up 
57. This section has discussed the main channels through which four sets of policies affect trade and 
FDI and has in some cases provided prima facie evidence of their importance. Table 2 provides a summary 
of the likely impacts of specific policies on outward FDI and on exports of goods and services. Several of 
the policy indicators constructed for this study suggest that the variability of border and non-border barriers 
to trade and FDI over time and across OECD countries is large enough to potentially explain part of the 
observed dispersion in trade and FDI intensities. Although simple correlations suggest that these policy 
variables may have a role in determining trade and FDI, their full importance can be gauged only with 
multivariate statistical analysis, which is carried out in the next section. 
4. Empirical evidence 
58. This section presents evidence on the impact of policy and other factors on bilateral outward FDI 
positions (henceforth FDI outstocks), multilateral inward FDI positions (henceforth total FDI instocks), 
bilateral exports of goods and bilateral exports of services of OECD countries. Thus, the focus is on the 
determinants of exports or outward FDI from a country to its partners and the determinants of the global 
attractiveness of a country for international investors. For ease of exposition, only the results from 
“preferred” regression specifications are reported below -- detailed regression estimates can be found in the 
Annex. It should be noted at the outset that, due to limitations in data coverage, the data sets on which the 
results are based vary across the dependent variables and the policies considered (Box 1). FDI outstock and 
instocks as well as goods exports cover 28 OECD countries and partners over the 1980-2000 period at the 
bilateral and multilateral levels. However, a long enough time-series of total FDI instocks is only available  
                                                                                                                                                                             
Keller, 2002). Their role in determining vertical FDI is emphasised in Helpman (1984) and Helpman and 
Krugman (1985). 
44. Markusen (2002) notes that FDI has only a relative advantage over trade with distant countries. Therefore, 
distance and transport costs may well have a negative influence on the intensity of outward FDI. 
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Expected impact on: Outward FDI
Policies: Goods Services
Tariff barriers +/? -- na
Positive for hor. MNE (tariff-jumping) Trade cost/barrier
Negative for ver. MNE
Non-tariff barriers +/? -- na
Positive for hor. MNE (tariff-jumping) Trade cost/barrier
Negative for ver. MNE
Free trade area
(same for home and host) +/? + +/?
Ambiguous for hor. MNE Gravity and market size effects Gravity and market size effects
Positive for ver. MNE Non-border barriers more relevant
Free trade area (only host) + +/? +/?
Non-members access larger market Gravity and market size effects Gravity and market size effects
Non-border barriers more relevant
FDI restrictions
-- +/? ?
Investment cost/barrier Positive for hor. MNE (FDI-jumping) FDI-jumping for hor. MNE
Negative for ver. MNE FDI and trade complementary modes of supply
Product market regulation
(at home) ? -- --
Incentive to delocalise Curbs competitiveness (short run) Hinders trade at both ends of transaction
Handicaps ability to internationalise Distorts relative prices
Curbs intraindustry trade
Product market regulation
(in host) ? ? --
Negative for ver. MNE and "greenfield" FDI Raises competitiveness of home Hinders trade at both ends of transaction
Ambiguous for hor. MNE and M&A FDI country exports (short run)
Creates barriers to foreign goods
Lack of IPR (in host)
-- na na
Reduces incentives to FDI due 
to risk of imitation
EPL and tax wedge on labour 
(at home) ? --/? --/?
Incentive to delocalise Curbs competitiveness (short run) Trade cost 
Handicaps ability to internationalise Distorts relative prices Effect depends on bargaining regime at home
Effect depends on bargaining regime at home Effect depends on bargaining regime at home
EPL and tax wedge on labour 
(in host) --/? +/? --/?
Investment cost Raises competitiveness of home Trade cost 
Investors may choose locations with country exports (short run) Effect depends on bargaining regime in host
lower risk-return ratio Effect depends on bargaining regime in host
Currency unions 
(same for home and host) +/? +/? +/?
May reduce risk in some cases May reduce transaction costs and May reduce transaction costs and 
risk in some cases risk in some cases
Infrastructure (at home) na na +
Facilitates trade at both ends of transaction
Infrastructure (in host) +/? na +
Reduces investment cost Facilitates trade at both ends of transaction
Discourages FDI in infrastructure
General comments
Relative stringency of regulations and labour 
market arrangements in home and host 
countries most relevant for outward FDI
Labour market arrangements may have 
different effects in home and host countries 
depending on bargaining systems
Regulatory environment and infrastructure 
conditions at both ends of the transactions 
jointly affect service exports
Labour market arrangements may have different 
effects in home and host countries depending on 
bargaining systems
Source: OECD.
Table 2. Policy and other influences on trade and FDI (cont.)
Exports
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for a smaller set of OECD countries. Bilateral exports of services cover 20 reporting countries and 
27 partners over the 1999-2000 period.45 All trade and FDI variables are expressed in dollars at 1996 
purchasing power parity values. 
4.1. Approach 
59. The estimated equations are reduced forms relating trade in goods, trade in services and FDI 
outstocks to broadly the same set of factors. This is in line with recent research that stresses the joint 
determination of trade and FDI transactions.46 Bilateral exports and outward FDI from the home country to 
the partner country (henceforth partner for brevity) were related to i) geographic and non-policy-related 
structural factors, and ii) the relative costs of trading and investing implied by policies in the home country 
or partner. FDI regressions focus on bilateral outstocks; results for bilateral outflows are broadly the same 
and are reported in the Annex.47 
60. Thus, the building blocks of the estimated equations are geographical and non-policy-related 
structural factors including: 
• Variables expressing gravity forces: total GDP (the sum of home country and partner GDPs 
in bilateral equations) proxying for total market size; an index of similarity of GDPs 
proxying for size similarity; distance (from capitals); and transport costs (computed as the 
difference between CIF imports in the partner and FOB exports by the home country).48 
• Variables expressing factor proportions: dissimilarity in capital-labour ratios; and 
dissimilarity in human capital endowments (taking into account the share of population by 
different education levels and average years of schooling in each level). 
• Other economic variables likely to affect trade or FDI: R&D intensity in the home country 
or partner (defined as the ratio of business R&D expenditure to GDP); bilateral exchange 
rates (defined as nominal exchange rates in bilateral equations and effective (import-
                                                     
45. As mentioned above, these “financial” FDI data suffer from several drawbacks (e.g. they do not distinguish 
between mergers and acquisitions and greenfield investment, and may be geographically biased to the 
extent that MNEs use strategically-located holding companies to intermediate their investments), but the 
period and country coverage of the data on foreign affiliates was too limited for the purposes of empirical 
analysis. As regards services trade, the countries excluded are Belgium, Luxembourg, the Czech Republic, 
Iceland, Poland, Turkey, New Zealand, Mexico, Switzerland. Belgium and Luxembourg are excluded from 
partners. The Slovak Republic was also excluded from the analysis because data for other variables are 
missing. 
46. For similar specifications see, for instance, Markusen and Maskus (1999) and Egger (2001). The reduced 
form approach implies that the estimated coefficients incorporate both direct and indirect effects of the 
explanatory variables. For example, the parameter of tariffs in the trade equations reflects both the direct 
effect on trade and the indirect effect operating through the effect of tariffs on FDI and the possible impact 
of the induced effect of FDI on trade. 
47. The focus on FDI outstocks or instocks (instead of outflows or inflows) is justified by the fact that the 
decision of firms concerns the level of local production, which is a function of the desired level of the local 
stock of FDI. 
48. The year-on-year difference of transportation costs was smoothed out to eliminate excessive volatility in 
the data. 
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weighted) nominal exchange rates in total instock equations); and exchange rate variability 
(defined as the standard error of the monthly exchange rates).49 
As in the previous section, policy factors are grouped in four categories: 
• Openness: multilateral and bilateral tariffs; multilateral indicators of non-tariff barriers; 
dummies for free-trade agreements (henceforth FTA); and the indicator of FDI 
restrictions described in Golub (2003). 
• Product market regulation: this covers two broad areas -- protection of intellectual 
property rights (henceforth IPR) and regulations curbing competition. The former is 
proxied by the Ginarte and Park (1997) cross-section indicator of protection of IPR in 
1997. Anti-competitive regulation is proxied in two different ways. FDI and trade in 
goods are related to a time-series indicator that combines barriers to entry in seven non-
manufacturing industries over the 1980-1998 period with economy-wide regulation in 
1998. Trade in services is related to an indicator summarising barriers to entry in twelve 
non-manufacturing industries in 1998. 
• Labour market arrangements: the tax wedge on labour income; an indicator of 
employment protection legislation (EPL); and an indicator of the degree of centralisation 
and co-ordination of the bargaining regime. The latter two indicators are interacted to 
account for the possible influence of bargaining institutions on the costs implied by EPL 
(see above). 
• Infrastructure: the indicator of quantity and quality of infrastructure in transport, 
telecommunications and electricity supply. 
All indicators are normalised and range from 0 to 100. The scale of all policy indicators is from least to 
most restrictive, except for the indicator of IPR which is increasing in the lack of protection. The 
infrastructure indicator is increasing in the quality and quantity of infrastructure. Details on all variables 
and indicators used in the regressions, including sources, definitions, methodologies, sensitivity analyses 
and a description of cross-country patterns are contained in the Annex. 
61. The empirical estimates are based on panel regressions that take into account four different kinds 
of effects potentially unexplained by the above set of variables and indicators: i) time invariant effects that 
are specific to each home country and partner (e.g. institutions, data collection and reporting methods); 
ii) time invariant effects that are specific to each home country-partner pair involved in bilateral 
transactions (e.g. common language, cultural affinity); iii) time-varying factors common to all home 
countries and partners (e.g. global demand, supply or technology shocks); and iv) time-varying factors 
specific to each home country and partner (e.g. business cycle, country-specific technology shocks).50 The 
econometric approach takes into account these factors either explicitly (by estimating the relevant 
                                                     
49. In FDI equations, bilateral and effective exchange rates capture valuation and asset effects. In trade 
equations, nominal exchange rates together with the determinants of relative prices (i.e. relative factor 
endowments and policies that affect production costs) capture real competitiveness effects. 
50. In addition a specific dummy for English-speaking countries was introduced to test for the possible 
influence of “language” effects, but no such effect was detected perhaps due to the presence of the bilateral 
fixed effect. 
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parameters) or implicitly (by transforming the data prior to estimation).51 In the analysis of bilateral trade 
or FDI, the observations are home country-partner pairs in each period; in the analysis of total FDI instocks 
observations are countries in each period. The analysis of total FDI instocks accounts for the possibility 
that the adjustment of actual to desired stocks of FDI is costly and takes time. Therefore, equations for total 
FDI instocks are of the dynamic partial adjustment kind, with the total FDI instock in each period also 
depending on the realised instock in the previous period (See Cheng and Kwan, 2000, for a similar 
specification). Moreover, the estimations also account for the possibility that some of the variables 
explaining FDI might be endogenous to outcomes (e.g. while the FDI instock may depend on infrastructure 
conditions in the country, infrastructure conditions themselves may depend on FDI in infrastructure) by 
using an appropriate instrumental variables estimation approach. Finally, the total instock equations also 
account for the possibility that investments in FTAs are the outcome of a two-stage process in which, first, 
the decision is made to invest in the FTA, and, second, locations within the FTA are chosen based on the 
relative attractiveness of member countries.52 Estimation methods are summarised in Box 6, more details 
can be found in the Annex. 
Box 6. Empirical methods 
Regression results are obtained from single-equation estimation of reduced forms for bilateral FDI outstocks, goods 
exports and service exports as well as for total FDI instocks. To appropriately account for both the cross-section and 
time-series dimensions of the data, panel data estimation methods are used. 
In bilateral equations, panel data methods require controlling for unobserved factors that are specific to each country, 
each partner, each country-partner pair and each period, as well as for shocks that are common to all countries over 
time. However, estimating dummies for all these factors is not viable, due to an excessive loss of degrees of freedom. 
Therefore, the “transformed least squares” (TLS) approach (Erkel-Rousse and Mirza, 2002) was employed, which 
simplifies the equation to be estimated while at the same time preserving the desirable properties of the relevant 
coefficient estimates. This approach expresses all variables as deviations from the mean investor (or exporter) or, 
alternatively, the mean host (or importer). Thus, for instance, two equations for bilateral FDI outstocks are obtained: a 
“country” equation, in which bilateral outstocks and all explanatory variables are expressed as deviations from their 
values for the average investor; and a “partner” equation, in which bilateral outstocks and all explanatory variables 
are expressed as deviations from their values for the average host. The advantage is that in the country equations 
partner-specific unobserved effects (and common time trends) are accounted for prior to estimation in a non-
parametric way and only country-specific effects have to be estimated, while in the partner equations it is the country-
specific unobserved effects (and common time trends) that are accounted for non-parametrically and the partner-
specific effects that are estimated. This reduces the number of parameters to be estimated in each equation.1 The 
downside is that, due to the transformation of the data, no time-invariant partner-specific variables can be included in 
the country equations and, symmetrically, no time-invariant country-specific variables can be included in the partner 
equations. Finally, additional degrees of freedom are gained by assuming that, in each of the two equations, the 
incremental information provided by the unobserved country pair effect over the “pure” country or partner effect is 
random and can be included in the error term.g 
 
                                                     
51. This transformation involves expressing the data as deviations from the values for the average home 
country or the average partner, which eliminates partner-specific or home country-specific effects, 
respectively. 
52. Thus, in preliminary regressions, FDI instocks were related to both the average restrictiveness of policies in 
the host-country’s FTA and their restrictiveness in the host country relative to other countries within the 
same FTA. 
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Total instock equations are estimated using a panel data procedure that controls for the possible inconsistency of 
estimates implied by the presence of the lagged dependent variable and the potential endogeneity of some of the 
explanatory variables (Bond, 2002). To this end, the equations are first-differenced, the lagged dependent variable 
and endogenous explanatory variables are instrumented by the lagged values of the variables themselves and the 
parameters are estimated applying a generalised method of moments procedure (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Serial 
correlation tests and Sargan tests for overidentifying restrictions were performed to ensure that the regression 
specifications reported in the main text were supported by the data. 
_____________________ 
1. To check the robustness of regression results to this transformation, each equation was also estimated using a standard 
fixed effects regression, including all unobserved effects save the country-partner pair effects (see the Annex.) 
 
62. All the results reported below are based on full-model specifications including both non-policy 
related variables and policy variables. However, the results are generally robust to the omission of subsets 
of policy variables. The results of “thematic” regressions, focusing on specific policy areas (such as 
openness or product market regulation) are shown in the Annex. It is important to keep in mind that the 
results for the total FDI instock are based on a dynamic specification, which is significantly different from 
the static bilateral one, and covers a more limited set of countries.53  
4.2. Non-policy-related structural factors impinging on trade and FDI 
63. Table 3 reports the estimates of the basic equations that include only non-policy-related structural 
factors. Four main features stand out: 
• First, as expected, the coefficients of the gravity variables are correctly signed and 
significant in all equations. Thus, market size, market similarity, distance and transport 
costs affect in the same way FDI and exports of goods and services.54  
• Second, the estimated effect of market size on trade in services and FDI is stronger than 
in goods trade, while the effect of transport costs (proxied by distance in the service trade 
equations) is smaller. While a smaller effect of transport costs on FDI is expected, 
because these should affect (indirectly) only vertical MNEs, the smaller effect on 
services is surprising, because such costs are often quoted as the reason for the lower 
intensity of trade in this sector. Thus, neither gravity nor transport cost factors seem able 
to explain the different trade intensities observed for goods and services. 
• Third, the effects of differences in endowments of labour and physical or human capital 
vary across FDI, trade in goods and trade in services. Differences in endowments 
positively affect trade in goods, as would be expected from comparative advantage 
                                                     
53. Due to data limitations, the total instock regressions covered only 10 to 19 OECD countries, depending on 
the policy variables included. 
54. Distance could not be estimated in bilateral FDI equations because of its purely cross-section nature. Its 
effect is captured by the bilateral fixed effects. Transport costs were omitted from the bilateral service trade 
equations for two reasons. First, the measure used in this study is constructed as the difference in CIF-FOB 
in manufacturing trade, which may have little relevance for trade in services. Second, transport is one 
component of service trade, hence transport costs are likely to be endogenous to it. 
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considerations. However, factor dissimilarities negatively affect outward FDI, though a 
high level of human capital tends to attract inward FDI. Taken together, the findings of a 
positive effect of market size similarity and a negative effect of factor dissimilarity 
support the conjecture that FDI by horizontal MNEs is prevalent among OECD countries 
(see Table 2). Finally, factor dissimilarities have no statistically significant impact on 
service trade. This finding may be interpreted as suggesting that the various kinds of 
services respond unevenly to those differences (e.g. while comparative advantage factors 
could sometimes be playing a positive role in tourism, similarity in endowments could be 
needed in financial or communication transactions). 
• Fourth, the sizeable coefficient estimate for the lagged FDI instock in the dynamic total 
instock regressions suggests that there is a high persistence present in the data, with FDI 
flowing to countries that already have relatively high bilateral instocks. This 
phenomenon may reflect the presence of “agglomeration effects”, whereby FDI is 
attracted to locations in which important investments by home country MNEs have 
already been made (see, for related evidence, Barrell and Pain, 1998 and 1999).55 
64. R&D intensity in the home and partner countries and the level and volatility of bilateral and 
effective exchange rates have the expected influence on trade and FDI. R&D in the home country is a 
common proxy for product differentiation, which positively affects intra-industry trade. At the same time, 
the overall level of R&D expenditure in the host country increases its attractiveness for total inward FDI. 
For given relative prices (whose effect is captured by relative factor endowments and, in later regressions, 
by the product and labour-market regulation variables), an exchange rate appreciation curbs the 
competitiveness of home country exports of goods, as pointed out by the negative and significant estimates 
of its coefficient in bilateral export equations. However, it has two opposing effects on FDI. On the one 
hand, it reflects a pure valuation effect, with the US$ value of assets held by the home country in the host 
country decreasing; on the other hand, it reflects an asset effect, increasing the attractiveness of investment 
in the host country, as its assets become cheaper for foreigners. The results are ambiguous. The estimated 
effects change sign across bilateral FDI specifications, though the valuation effect seems to prevail in most 
regressions (see Annex). At the multilateral level (as captured by the dynamic total instock regressions), 
the asset effect seems to prevail, perhaps due to composition effects.56 The effects of exchange rate 
variability are discussed below. 
4.3. The direct and indirect influence of policies 
65. Table 4 reports the results of regressions that include policy variables. The reported specifications 
generally include all of them. However, some policy variables are sometimes omitted when the inclusion 
of all variables would imply either significant changes in country coverage (such as in the total instock 
equations) or excessive multicollinearity (such as in the cross-section services trade regressions). To 
highlight similarities and differences in the way policies may influence trade in goods, trade in services and 
bilateral or multilateral FDI, it is useful to look at the estimated effects of each policy across the different 
measures of trade and FDI. Therefore, the effects of each of the four sets of policies covered in this paper 
are analysed in turn under the usual headings. 
                                                     
55. Relatedly, persistence could be also driven by the large share of reinvested earnings in FDI flows. 
56. In the total instock regressions the relevant variable is the nominal effective exchange rate, which is a 
trade-weighted average of bilateral exchange rates. A depreciation of this rate does not necessarily imply a 
depreciation of all bilateral rates. Thus, the overall effect depends on the interaction of depreciation with 
the country mix of bilateral trade flows. 
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Total instock
multilateral
country partner country partner country partner dynamic IVb
Total GDPc 1.284 0.78 1.926 1.677 1.928 1.903 0.135
[14.95]** [9.19]** [11.49]** [13.66]** [4.89]** [5.37]** [2.02]*
Size similarity 0.627 0.38 0.948 0.694 1.436 1.247
 [11.89]** [7.47]** [9.70]** [9.22]** [7.50]** [7.22]**
Factor dissimilarity 0.084 0.046 0.386 0.032 -0.199 -0.43
[2.64]** [1.50] [1.41] [0.30] [3.18]** [7.05]**
Human capital dissimilarity 0.415 0.338 -0.177 0.66 -2.122 -2.153
[2.63]** [2.51]* [0.29] [1.19] [9.43]** [10.28]**
 Human capital endowment 1.873
[4.38]**
Transport costs -0.813 -0.792 -0.722 -0.506
[18.02]** [18.64]** [5.95]** [3.86]**
Distance -1.106 -1.126 -0.843 -0.762
[27.74]** [30.63]** [10.47]** [10.34]**
R & D intensity 0.107 0.36
[3.79]** [5.42]**
Bilateral exchange rate -0.583 -0.237 0.637 -0.701
[11.14]** [4.40]** [3.78]** [4.34]**
Effective exchange rate 0.005
[4.70]**
Exchange rate variabilityd -0.003 -0.002
[1.94] [1.65]
Lagged dependent variable 0.688
[17.11]**
Constant 1.92 0.96 -0.60 -0.10 -2.13 -1.06 0.00
[9.58]** [5.92]** [4.94]** [0.98] [4.31]** [2.76]** [0.34]
Notes: 19 countries
Period 1980-2000
Observationse 7780 7768 540 534 4521 4517 174
R-squaredf n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.72 0.65 n.a.
Country effects Yes Implicit Yes Implicit Yes Implicit Yes
Partner effects Implicit Yes Implicit Yes Implicit Yes
Common time trend Implicit Implicit Implicit Implicit Implicit Implicit
Country-specific trend Yes Implicit n.a. n.a. Yes Implicit
Partner-specific trend Implicit Yes n.a. n.a. Implicit Yes
Bilateral effect Random Random Random Random Fixed Fixed
   Sargan testg 224 (340)
   Autocorrelation in first-differenced residuals
       First-orderh -3.940
       Second-orderh -2.160
Absolute value of t or z-statistics in brackets. * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level; n.a. = not applicable.
See Annex for the definitions of variables.
a)  Equations estimated using the Transformed Least Squares (TLS) approach (Erkel-Rousse and Mirza, 2002).
"country" indicates the use of data expressed as deviations from the mean host that allows for estimation of investor-specific variables, 
"partner"  indicates the use of data expressed as deviations from the mean investor that allows for estimation of host-specific variables.
b)  The dynamic panel specification was estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) generalized method of moments estimator.
c)  Defined as domestic absorption in the total instock regressions.
d)  Coefficients multiplied by 100.
e)  Samples are adjusted for outliers based on the Welsch distance cut-off (Chaterjee and Hadi, 1988).
f)  The R-squared is reported only in fixed effects regressions.
g)   The Sargan statistic tests the null hypothesis that all moment conditions are satisfied. The statistic is Χ2-distributed with degrees of freedom in parenthesis.
h)   These tests check the assumption that residuals are serially uncorrelated. This assumption implies that their first differences follow an MA(1) process  
having non-zero first-order correlation but no higher-order correlation. Reported statistics, both distributed N(0,1), test the null  hypothesis of zero
first-order and second-order autocorrelation, respectively. 
Source: OECD.
bilateral TLSa
28 countries
and partners
1980-2000
17 countries,
26 partners
1999-2000
28 countries
and partners
1980-2000
Table 3. Non-policy-related structural factors impinging on trade and FDI
Dependent variable (ln)
Specification
FDIExport of
Goods Services Outstock
bilateral TLSa bilateral TLSa
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country partner
Total GDPc 3.342 1.328 0.283 0.389 0.363
[8.39]** [3.78]** [3.76]** [5.01]** [4.56]**
Size similarity 2.187 0.968
 
[11.43]** [5.64]**
Factor dissimilarity -0.059 -0.794
[0.63] [6.90]**
Human capital dissimilarity -0.844 -1.383
[3.57]** [6.08]**
 Human capital endowment 1.248 0.658 1.219
[2.83]** [1.42] [2.67]**
Transport costs -0.662 -0.743
[5.39]** [6.14]**
R & D intensity 0.323 0.403 0.485
[4.93]** [5.71]** [6.66]**
Bilateral exchange rate 0.283 -0.97
[1.61] [5.70]**
Effective exchange rate 0.004 0.003 0.004
[4.15]** [3.33]** [3.70]**
Exchange rate variabilityd 0.024 -0.0001 -0.008 -0.008 -0.011
[5.45]** [1.23] [1.33] [1.47] [1.80]
Lagged dependent variable 0.626 0.558 0.519
[15.19]** [12.42]** [10.98]**
Free trade area 0.366 0.482
[5.22]** [5.84]**
FDI restrictions -0.019 -0.007 -0.002 0.006
[3.06]** [2.62]** [0.50] [1.58]
Bilateral tariff barriers -0.1 -0.059
[6.08]** [4.07]**
Non-tariff barriers 0.011 0.112 0.143 0.166
[1.89] [3.55]** [4.44]** [4.89]**
Employment protection ratioi -0.032 -0.053 -0.007 -0.007
[2.62]** [5.37]** [2.91]** [2.46]*
Labour tax wedge ratioi -0.925 -2.297 -0.005 -0.008
[9.20]** [11.65]** [1.10] [1.75]
Regulation ratioi -0.142 -0.1 -0.006 -0.010
[8.25]** [6.11]** [1.53] [2.53]*
Infrastructure 0.008 0.013 0.006
[2.12]* [2.92]** [1.35]
Constant -0.87 -3.29 -0.008 -0.007 0.009
[1.75] [7.97]** [1.07] [0.88] [1.04]
Notes: 16 countries 14 countries 10 countries
Period 
Observationse 3792 3601 169 163 134
R-squaredf 0.71 0.72 n.a. n.a. n.a.
   Sargan testg 223 (340) 205 (693) 151 (338)
   Autocorrelation in first-differenced residuals
       First-orderh -3.45 -3.30 -3.30
       Second-orderh -1.93 -1.94 -1.73
Absolute value of t or z-statistics in brackets. * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level; 
n.a. = not applicable. See Annex for the definitions of variables.
Country, partner, bilateral and time effects as in Table 3.
Notes: a)-h)  see Table 3
i)  The ratio increases as employment protection, regulation or the labour tax wedge become more 
restrictive in the host country.
Source: OECD.
Table 4a. The influence of policies on foreign trade and investment
Total instock
multilateralbilateral TLSa
Dependent variable (ln)
Specification
Outstock
FDI
28 countries and partners
1980-2000
dynamic IVb
1980-2000
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bilateral TLSa
country partner country partner country partner partner
Total GDP 1.006 0.747 1.759 1.614 1.569 1.464 1.623
[11.15]** [8.77]** [29.53]** [31.88]** [27.51]** [27.22]** [11.31]**
Size similarity 0.539 0.44 0.897 0.676 0.803 0.571 0.659
 
[9.52]** [8.19]** [13.31]** [11.94]** [13.41]** [9.97]** [7.80]**
Factor dissimilarity 0.153 0.112 0.26 0.193 0.137 0.198 0.099
[3.87]** [2.72]** [1.93] [1.67] [0.97] [1.36] [0.92]
Human capital dissimilarity 0.54 0.46 -0.788 -0.852 -0.415 0.31 0.729
[2.80]** [2.69]** [2.24]* [2.21]* [1.08] [0.70] [1.25]
Distance -0.972 -0.991 -0.928 -0.806 -0.895 -0.795 -0.751
[18.18]** [20.63]** [19.44]** [18.81]** [23.42]** [19.36]** [7.43]**
Transport costs -0.71 -0.683
[11.37]** [11.75]**
R & D intensity 0.208
[7.89]**
Bilateral exchange rate -0.489 -0.285
[8.33]** [5.53]**
Free trade area 0.109 0.134 -0.02
[4.77]** [4.96]** [0.07]
FDI restrictions -0.039 -0.399
[0.84] [3.03]**
Bilateral tariff barriers -0.137 -0.145
[3.69]** [4.08]**
Non-tariff barriers -0.08
[4.23]**
Country or partner-specific policy variables
      Regulation -0.253 -0.118
[3.85]** [2.06]*
      Labour tax wedge -0.399 0.194 -0.608 -0.726
[5.54]** [2.94]** [3.83]** [4.70]**
      Employment protection -0.011 -0.022
[4.85]** [8.10]**
            With high-level  corporatism 0.002 0.001 0.034 0.01
[1.85] [0.92] [4.34]** [1.86]
            With mid-level corporatism -0.003 -0.002 -0.011 -0.003
[2.52]* [1.43] [1.47] [0.32]
            With low-level corporatism 0.001 -0.001
[0.60] [0.80]
Combined country/partner policy variables
 Regulationg -0.258 -0.241 -0.236 -0.258
[2.57]* [2.26]* [2.18]* [2.18]*
Transport infrastructureg 0.212 0.365
[2.39]* [5.70]**
Constant 1.50 1.21 -0.63 -0.06 -0.53 0.09 -0.11
[6.20]** [6.98]** [10.39]** [1.57] [11.02]** [1.88] [1.06]
Notes: 
Period 
Observationse 6107 6119 480 477 435 432 519
R-squaredf n.a. n.a. 0.79 0.76 0.79 0.76 n.a.
Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level; n.a. = not applicable.
See Annex for the definitions of variables.
Country, partner, bilateral and time effects as in Table 3.
Notes:a)-f) see Table 3
g)  Product of indicators in home and host countries.
Source: OECD.
Specification bilateral TLS
a bilateral TLSa bilateral TLSa
1980-2000
28 countries and partners 17 countries and 26 partners
1999-2000
Goods Services 
Export of
Table 4b. The influence of policies on foreign trade and investment
Dependent variable (ln)
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4.3.1. Openness 
66. FDI restrictions by the partner are estimated to have a significant negative impact on bilateral 
FDI outstocks (Table 4, panel A). For instance, the semi-elasticity estimates imply that such barriers could 
be depressing FDI outstocks by between 10 and 80 per cent, depending on the restriction considered (see 
Table 5).57 FDI restrictions are also found to significantly depress the inward position of a host country in 
the dynamic total instock regressions, which are based on a smaller set of OECD countries. However, this 
effect appears to be sensitive to changes in the country coverage, probably due to a relative lack of 
variability of restrictions across subsets of OECD countries, and to the the inclusion of additional policy 
variables in the regression, reflecting the close correlation between FDI and product market liberalisation 
over the sample period. 
Removal of foreign equity ceilings
Removal of approval and national interest tests
Easing of nationality requirements on managementb
a)  The simulations are based on the coefficients estimated in regression B of Table A17 in the Annex.
     The regressions cover bilateral FDI relationships between 28 OECD countries over the 1980-2000 period.
b) From majority of domestic managers to only one or more domestic managers.
Source: OECD.
21.2
10.1
77.9
Table 5. FDI positions: the hypothetical effect of removing FDI restrictionsa
Average across countries
Per cent change in 
inward FDI position
 
67. Similarly, border barriers directly affect trade in goods (Table 4, panel B). Applied bilateral tariff 
rates have a significant negative effect on exports, with the estimated elasticities implying around one per 
cent increase in exports as tariffs decline by one percentage point. Moreover, the estimates suggest that a 
decrease by one percentage point of the import coverage of (multilateral) non-tariff barriers in the partner 
may also increase bilateral exports of the home country by around one per cent. These results should be 
interpreted with caution because, due to data limitations, both the tariff and non-tariff measures are not 
fully appropriate: applied bilateral tariffs are available for only one recent year, and cover therefore only 
the cross-section dimension, while the available non-tariff measures are multilateral, and therefore do not 
accurately account for the influence of border barriers on bilateral trade.58  
                                                     
57. The estimated effect of restrictions is similar for FDI flows, with the reduction in flows implied by the 
restrictions varying between 9 and 70 per cent. The estimation results for FDI outflows are reported in the 
Annex. 
58. Available non-tariff measures are partner-specific variables that express MFN import protection against the 
average OECD exporter. Thus, they do not account for bilateral arrangements and other special regimes, 
including non-MFN treatment and anti-dumping measures. Bilateral tariffs do account for some of these 
factors, but are available only for the year 2001. It should be noticed, however, that results for bilateral 
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68. Table 4 also reports estimates of the potential cross-effects of border barriers on trade and FDI. 
To this end, tariff and non-tariff barriers were included in the FDI equations (to test for the tariff- jumping 
hypothesis) and, conversely, FDI restrictions were included in the trade equations. Estimation results for 
bilateral FDI outstocks and, especially, total instock equations provide some evidence that FDI may be 
aimed at bypassing non-tariff barriers, which often establish limits to market access (e.g. quotas), rather 
than tariff barriers, which generally add to the cost of trade without necessarily foreclosing exports. Indeed, 
tariff barriers appear to have a negative effect on FDI outstocks, perhaps reflecting their discouraging 
effect on the intra-firm trade related to vertical FDI. Some evidence of cross-effects is also found in 
services trade equations, with FDI restrictions negatively affecting trade in some regressions, perhaps 
reflecting the complementarity between commercial presence and consumption abroad or cross-border 
supply for some services (e.g. tourism). Cross effects are not found for exports of goods, suggesting that 
goods trade is not frequently resorted to as a means of bypassing FDI restrictions. 
69. As regards FTAs, the empirical analysis considered the impact of different situations of the home 
and partner countries: i) the two countries belong to any FTA; ii) the partner belongs to any FTA ; iii) the 
two countries belong to the same FTA; iv) the two countries belong to the EU, NAFTA or EFTA; and 
v) the partner (but not the home country) belongs to the EU, NAFTA or EFTA. Only results concerning the 
latter three situations and, for services trade regressions, membership in the EU or NAFTA are reported, 
since the dummies for membership of both countries or the partner in any FTA were insignificant in most 
cases. The analysis of situations (iv) and (v) omitted policy variables unrelated to openness to avoid 
multicollinearity problems, but the results are broadly unchanged in specifications including all policy 
variables. The three main findings were: 
1. Membership in the same FTA increases both exports of goods and FDI outstocks (Table 4); 
2. Bilateral exports of goods and outward FDI to partners belonging to a different FTA tend to 
increase only when the partner is a EU country (Table 6); 
3. FTA membership does not enhance exports of services. In particular, close integration under the 
Single Market Programme does not appear to have boosted services trade among EU countries 
(Table 6). 
Thus, FTAs that eliminate border barriers appear to be unsuccessful in raising services trade, perhaps 
because the latter is often impeded by non-border barriers. Moreover, FTAs appear to benefit principally 
goods trade among their members, but have little impact on trade with third-party countries (independent 
of their membership in another FTA), except when trading with a EU member. While FTAs also benefit 
FDI among their members, FDI outstocks are stimulated as well when the partner belongs to the European 
Union, though this effect is only weakly significant. In other words, the European Union appears to be 
more attractive for third-party FDI and exports than other FTAs, such as NAFTA. This may be related to 
lower average tariffs, closer integration (i.e. a custom union versus a free-trade area) in the Single Market 
and/or the different role played by rules of origin in the two areas.59 
                                                                                                                                                                             
tariffs are robust to the adjustment of standard errors for repeated observations over the time dimension 
(see the Annex). 
59. The finding that FDI is boosted by EU membership is consistent with related evidence by Pain (1997) and 
Pain and Lansbury (1997). Positive effects of EU membership on FDI from third-party countries were also 
found by Dunning (1997) and Barrell and Pain (1998). 
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country partner country partner country partner
Total GDP 1.89 1.918 1.33 0.662 1.999 1.692
[4.86]** [5.42]** [14.59]** [7.74]** [14.57]** [18.21]**
Size similarity 1.414 1.255 0.702 0.369 0.981 0.71
 [7.51]** [7.25]** [12.94]** [6.98]** [12.20]** [9.57]**
Factor dissimilarity -0.176 -0.395 0.164 0.12 0.444 0.259
[2.79]** [6.41]** [4.36]** [3.27]** [1.60] [2.78]**
Human capital dissimilarity -1.906 -1.934 0.216 0.093 -0.152 0.571
[8.56]** [9.34]** [1.26] [0.62] [0.23] [0.98]
Transport costs -0.693 -0.479 -0.749 -0.72
[5.75]** [3.74]** [13.74]** [14.16]**
Distance -1.042 -1.058 -0.844 -0.73
[20.97]** [22.14]** [7.44]** [6.84]**
R & D intensity 0.119
[4.12]**
Bilateral exchange rate 0.711 -0.718 -0.58 -0.346
[4.26]** [4.47]** [10.20]** [6.39]**
Exchange rate variabilityd -0.003 -0.002
[1.50] [1.26]
FDI restrictions -0.107 -0.139
[2.33]* [1.00]
Bilateral tariff barriers -0.097 -0.105
[2.31]* [2.69]**
Non-tariff barriers -0.074
[3.78]**
Infrastructure 0.355 0.381
[1.59] [3.19]**
European Union 0.529 0.808 0.058 0.163 0.194 0.26
[7.73]** [3.89]** [1.85] [3.34]** [0.83] [0.74]
NAFTA 1.578 1.754 0.485 0.495 -0.367 -0.508
[7.37]** [7.69]** [2.43]* [3.58]** [1.21] [1.54]
EFTA 0.466 0.5 0.183 0.239
[2.53]* [1.49] [3.12]** [3.12]**
Partner in:
European Union 0.376 0.144
[1.79] [3.16]**
NAFTA -0.048 0.033
[0.27] [0.64]
EFTA 0.264 0.027
[0.98] [0.46]
Constant -2.21 -0.85 2.08 0.82 -0.70 -0.09
[4.53]** [2.05]* [9.94]** [4.76]** [4.65]** [1.31]
Notes: 
Period 
Observationse 4521 4517 6958 6945 525 519
R-squaredf 0.73 0.66 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Absolute value of t or z-statistics in brackets. * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level; n.a. = not applicable.
See Annex for the definitions of variables.
Country, partner, bilateral and time effects as in Table 3.
Notes: a)-f) see Table 3
Source: OECD.
bilateral TLSa
17 countries and 26 partners
1999-2000
28 countries and partners
1980-2000
28 countries and partners
1980-2000
Specification
Outstock Services
Table 6. The influence of free-trade agreements
FDI Exports of
Goods
Dependent variable (ln)
bilateral TLSa bilateral TLSa
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70. Exchange rate variability can be interpreted as capturing the effect of economic unions to the 
extent that these generally require stable exchange rate arrangements or a single currency. In most 
regressions, a reduction of both bilateral and multilateral exchange rate volatility tends to increase FDI in 
the host country. Though this effect is not significant at conventional levels in the regressions reported in 
Table 4 and 6, it is significant in other bilateral and multilateral specifications of the FDI outstock and 
outflow equations (see the Annex). In some specifications, however, the sign is reversed, suggesting a 
positive relationship between exchange rate volatility and FDI, and no effects of volatility could be found 
on goods or services exports (the variable was therefore omitted from the preferred bilateral trade 
specifications reported in the tables). Whether currency unions stimulate economic integration among their 
members remains, therefore, a largely unresolved empirical issue. 
4.3.2. Product market regulation 
71. Product market regulations that curb competition are estimated to have a negative and significant 
effect on both trade and FDI (Table 4). However, the results suggest that they do so in different ways for 
FDI, trade in goods and trade in services. What is relevant for bilateral FDI outstocks is the ratio of the 
regulatory indicators in the host and home countries. As regulation in the host country becomes more 
restrictive than regulation in the home country, outstocks of the latter decrease. This is confirmed by the 
significantly negative impact of anti-competitive regulations in the host country (relative to the OECD 
average) on its total FDI instock.60 Put simply, the net effect of regulations that curb competition is to make 
the host country less attractive for international investors located in countries where regulations are less 
restrictive. No robust effect of the lack of intellectual property rights protection in the host country could 
be found on FDI outstocks, perhaps due to the crude proxy used to test for this potential effect of policies, 
which varies only in the cross-section dimension.61 Hence, this variable was omitted from the preferred 
specifications reported in Table 4. 
72. Conversely, what is most relevant for bilateral exports of goods is the level of regulation in the 
home country, which increases production costs, curbing the competitiveness of exports, distorts relative 
prices and possibly reduces also opportunities for intra-industry trade by narrowing product variety. To a 
lesser extent, regulations in the partner countries also tend to depress exports, suggesting that their effect 
on market access dominates the possible stimulating effect on the competitiveness of foreign versus home 
goods. 
73. Finally, estimation results point to an identical effect of regulations in the home and the partner 
country on bilateral services exports. In other words, statistical tests suggest that it is the product of the 
regulatory indicators in the two countries that has a negative and significant effect on services trade. This 
probably reflects the need for using efficiently inputs in both countries to produce many of the services that 
are traded (e.g. travel, freight, tourism, communication, banking). Moreover, regulation is estimated to 
have a stronger impact on services trade, as measured by the size of the estimated coefficient, than on both 
goods trade and FDI. The fact that anti-competitive regulations are generally more widespread in services, 
that these regulations combine in both the exporter and importer countries to lower service exports and that 
their combined impact is stronger than in goods trade, could contribute to explain not only cross-country 
patterns of services trade but also observed differences in trade intensities of goods and services. 
                                                     
60. In the total instock equation regulation can be interpreted as being expressed relative to the OECD average. 
61. Results for IPR are not robust to the adjustment of standard errors for repeated observations over the time 
dimension (see the Annex). The relationship between IPR protection and FDI is discussed in OECD 
(2002k). 
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4.3.3. Labour market arrangements 
74. The tax wedge on labour income appears to influence FDI in much the same way as 
anti-competitive regulation. What appears to be relevant for bilateral FDI outstocks is the ratio between 
wedges in the partner and the home country: the higher this ratio, the lower the outstock of FDI from the 
home country to the partner. This latter result is only partially confirmed by the dynamic total instock 
estimates, in which the wedge is estimated to have a negative, but weakly significant, impact on the ability 
of the host country to attract OECD-wide FDI. As with product market regulation, bilateral exports of 
goods are significantly depressed by a high tax wedge in the home country, suggesting that its impact on 
production costs is not fully offset by wages. In this case, however, a symmetric (though weaker) reverse 
effect is found for a high tax wedge in the partner, which ceteris paribus raises the competitiveness of the 
home country exports. Finally, high tax wedges in both the home country and the partner are estimated to 
have depressing effects on bilateral service exports, confirming that traded services may use labour inputs 
in both countries involved in the transaction.62  
75. Results for EPL are similar but more nuanced, because some of them depend on the bargaining 
regime in place in the home country and the partner. The effect of EPL on bilateral FDI outstocks and total 
FDI instocks mirrors that of anti-competitive regulations and wedges: host countries in which EPL is 
stricter than in their investing partners tend to attract significantly less FDI. Here, the bargaining regime 
plays no moderating role, perhaps due to the influence of EPL regimes on the risk-adjusted returns to 
foreign investment or differential information costs for domestic and foreign investors (see above). On the 
other hand, strict EPL in the home country depresses goods exports by increasing production costs, thus 
curbing the competitiveness of exported goods, and distorting relative prices, but only in countries where 
industry-level bargaining (labelled “mid-level corporatism” in Table 4) discourages the shift of those costs 
to wages. At the same time, no effect of strict EPL in the partner is found, independent of the level of 
corporatism. Finally, in services trade strict EPL in the home country and the partner both have a negative 
effect on exports, further confirming the pattern already observed for regulation and wedges. However, this 
effect vanishes in highly corporatist home countries.  
4.3.4. Infrastructure 
76. Table 4 looks only at the influence of infrastructure provision on FDI and trade in services, 
because the role of infrastructure for trade in goods is indirectly captured by transport costs and, therefore, 
is not modelled explicitly.63 Even though the coefficient estimated for infrastructure has the expected sign, 
the estimation results provide little evidence that the quality and quantity of infrastructure in the partner, as 
captured by the indicator described in the previous section, significantly affects bilateral patterns of FDI 
(see Annex). Therefore, this variable was omitted from the “preferred” specifications reported in Table 4. 
The lack of any definite result for this variable may also be related to its potential endogeneity to FDI (see 
above). Indeed, total instock regressions, which control for endogeneity through instrumental variable 
estimation, suggest that infrastructure tends to improve the overall attractiveness of a host country for 
international investors, though this result is sensitive to changes in country coverage.64 Moreover, transport 
infrastructure is estimated to have a sizeable and significant positive effect on trade in services. Here, 
                                                     
62. In this case, however, statistical tests rejected the hypothesis that the effect is identical in both countries. 
Therefore, separate coefficients were estimated for wedges in the home country and the partner. 
63. Transport would seem to be the main relevant infrastructure for trade in goods. It also plays an important 
role in trade in services, both directly through the freight and travel components of this trade and indirectly 
through the tourism component. 
64. Excluding the low infrastructure countries yields insignificant (though correctly signed) estimates, 
probably due to the lack of sufficient cross-country variability in the data.  
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infrastructure in both the country and partner is relevant for trade and, therefore, transport infrastructure is 
defined as the product of the indicator values in the two countries.65 The results suggest that the elasticity 
of bilateral service exports with respect to transport infrastructure provides a significant offset to the 
negative effect of distance. Poor or inefficient infrastructure is therefore a supplementary explanation of 
both cross-country services trade patterns and the relatively low trade intensity observed in the service 
sector. 
4.4. Summing up 
77. Empirical results broadly support the influences expected from both non-policy related and 
policy factors on trade and FDI. The main insights are the following:  
• Gravity forces affect trade and FDI in the same way. However, the effect of market size 
and transport costs on FDI and trade in services is, respectively, stronger and weaker than 
in goods trade. Thus, economic and geographic considerations alone are unable to 
explain the significant difference in the intensity of trade in goods and services.  
• Border barriers have a direct depressing effect on both trade and FDI, but there is also 
evidence that MNEs may be able to bypass non-tariff barriers, which limit the access of 
exporters to local markets, by increasing the activity of their foreign affiliates in these 
markets. Conversely, no such bypass seems to occur for tariff barriers, which raise the 
cost of trade for both exporters and vertical MNEs. 
• Participation in a FTA enhances trade and FDI amongst its members, but the only FTA 
that appears to have benefited also from an increase in trade and FDI from third parties is 
the European Union, perhaps due to its closer degree of integration. Moreover, FTAs do 
not appear to have affected positively services trade among their members, which might 
be due to limited coverage of the agreements and remaining non-border barriers. 
• There is some evidence that the supply of high quality infrastructure enhances the overall 
appeal of a host country with respect to inward FDI. Moreover, good infrastructure 
conditions in both the home country and partner have a powerful positive effect on 
services exports. 
• Anti-competitive regulations curb FDI and trade, with a particularly strong negative 
effect on services trade, which is sensitive to regulatory conditions in both the home 
country and the partner. 
• High tax wedges on labour income and strict EPL also curb FDI and trade, but the effect 
of EPL on trade depends on the bargaining regime. Again, services trade is particularly 
sensitive to conditions in both the home country and the partner. 
• Taken together, the results for services trade suggest that poor or inefficient 
infrastructure, lack of competitive pressures and adverse labour market arrangements in 
trading partners could contribute to explain the low services trade intensities relative to 
goods trade observed in many OECD countries. 
                                                     
65. The restriction that the coefficients of (the log of) infrastructure in the country and partner are the same is 
supported by statistical tests. 
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5. How do policies shape trade and FDI patterns? 
78. The impact of policies on trade and FDI is significant, but how much of the observed differences 
in bilateral trade and FDI transactions among OECD countries can actually be explained by differences in 
policies? What are the policies that play the largest role in explaining such differences? What would be the 
effect of changing policies on trade and FDI? Bearing in mind the illustrative nature of any policy 
simulation based on regression results, empirical estimates can be used to provide tentative answers to 
these questions.66 Specifically, this section quantifies i) the relative contributions of policies and other 
factors to the observed deviations of exports (of goods and services) and FDI from OECD averages; and 
ii) the long-run impact on total FDI instocks and export flows of changes in policies that affect border 
barriers, labour taxation and product market regulation. It is important to notice that the quantitative effects 
highlighted in the policy simulations depend on the specification of the estimated models as well as on the 
configuration of policies and the distribution of FDI stocks and trade flows in the baseline scenario. This is 
particularly the case for simulations concerning domestic regulatory policies in product and labour 
markets. Finally, given the specification of some of the policy variables, which entail a comparison 
between policies of the home country and the partner, diversion effects are not taken into account. To the 
extent that these effects are important, the simulation results may overestimate the effects of policy 
changes on the variables of interest.  
5.1. Accounting for cross-country patterns of trade and FDI 
79. Figures 21-23 show the contributions of policies to the deviation (in logarithms) of total FDI 
instocks, services exports and goods exports in each country from the OECD average over the 1990s. The 
figures also show how much of these deviations are explained on average by non-policy-related factors 
-- including gravity forces, factor endowments and all effects that are not accounted for by the policy and 
non-policy-related variables in the regressions (i.e. the country and partner-specific fixed effects and the 
bilateral effects) -- and the unexplained regression residual.67 The decompositions shown in the figures are 
based on the results of the bilateral equations averaged over the estimation period and investor countries 
(for FDI instocks) or importer countries (for exports of goods and services). The precise specifications on 
which the simulations are based are reported in the figures. 
80. Policies influence bilateral FDI positions across Member countries almost as much as all other 
(“non-policy”) factors taken together (Figure 21).68 The most important policy effects come from labour 
market arrangements and openness factors. A more detailed analysis shows that the labour tax wedge is the 
most influential component of these arrangements, with EPL playing a lesser role. Anti-competitive 
product market regulations explain a smaller part of the deviations of FDI instocks from the OECD 
average. However, these policy influences play different roles in different countries. For instance, while 
labour market arrangements have a relatively positive influence on FDI instocks in English-speaking 
countries, Japan and Portugal, they tend to depress them in other European countries. Similarly, while in 
most European countries and the United States openness factors play a positive role, comparatively  
                                                     
66. In particular, this kind of simulations assumes that policy changes do not change the estimated average 
relationships (i.e. the estimated regression coefficients) between trade, FDI and policies and are thus 
subject to the Lucas critique (Lucas, 1976). Moreover, it is assumed that these average cross-country 
relationships are representative of relationships in each country. 
67 . Since differences in the level of trade and FDI across countries are captured by dummy variables, it is not 
surprising that policy variables appear to play a relatively small role in contributing to the overall variance 
in the data. 
68. The unexplained residual is generally very small in the FDI equations. 
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1. Other border barriers  contains the contribution of tariff and non-tariff barriers of memership
 in a free-trade area.
Labour market  contains the countributions of the relative indicator of the tax wedge on labour 
income and of the relative indicator of employment protection legislation. 
Product market  contains the contribution of the relative level of barriers to entry. 
Other  include the contribution of the structural variables and dummy variables. 
2. Contributions are computed using the results of regression B in Table A17 in the Annex.
Details on the methodology used to compute the contributions are in the Annex.
3. Average is computed on countries included in the sample.
     Source:  OECD.
Figure 21.
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restrictive border measures depress FDI instocks relative to the OECD average in Canada, Australia and, to 
a lesser extent, Japan. The contribution of product market regulation is significant for countries having 
either a relatively liberal approach (the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada and Sweden), where it pushes up relative FDI instocks, or a relatively restrictive approach 
(continental European countries), where it pulls down relative FDI instocks.  
81. Policies also play an important (though smaller) role in explaining why services exports are 
above or below the OECD average (Figure 22). In this case, the contribution of other factors is inflated by 
unexplained regression residuals, which are larger than for FDI. The contribution of policies to explaining 
services trade is more evenly distributed than for FDI among product market regulation, the tax wedge, and 
infrastructure provision though the latter tends to predominate. The tax wedge favours services exports 
relative to the OECD average particularly in Australia, Japan, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, while it penalises them in France, Austria, Finland, Denmark and, especially, Sweden. 
Having comparatively liberal product markets in services industries enhances services exports relative to 
the OECD average in the United Kingdom, Australia, Sweden, Finland and the United States, while 
relatively restrictive markets curb them in Canada, Greece, Portugal and Austria. Finally, relatively poor 
transport infrastructure endowments depress services exports in Japan and Italy, while its effect is either 
positive or close to zero in other countries. 
82. Policies can explain only a relatively small part of the cross-country variance in goods exports 
(Figure 23). Most of this variance is explained by geographical and other non-policy-related factors (such 
as market size and distance from major OECD markets). The main policy influences come from bilateral 
openness (e.g. the border barriers faced by the exporter country when trading with its partners) and labour 
market arrangements, while product-market regulations generally play a lesser role. Exports of EU 
countries are pushed up relative to the OECD average by bilateral openness with trading partners, which 
are mainly within the Single Market, while non-EU countries suffer from a relative lack of bilateral 
openness with respect to their EU trade partners. A closer look at the impact of policies in each country 
suggests that, in many cases, offsetting effects are at work. For instance, Australia, New Zealand, the 
United States, Canada and Japan are penalised by a relative lack of bilateral openness, but relatively liberal 
labour and/or product market policies help to offset this negative bilateral openness. Conversely, while 
goods exports in European countries are stimulated by gravity factors, they are negatively affected by a 
relatively restrictive policy stance in labour and product markets. The only countries in which all policy 
factors depress goods exports relative to the OECD average are Switzerland and, to a lesser extent, 
Norway.  
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Average contributions (absolute values)
1. Product market contains the contribution of the level of barriers to entry. 
Other  include the contribution of the structural variables and dummy variables. 
Residual  contains the unexplained part of the variation.
2. Contributions are computed using the results of regression D in Table A23 in the Annex.
Details on the methodology used to compute the contributions are in the Annex.
3. Average is computed on countries included in the sample.
    Source:  OECD.
Figure 22.
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       Average contributions (absolute values)
1. Openness  contains the contributions of bilateral tariffs of memership in a free-trade area. 
Labour market contains the contributions of the relative indicator of the tax wedge on labour income 
and of the relative indicator of employment protection legislation. 
Product market  contains the contribution of the relative level of barriers to entry. 
Other  include the contribution of the structural variables and dummy variables. 
Residual  contains the unexplained part of the variation.
2. Contributions are computed using the results of regression D in Table A20 in the Annex.
Details on the methodology used to compute the contributions are in the Annex.
3. Average is computed on countries included in the sample.
       Source:  OECD.
Figure 23. Policies and goods exports1
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5.2. The impact of removing impediments to trade and FDI 
83. The lifting of border and non-border barriers to trade and investment figures significantly on both 
national and international policy agendas (see, for instance, World Bank, 2002, 2003; and OECD, 2001d, 
2003). To quantify the likely impact of such policy changes, the preferred equations described above have 
been used to simulate the following hypothetical policy scenarios: 
• Policies aimed at lifting border barriers. These include i) the OECD-wide alignment of 
FDI restrictions and multilateral non-tariff barriers on those of the least restrictive OECD 
country; ii) the alignment of bilateral tariff rates on those of the least restrictive trading 
partner or the least restrictive country pair; and iii) the accession to the European Union 
by the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland; 
• Domestic competition-oriented policies in product markets that result in an alignment of 
product-market regulations on those of the least restrictive OECD country; 
• Domestic labour tax reforms that result in the alignment of the labour tax wedge on that 
of the OECD country with the lowest wedge. 
5.2.1. Policies and FDI 
84. Figure 24 shows the effect of bringing FDI restrictions in all OECD countries down to the level 
of restrictions in the United Kingdom, the least restrictive country according to the indicator described in 
Golub (2003). This move would require country-specific reforms that differ in content and scope 
depending on the patterns of FDI restrictions in place, but typically they would imply lifting screening 
requirements and restrictions on foreign shareholdings, and substantially reducing other restrictions 
(e.g. on the nationality of management, board composition and movement of people). The effects of such 
reforms on FDI instocks depend on how restrictive each country was before the policy move. Relatively 
restrictive countries could increase their total FDI instock by between 40 and 80 per cent, but even in 
countries that are estimated to be already relatively liberal the gains could amount to around 20 per cent of 
their initial instock.69 Overall, such policy reforms could increase OECD-wide instocks by almost 20 per 
cent. 
85. Reducing anti-competitive product market regulations is also likely to increase significantly FDI 
instocks (Figure 25). If all OECD countries were to reduce the level of their product market regulations to 
that in the United Kingdom (the least restrictive country), OECD-wide instocks would increase by over 
10 per cent relative to the initial instock. Since bilateral FDI outstocks are estimated to depend on the 
relative stringency of regulation in the home and host countries, relatively restrictive host countries -- such 
as Greece, Italy and France -- that host FDI from relatively liberal countries could increase their FDI 
instocks by as much as 60 to 80 per cent through regulatory reform. Conversely, countries that are 
relatively liberal would see the relative attractiveness of their product markets either unchanged (such as in 
the United States, New Zealand and Sweden) or even reduced (such as in the United Kingdom and 
Australia). 
                                                     
69. In the simulations, the initial stock is defined as the inward FDI position in 1998. 
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1. The simulation is based on the coefficient estimated in regression B of Table A17 in the Annex. It shows the effect of a decrease
in regulation in all countries to the level of the least restrictive country (i.e. the United Kingdom).
The regressions cover bilateral FDI relationships between 28 OECD countries over the 1980-2000 period.
Details on simulation methodologies are in the Annex.
Source:  OECD.
Figure 24.
 Policies and inward FDI positions: the scope for further integration1
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1. The simulation is based on the coefficient estimated in regression B of Table A17 in the Annex. It shows the effect of a decrease
in regulation in all countries to the level of the least restrictive country (i.e. the United Kingdom).
The regressions cover bilateral FDI relationships between 28 OECD countries over the 1980-2000 period.
Details on simulation methodologies are in the Annex.
Source:  OECD.
Figure 25. Policies and inward FDI positions: the scope for further integration1
Easing product market regulations
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5.2.2. Policies and trade 
86. Figure 26 looks at the effects of three different policies -- reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers 
(panel A), liberalising product markets and reducing the tax wedge on labour income (panel B) -- on 
country-specific and OECD-wide goods exports. Countries are ordered according to the cumulative gains 
obtained by implementing these policies. For bilateral tariffs, two scenarios are simulated: the decrease of 
tariffs to meet the lowest tariff among each country’s trading partners; and the equalisation of all tariffs at 
the level of the lowest bilateral tariff observed in the OECD area. Consistent with regression results (see 
above), the liberalisation and labour tax reduction scenario take into account the cumulative effects on 
exports of policy changes in both the exporter and importer countries. 
 
Panel A. Effect of reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers2
Figure 26. Change in goods exports from reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers, 
product market regulation and the tax wedge on labour income1
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1. The simulation is based on the coefficients estimated in regressions D and E of Table A20 in the Annex. 
    Details on simulation methodologies are in the annex.
2. Tariff scenario 1 : bilateral tariffs are reduced to the least restrictive average bilateral tariff in the OECD (0.057 % in 2001).
   Tariff scenario 2:  for each country bilateral tariffs are reduced to the least restrictive average tariff it faces when trading
   with its OECD partners in 2001.
   Non -tariff scenario : the import coverage of multilateral non-tariff barriers is aligned in all countries to that of the least 
   restrictive country in 1996 (Iceland). For Iceland, simulation cannot be presented as this country is present in the sample 
   only as a partner.
3. The simulation shows the effects of a easing regulation in all countries to the level of the least restrictive country
    and a decrease in tax wedges to the level of the lowest wedge country in 2000 (Australia).
Source:  OECD.
Panel B. Effect of easing product market regulation and reducing tax wedges3
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87. The increase in the level of total exports within the OECD area ranges from 6 to 20 per cent, 
depending on the policy package implemented. Unsurprisingly, the largest and most widespread gains are 
obtained by setting all bilateral tariffs to their minimum OECD level (close to zero), but significant large 
gains are also obtained when the import coverage of non-tariff barriers is reduced to the level found in the 
least restrictive country (Iceland according to the indicator presented above). Country-specific gains from 
these policies (relative to the level of exports in 1998) depend on the initial geographical distribution of a 
country’s exports, but generally lie within a range of 10 to 15 per cent. The alignment of tariffs on those of 
the least restrictive partner would imply smaller gains (ranging from 4 to 10 per cent for most countries), 
partly because trade with high-tariff partners is usually weak. Simulated export gains from easing 
multilateral non-tariff barriers are more uniform across countries (around 7 to 8 per cent), partly reflecting 
the smaller cross-country differences due to the lack of the bilateral dimension in the available data.  
88. Large OECD-wide gains are also obtained by aligning regulatory restrictions on those of the least 
regulated OECD country in 1998 (the United Kingdom, according to the indicator used in the empirical 
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analysis). The increase in exports implied by such policy for relatively restrictive countries -- such as 
Greece, Portugal, Italy, France, Switzerland and Ireland -- is about 30 per cent. Finally, curbing tax wedges 
to meet those of the lowest tax wedge country in 2000 (Australia) yields smaller, but still noticeable, 
OECD-wide gains. Indeed, in several European countries, where wedges are relatively high, this policy 
yields gains that are comparable to those obtained by reducing non-tariff barriers. Interestingly, the export 
losses implied by this policy scenario in a few countries (notably Australia and Ireland) reflect the relative 
loss in competitiveness of these countries’ exports to countries that experience a large drop in the tax 
wedge as a result of the policy. On the whole, changes in policies have significant effects on goods exports 
in most countries, even though their absolute contribution to explaining deviations of exports from the 
OECD average is small (see above).  
89. Figure 27 reports the results of a similar simulation for exports of services.70 In this case, the 
gains implied by non-manufacturing product market liberalisation and lower labour tax wedges are larger, 
reflecting the stronger estimated effect of policies on bilateral service exports. Tax and product market 
reform could increase total services exports among OECD countries by 50 and 20 per cent, respectively. 
1. The simulation is based on the coefficients estimated in regressions D and E of Table A23 in the Annex. 
    Details on simulation methodologies are in the annex.
2. The simulation shows the effects of easing regulation in non-manufacturing industries to the level of the least restrictive country 
in 1998 (the United Kingdom) and  aligning wedges to that of the lowest wedge country in 2000 (Australia).
Source:  OECD.
Figure 27. Change in services exports from easing product market regulation
 and reducing the tax wedge on labour income1,2
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70. Here regulation is specific to non-manufacturing and the most liberal country in 1998 is again estimated to 
be the United Kingdom. 
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5.2.3. EU accession, FDI and trade 
90. Empirical results suggest that participation in free-trade agreements has had significant effects on 
both trade and FDI, especially within the European Union. Quantifying these effects is particularly 
important for OECD countries that will join the European Union in 2004, as established in the recent 
Athens EU Council Meeting. Table 7 suggests that the gains from EU accession for the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland will indeed be sizeable in terms of trade integration and FDI stocks. This is due to 
both increased transactions with other EU countries and (to a lesser extent) increased trade and investment 
flows from non-EU countries. Trade flows are estimated to increase by around 10 per cent in both 
directions while FDI outstocks and instocks are estimated to double relative to average levels in the 1990s 
in most countries. However, these simulation results are likely to overestimate the actual post-accession 
gains to the extent that trade and FDI stocks have already been affected by the expectation of EU 
membership. 
 
Percent increase in 
exports c
Percent increase in 
imports c
Percent increase in the 
FDI outstock d
Percent increase in the 
FDI instock d
Czech Republic 11.5 10.9 103.0 112.0
 (47.2)  (49.7)  (0.4)  (24.2)
Hungary 11.2 10.4 28.1 107.0
 (45.0)  (47.8)  (1.6)  (19.3)
Poland 11.6 10.7 92.2 104.9
 (15.0)  (26.0)  (0.3)  (9.3)
a) The simulation is based on the coefficient estimated in regression B of Table A13 in the Annex. 
b)  Initial levels relative to GDP are in parentheses.
c) Relative to 1998 values.
d)  Relative to the average level over the 1990s.
Source: OECD.
Table 7. The effects of European Union accession on trade and FDI a,b
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Annex 1. FDI and other miscellaneous data: sources and methodologies 
 
A1.1 Dependent variables 
91. The four main activities studied in the paper are foreign direct investment, trade in goods, trade in 
services, and the activities of foreign affiliates. Table A1 presents the basic information about the data sets 
used. The study primarily focuses on the period 1980-2000 and 28 countries, where data for Belgium and 
Luxembourg are combined and Slovakia is not included because of insufficient availability of data and 
indicators. The coverage of FDI and trade in goods is broadly the same over the cross-country as well as 
the time-series dimension. Services trade data are only available for the 1999-2000 period, while the data 
on foreign affiliates have a more patchy time-series coverage. 
Table A1. Basic data used in the analysis 
 FDI flows and stocks a) Activities of foreign 
affiliates 
Trade in goods a) Trade in services 
Number of reporting     
countries 28 19 28 17 
Countries excluded Slovakia 
Australia, Canada, 
Switzerland, Denmark, 
Spain, Greece, Iceland, 
Korea, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Slovakia 
Slovakia 
Belgium+Luxembourg, 
Switzerland, Czech 
Rep., Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Korea, 
Mexico, New Zealand, 
Poland, Slovakia, 
Turkey 
     
Number of partners 28 29 28 27 
Partners excluded Slovakia Slovakia Slovakia Belgium+Luxembourg,  Slovakia 
     
Time span 1980-2000 1990-1999 1980-2000 1999-2000 
 
a) Data are combined for Belgium and Luxembourg. 
Source: OECD. 
92. Table A2 provides basic statistics on the trade and FDI data used in the empirical analysis.71 
Statistics refer to both bilateral data, reflecting the stocks/flows between two countries, and multilateral 
data, reflecting the overall inward or outward positions of the reporting countries. As highlighted in the 
main text, there are large cross-country differences in bilateral and multilateral trade and investment 
intensities. 
                                                     
71. In the analysis, the variables are expressed in US dollars at 1996 purchasing power, and logarithms are 
taken of these values. 
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Table A2. Characteristics of the dependent variables 
Bilateral values Multilateral values 
Variablea) Number of 
observations 
Mean Maximum Number of 
observations 
Mean Maximum 
Outflows ratio 8032 0.0009 0.130 492 0.015 0.336 
Inflows ratio 7862 0.0010 0.196 490 0.015 0.340 
Outstock ratio 6161 0.0058 0.394 394 0.091 0.649 
Instock ratio 6136 0.0084 0.442 395 0.131 0.834 
Manufacturing export ratio 13843 0.0077 0.337 525 0.186 0.798 
Manufacturing import ratio 13851 0.0081 0.271 525 0.194 0.673 
Services export ratio 659 0.0026 0.070 380 0.068 0.155 
Services import ratio 659 0.0029 0.123 380 0.061 0.275 
 
a) Ratios are expressed as a share of reporting country’s GDP. 
Source: OECD. 
A1.1.1 Foreign direct investment 
93. Foreign direct investment is a category of international investment made by a resident entity in 
one country (direct investor) with the objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in 
another country (direct investment enterprise). ”Lasting interest” implies the existence of a long-term 
relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise and a significant degree of influence by the 
direct investor on the management of the direct investment enterprise. Direct investment involves both the 
initial transaction between the two entities and all subsequent capital transactions between them and among 
affiliated enterprises, both incorporated and unincorporated. According to classification applied in balance-
of-payments accounts, a foreign direct investment enterprise is an incorporated enterprise in which a 
foreign investor owns 10 per cent or more of the ordinary shares or voting power or an unincorporated 
enterprise in which a foreign investor has equivalent ownership. 
94. The present study takes advantage of the existence of two qualitatively different sets of data on 
foreign direct investment, and can thus look at the international investment activity from two perspectives: 
from the viewpoint of (“financial”) investment flows and stocks, and from the viewpoint of “real” 
activities of foreign affiliates in the OECD countries. The two data sets differ mainly due to their different 
coverage: while FDI flows and stocks relate to ownership of 10 per cent or more of the shares or voting 
power, the data on the activities of foreign affiliates include only enterprises with foreign ownership of 
50 per cent or more. Because of the better coverage, this study focuses on the analysis of the financial data; 
the information on real activities of foreign affiliates is used as a complementary descriptive tool. 
 Investment stocks and flows  
95. Statistics on FDI transactions and positions are based on the OECD database developed by the 
Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs (published under the title International Direct 
Investment Statistics Yearbook). These statistics are compiled according to the concepts used for balance of 
payments (flows) and international investment position (stocks) statistics. Both data sets are available for 
inward and outward investment with further breakdowns i) by partner country and ii) by economic sector 
(according to ISIC Rev. 3 classifications).  
96. Generally, information on inward flows and stocks and on outward flows and stocks is available. 
The data set used in the empirical analysis covers 28 OECD countries (Luxembourg and Belgium report 
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together; data for Slovakia are not included) over the 1980-2000 period and hence comprises 756 country-
partner pairs per year for a potential of 15 876 observations. However, some countries are not yet able to 
provide complete sets of statistics and, therefore, the panel is unbalanced.72 
97. Using the bilateral dimension, data limitations can be sometimes remedied by using data on the 
mirror activity in the country-partner pair to substitute for missing observations. Thus, for instance, if 
country X does not report data on its outward stock, the data reported by all other countries on their inward 
stocks from country X can be used. While potential differences in reporting methodologies (see below) 
make it inadvisable to use this approach to replace single missing observations, the procedure can be 
adopted for those series that are entirely missing for a given country-pair. Around 19 per cent of the sample 
(the share varies depending on the variable) has been restored by applying this procedure (Table A3).  
Table A3. FDI observations gained by using mirror information 
Number of observations in 
Variable 
Original data Enlarged data 
Outward stock 5086 6193 
Outflows 7093 8059 
Inward stock 4985 6148 
Inflows 7348 7897 
Source: OECD. 
98. Substantial progress has been made towards agreed international standards for FDI data 
compilation established by the IMF and the OECD. However, some OECD countries still deviate from the 
standards in terms of, for instance, the elements included in the disseminated data (income on equity, 
reinvested earnings and income on debt), the treatment of indirectly-owned investment enterprises or, to a 
minor extent, definitions used to identify direct investment enterprises resident in the reporting country. 
The majority of countries report data on investment positions based on book values, but some measure the 
positions in market values. These issues make the cross-sectional comparability of the data somewhat 
problematic. However, to the extent that they do not vary over time, most of these cross-country 
idiosyncrasies are potentially handled by the fixed country- and partner-specific effects used in the 
empirical analysis.  
99. Table A4 provides details on the geographical distribution of bilateral FDI. It describes the 
concentration (kurtosis) of the distribution and the number of partners for each country. 
                                                     
72. For the period 1980-2000, no geographic breakdown is available for the stock data for the Belgium-
Luxembourg Economic Union, Spain, Ireland and Turkey; for outward stocks for Hungary and Mexico; 
and for outflows for Greece and Mexico. 
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Table A4. Statistics on the geographical distribution of bilateral FDI 
Kurtosisa) Number of partnersb) 
Country 
Outflows Inflows Outstock Instock Outflows Inflows Outstock Instock 
Australia 6.78 17.68 6.17 9.05 19 21 16 21 
Austria 5.17 8.79 5.11 15.78 26 22 25 23 
Belgium 3.81 9.14 8.77 2.66 27 27 23 21 
Canada 12.02 17.41 20.37 21.16 21 20 24 24 
Czech Republic 1.00 3.69 9.54 8.59 2 17 21 26 
         
Denmark 7.53 11.29 17.79 8.77 22 14 27 21 
Finland 22.74 14.89 10.90 12.87 26 17 25 18 
France 5.45 8.38 7.39 3.62 27 27 26 26 
Germany 23.01 9.12 13.48 8.37 27 27 27 26 
Greece 5.73 1.00 10.47 4.80 12 2 13 17 
         
Hungary n.a. n.a. 3.29 8.25 n.a. n.a. 8 25 
Ireland 6.60 1.50 9.06 5.72 19 3 17 17 
Iceland 5.56 5.85 3.61 12.99 16 15 17 15 
Italy 3.95 3.39 2.45 1.58 25 19 11 11 
Japan 7.21 15.25 11.86 13.12 19 18 15 16 
         
Korea 10.75 4.98 18.87 n.a. 20 17 22 n.a. 
Mexico 5.15 18.32 9.07 19.16 7 22 11 24 
Netherlands 7.89 5.88 9.32 7.74 27 24 27 27 
Norway 3.45 3.76 3.11 3.91 15 10 19 16 
New Zealand 3.42 9.67 7.39 5.21 13 17 12 16 
         
Poland 5.73 10.17 5.20 8.71 9 26 18 26 
Portugal 8.13 5.01 11.86 3.16 26 24 26 27 
Spain 2.57 6.59 3.16 2.77 23 26 18 18 
Sweden 18.08 15.80 5.99 3.56 23 18 25 19 
         
Switzerland 7.52 10.59 10.48 5.32 25 20 25 21 
Turkey 1.50 6.08 6.29 1.44 3 15 10 11 
United Kingdom 20.68 6.25 16.22 15.01 25 16 25 19 
United States 8.30 9.11 9.40 3.98 26 24 27 27 
 
a) Kurtosis of bilateral values in 1998. The kurtosis statistics measures (on an increasing scale) the extent to which the distribution of bilateral 
FDI is concentrated around a few investors/hosts. 
b) Number of partners with non-zero and non-missing values. 
Source: OECD. 
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 Activity of foreign affiliates 
100. The complementary approach to measure foreign direct investment is to use “real” data. The data 
used in the descriptive part of this study are drawn from a database developed by the OECD Directorate for 
Science, Technology and Industry and published in Measuring Globalization: The Role of Multinationals 
in OECD Economies that stores information on the activities of foreign affiliates. These data are based on 
surveys of foreign-owned enterprises and are disaggregated by investing country and by industry.73 The 
reported information includes turnover, employment and value added. Research and development 
expenditures and intra-firm exports and imports are also reported, but their coverage is very limited.  
101. The cross-sectional coverage of this database is limited to 21 reporting countries, 19 of which can 
be used for multilateral and 12 for bilateral analysis. Each of these countries reports transactions with all its 
partners; 29 OECD partners are used in the analysis. In general, data pertain to the 1990-1999 period. For 
most countries, however, data are available for only a few years or even just a single year. 
102. The statistics on foreign affiliates in services and manufacturing are provided by different 
national sources: central banks usually provide data on the activities of foreign affiliates in the service 
sector, while finance ministries, trade ministries, or business registries are the sources of data on the 
activities of foreign affiliates in manufacturing. Therefore, the two sets of data are not necessarily 
consistent. The same industries may appear in both databases and values of the activities in these industries 
for some countries may not be the same. 
103. Foreign affiliates are included in the database if foreign investors have majority shareholdings in 
their capital.74 Hence, the activities covered represent a subset of all activities originated by “financial” 
foreign direct investment. Also, the information on real activities is collected at the level of the company 
and is classified accordingly (i.e. all activities of the affiliate are classified according to its main activity), 
while industrial statistics are usually based on establishment-level surveys. Therefore, direct comparability 
of employment, turnover and value-added in foreign affiliates to the corresponding sectoral or national 
account aggregates is impossible. Selected basic ratios relating these foreign affiliates’ statistics to 
industrial statistics are used for descriptive purposes only in this study.  
A1.1.2 Foreign trade 
104. The information on trade in goods and trade in services has been collected from three sources 
within the OECD.  
105. Data on trade in goods come from the OECD publication International Trade by Commodity 
Statistics. This database provides time-series disaggregated according to trading partners. The primary 
sources of these data are customs records. For the purposes of the study, the same coverage as for financial 
FDI data was used, i.e. 28 countries and 28 partners over the 1980-2000 period. 
106. The newly-developed OECD database on bilateral trade in services (Statistics on International 
Trade in Services 1999-2000) was the source of the information on trade in services with partner 
disaggregation. These statistics cover 17 countries and 27 partners over the two years period. The primary 
source of the data is national balance of payments statistics, which measures only imperfectly the actual 
                                                     
73. Industries are coded according to ISIC rev.3. 
74. Some countries collect information also on enterprises where the share of the foreign investor is below 
50 per cent (the surveys in Hungary, Portugal and the United States include enterprises where the foreign 
share is at least 10 per cent). 
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amount of services trade, e.g. by failing to distinguish the various modes of supply and omitting certain 
items.75 
107. While no industry detail is available for the bilateral service trade data, sectoral details exist for 
multilateral trade in services over the 1990-1999 period. In this study, the sectoral data have been used for 
descriptive purposes only.  
A1.2. Non-policy-related structural variables 
108. The basic structural specification of trade and investment equations employs the gravity and 
factor proportion approaches in a panel data setting.76 Indexing the home country by i and the partner 
country by j, the gravity factors used in the present study include: 
− Total GDP ijt= )ln( jtit GDPGDP + , 
 measuring joint market size and the implied economies of scale.  
− Size similarity ijt=
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capturing the relative size of the two countries that influences bilateral intra-industry trade and 
horizontal investment. The exponent of this indicator varies between 0 (absolute size divergence) 
and 0.5 (countries are equal in size).  
− Distanceij is measured as the geographic distance between the capitals of the two countries 
and proxies for transport and transaction cost. 
− Transport costijt = 
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measuring the difference between the value of goods declared in the importing country (c.i.f.) 
and the value of goods declared in the exporting country (f.o.b.). Transport costs hence explicitly 
address the cost of trading goods. In order to smooth out the volatility of the data, a three-year 
moving average was computed.  
109. Factor proportions are expressed by: 
− Factor dissimilarityijt = 
it
it
jt
jt
N
K
N
K
lnln −  
                                                     
75. For a discussion of the limitations of balance of payments statistics on services, see Maurer and Chauvet 
(2002). 
76. Markusen and Maskus (2001) discuss a “unified approach” to international trade and investment and Egger 
(2000) discusses a correct specification of a panel gravity model. 
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This measures the difference between the relative factor endowments of the two countries. 
Relative factor endowments are defined as the capital-labour ratio (K stands for capital stock in 
the business sector, N for total employment in the business sector). The indicator is equal to zero 
when the relative factor endowments in both countries are identical, and increases with their 
difference. This variable captures comparative advantage considerations for bilateral trade, while 
for international investment it is supposed to determine whether cost advantages or cost 
similarities are more sought by MNEs. Data on capital stock and employment come from the 
OECD. Although some information is in general available for all countries, the availability of 
data on capital stock represents a significant problem in constructing this indicator, and therefore 
a proxy variable is defined below and used in the study.  
− Factor dissimilarity (alternative definition)ijt = 
it
it
jt
jt
POP
GDP
POP
GDP
lnln −  
The alternative definition of factor dissimilarity is expressed as the dissimilarity of national per 
capita incomes (POP stands for the population of a country; the source for these data is the 
OECD). The rationale for using this proxy is the long run positive relationship between high 
capital intensity of an economy and its income. Empirical results are robust to the use of the two 
alternative definitions of factor dissimilarity.  
− Human capital dissimilarityijt = itjt HCHC lnln −  
Human capital dissimilarity is defined in a similar way, and captures the difference between the 
two countries in terms of skilled labour. Human capital (HC) is measured as the average years of 
education of the working age population achieved in the country. Average years of education are 
a weighted average of years of education spent in different education levels, with weights equal 
to the share of working age population in each level. These data were drawn from Bassanini and 
Scarpetta (2001) and extended. 
110. Other economic factors:  
− The bilateral exchange rate77 is defined as units of partner currency per one unit of domestic 
currency. In the multilateral specification, the nominal effective exchange rate was used, 
which is a trade-weighted average of nominal bilateral exchange rates. Bilateral exchange 
rates and effective exchange rates come from the OECD 
                                                     
77. The level of bilateral exchange rate has important implications for international trade as it directly 
influences the competitiveness of the exports via price. The implications for foreign investment are more 
complicated. Here various effects are at work.  
− A simple accounting (or measurement) effect: as foreign investment is measured in dollars, changes in 
the exchange rate result in a revaluation of the stocks and flows. Depreciation thus should decrease the 
dollar value of a given investment.  
− An asset effect: host country depreciation should make assets in that country cheap, and ceteris paribus 
increase both horizontal and vertical investment.  
− A macroeconomic effect: depreciation in the host country may be a sign of instability, leading to a 
decrease in foreign investment.  
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− Exchange rate variability is defined as the yearly variability of the monthly exchange rate. It 
captures the foreign currency risk and is an indicator of the transaction costs incurred by 
traders and investors. 
− R&D intensity is defined as a country’s business expenditure on R&D as a percentage of its 
GDP. The data are drawn from the OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators, and are 
available for all countries. 
A1.3 Miscellaneous policy indicators  
111. The study analyses five main groups of policy variables: openness, infrastructure, taxation, and 
product and labour market regulation. Data on some policy variables were drawn from secondary sources 
(e.g. bilateral tariffs and intellectual property rights protection), but most of the policy indicators were 
created in the context of previous OECD studies, and new indicators of infrastructure, bilateral taxation 
and FDI restrictions were constructed for this study. These newly constructed indicators and indicators of 
product market regulation are described in separate Annexes. Here the focus is on those policy indicators 
that are either from secondary sources or are not described elsewhere. 
112. For the econometric analysis, all indicator variables were rescaled to range from 0 to 100. They 
are generally increasing in the level of regulation (Regulatory reform, Barriers to entry, Liberalisation, 
Employment protection regulation, FDI restrictions), quality of infrastructure or in the other dimensions 
covered (Indexes of co-ordination, centralisation and corporatism). The indicator of intellectual property 
rights (see Annex 5), however, decreases in the level of protection. 
113. Not all indicators are available for all countries (e.g. indicators for new Member countries are 
often missing). Therefore, the analysis of the influence of the full set of policies was limited to a subset of 
21 home countries and 20 host countries.78 Moreover, not all indicators cover the time-series dimension. 
Time invariant policy variables, generally referring to 1998, were used in the analysis where necessary (see 
Table A2.6 for availability and means of policy variables). 
A1.3.1 Openness variables 
114. Multilateral tariff barriers are expressed as the ad valorem tariff per cent rates; non-tariff 
barriers are expressed in their (per cent) import coverage. Multilateral tariff and non-tariff barriers were 
obtained by aggregation of the sectoral values available from the UNCTAD/OECD Indicators of Tariff and 
Non-tariff Barriers (UNCTAD, 2000). The tariff barriers were aggregated from 6-digit level of the 
Harmonised System to 2-digit level using import weights, and to national levels using sectoral value-added 
weights. The periods covered are 1988, 1993 and 1996. The data were interpolated in the missing years 
and the beginning and end values were extended backward and forward to cover the 1980-2000 period. 
The UNCTAD’s Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) has been the source of the most 
comprehensive available set of data on government trade measures; however, it is incomplete across 
countries and products and fails to capture all complexities of the NTBs. The data on tariff and non-tariff 
barriers are not available for Switzerland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Turkey. Therefore, all 
estimates that include multilateral tariff and/or non-tariff barriers exclude these countries.   
                                                     
78. Home countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium+Luxembourg, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United States. Host countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium+Luxembourg, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, 
New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United States. 
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115. Bilateral tariffs are based on the new MacMaps database assembled by the International Trade 
Centre in Geneva and CEPII in Paris. They cover MFN duties, other ad-valorem duties, specific duties, 
preferential margins, prohibitions, tariff quotas and anti-dumping (specific and ad-valorem) duties. The 
data are drawn from international (UNCTAD, WTO, AMAD) and national (official journals, etc.) sources 
as well as country notifications to the WTO regarding antidumping regimes. The data refer to 2001. The 
tariff line data are aggregated with average import weights within economically homogeneous groups of 
countries up to two digits ISIC Rev. 3. OECD-average import weights are used to obtain figures at the 
national level. For more details see Bouët et al. (2001 and 2002). 
116. The effects of regional free trade agreements were analysed using several types of dummy 
variables:  
− Free trade area captures the effect of trade liberalisation within a free trade area. This 
variable is equal to 1 if both countries are members of the same free trade area, 0 otherwise. 
− European Union analyses the effects of the EU economic integration. It is equal to 1 if both 
countries are members of the EU, 0 otherwise. 
− Partner in the European Union captures the effect on bilateral trade and investment of 
accessing the EU market by third countries. This variable is equal to 1 if the host/importer 
country is a member of the EU while the investor/exporter is not, and 0 otherwise. 
− NAFTA captures the effects of the North-American economic integration. It is equal to 1 if 
both countries are members of NAFTA, 0 otherwise. 
− Partner in NAFTA captures the effect on bilateral trade and investment of accessing the 
NAFTA market by third countries. This variable is equal to 1 if the host/importer country is a 
member of NAFTA while the investor/exporter is not, and 0 otherwise. 
− EFTA captures the effects of the European Free Trade Association. It is equal to 1 if both 
countries are members of EFTA, 0 otherwise. 
− Partner in EFTA captures the effect on bilateral trade and investment of accessing the EFTA 
market by third countries. This variable is equal to 1 if the host/importer country is a member 
of EFTA while the investor/exporter is not, and 0 otherwise.79 
A1.3.2 Intellectual property rights 
117. Intellectual property rights (IPR) confer on the owner the right to prohibit others from making, 
using, selling or importing the protected idea or invention for a defined period. They also impose on the 
owner certain obligations, for instance concerning disclosure. IPR are covered by international agreements, 
but are granted and enforced nationally. There is a wide variation across countries in subject matters 
covered by IPR, their administration and the way they are legally enforced, leading to international 
differences in their value. The index used in the empirical analysis is a composite of five indicators: the 
                                                     
79. All these variables are time-variant. In 2000, the members of the European Union were Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom; the members of the European Free Trade Association were Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland; and the members of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
were Canada, Mexico and the United States. 
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extent of coverage, the membership in international patent agreements, provisions for loss of protection, 
enforcement mechanisms and duration of protection (see Ginarte and Park, 1997, for details). 
A1.3.3 Labour market arrangements 
118. Table A5 provides definitions and sources for the indicators of labour market arrangements: 
Table A5. Labour market policies and institutions: definitions and sources 
Indicator Definition Source 
EPL  Index of strictness of employment 
protection legislation 
Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud (1999) 
Tax wedge Employees' and employers' social 
security contributions and personal 
income tax less transfer payments as 
percentage of gross labour costs. 
OECD database on the tax/benefits 
position of employees 
Corporatism Index of corporatism Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998) 
and OECD Economic Surveys (various 
years) 
Co-ordination Index of bargaining co-ordination Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998) 
and OECD Economic Surveys (various 
years) 
Centralisation Index of bargaining centralisation Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998) 
and OECD Economic Surveys (various 
years) 
Source: OECD. 
119. The employment protection legislation indicator is taken from Nicoletti et al. (1999) and is 
defined as a simple average of the level of employment protection legislation for regular and temporary 
workers constructed for 1989 and 1998. Turning points match actual dates of reforms as identified in the 
OECD Jobs Study. The variable is available for 22 countries for the main period; data for the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Korea and Poland are available only for 1998, no values are available for Iceland and 
Mexico. 
120. The tax wedge on labour income expresses the employees' and employers' social security 
contributions and personal income tax net of transfer payments as percentage of gross labour costs. This 
variable was drawn from the OECD database on the tax/benefits position of employees and is, in general, 
available for all countries. 
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Table A6. Summary statistics of policy variables 
 Number of 
observationsa) 
Mean Period 
Import weighted tariffs (per cent) 467 8.86 1980-1998 
Non-tariff barriers (per cent) 467 11.7 1980-1998 
Index of FDI restrictions (time series) 588 33.8 1980-2000 
Index of FDI restrictions (cross-section) 588 17.02 1998-2000 
Product market regulationb) 441 69.3 1980-1998 
Barriers to entry b) 441 68.52 1980-1998 
Economy-wide regulation 567 28.9 1998 
Tax wedge (per cent) 476 32.4 1980-2000 
Employment protection regulation 546 42.81 1989-1998 
Index of bargaining co-ordination 547 60.5 1980-1996 
Index of bargaining centralisation 539 42.37 1980-1996 
Index of corporatism 547 53.06 1980-1996 
Index of infrastructure (total) 588 68.54 1980-2000 
Index of infrastructure (transport) 588 45.05 1980-2000 
Lack of intellectual property rights protection 525 40.11 1995 
a) Numbers of observations refer to the availability within the 28 (countries) times 21 (years) panel. 
b) Summary indicator of regulation of seven non-manufacturing industries. 
Source: OECD. 
A1.3.4 Infrastructure 
121. The indicator on infrastructure is based on measures of quality and quantity of 
telecommunications, transport, and electricity infrastructure. It is available for 28 OECD countries over the 
1980-2000 period.80 For the purpose of this project, only physical infrastructure is covered, and the 
indicators exclude measures of social infrastructure on governance, judicial system, education, etc.  
122. For each of the three types of physical infrastructure, a weighted-average index based on several 
components was calculated. The structure of the index is shown in Figure A1. Each series is indexed to a 
standard base US 1995 = 100. The weights were based on judgements about the importance of the 
components as well as the quality of the data. For both of these reasons, a large weight was placed on 
telecommunications (0.5) with transport and electricity each given the weight of 0.25. 
                                                     
80. Missing values were interpolated in some cases as noted below. 
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Source:  OECD. 
Figure A1. Construction of infrastructure index
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123. Table A7 and Figure A2 present the findings for aggregate infrastructure. There have been 
substantial increases in infrastructure capital over the twenty years covered in the sample. The less 
developed and transition countries such as Mexico, Turkey, Poland and, to a lesser extent, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic and Korea have low levels of infrastructure. Most of these countries, however, show large 
gains in the 1990s. The Nordic countries, the United States, Canada, Switzerland, and Australia had among 
the highest levels of infrastructure in 2000.  
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Table A7. Composite indices of total infrastructure 
United States 1995 = 100 
 1980 1990 2000 
Australia 69 74 100 
Austria 52 59 91 
Belgium 54 65 89 
Canada 80 91 103 
Czech Republic 40 41 67 
Denmark 62 74 102 
Finland 58 72 102 
France 54 72 90 
Germany 53 62 79 
Greece 49 55 83 
Hungary 36 38 66 
Iceland 57 70 105 
Ireland 45 65 96 
Italy 49 60 84 
Japan 58 67 89 
Korea 41 55 76 
Mexico 39 44 60 
Netherlands 58 67 89 
New Zealand 60 74 92 
Norway 63 81 114 
Poland 31 33 54 
Portugal 38 48 81 
Spain 47 58 86 
Sweden 72 88 113 
Switzerland 67 80 104 
Turkey 34 41 56 
United Kingdom 55 67 88 
United States 77 90 109 
Source: OECD. 
Source:  OECD. 
Figure A2. Aggregate infrastructure, 1980 and 2000
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Telecommunications infrastructure 
124. The five constituent series underlying the indicator of telecommunications infrastructure are the 
number of mainlines per capita, the number of mobile phones per capita, the share of digital lines as a per 
cent of total lines, answer seizure ratios, and fault clearance rates.81 All data are from OECD sources. The 
first four are from the OECD Telecommunications file, and the last is from the OECD Regulations 
database. The first two of these measures are indicators of the quantity of infrastructure while the others 
are indicators of quality. Mobiles were given a low weight for two reasons. First, the explosion in the 
number of mobile phones in the 1990s is so large that it swamps movements in other variables if given a 
large weight. Second, the use of mobiles is sometimes a response to the poor quality of the mainline 
services. 
125. There have been large increases in telecommunications infrastructure over the 1990s for most 
countries (Table A8). The ordering of countries is similar to that for aggregate infrastructure. In addition to 
the countries noted above, others with particularly strong telecommunications infrastructure in 2000 
include Japan.  
Table A8. Composite indices of telecommunications infrastructure 
United States 1995 = 100 
 1980 1990 2000 
Australia 58 69 116 
Austria 55 66 114 
Belgium 54 72 104 
Canada 65 90 116 
Czech Republic 36 39 88 
Denmark 68 84 126 
Finland 59 79 128 
France 59 88 115 
Germany 58 71 100 
Greece 40 51 103 
Hungary 27 31 84 
Iceland 57 78 123 
Ireland 47 67 111 
Italy 50 68 113 
Japan 63 79 119 
Korea 40 66 105 
Mexico 35 45 76 
Netherlands 63 78 115 
New Zealand 53 75 98 
Norway 57 82 133 
Poland 24 27 70 
Portugal 34 50 104 
Spain 47 62 105 
Sweden 79 98 140 
Switzerland 66 82 111 
Turkey 26 44 71 
United Kingdom 59 79 116 
United States 69 89 116 
Source: OECD. 
                                                     
81. The fault clearance rate is the percentage of faults repaired in 24 hours. Fault clearance rates were only 
available for 1990-97. The answer seizure ratio is the proportion of international calls that successfully 
seize an international circuit and are answered in the terminating country. Answer seizure ratios are only 
available for the 1990s. Digital access and mobiles only came into widespread use in the 1990s, although 
there is some information for the 1980s. 
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Electricity infrastructure  
126. This indicator includes measures of transmission loss (gap between production and 
consumption), generating capacity per capita, and the reserve margin (deviation from the “optimal” gap 
between peak use and generating capacity).82 An attempt to control for the effect of climate differences on 
generating capacity was made by regressing the latter on the average temperature in the capital city of each 
country. 
127. Electricity infrastructure indices display much less cross-country variation as well as lesser 
changes over time than telecommunications (Table A9). In some countries, there are small decreases in the 
indexes. The countries with the highest levels of electricity infrastructure in 2000 are Norway, the United 
States, Iceland and Australia. The lower-income countries generally again have the lowest levels of 
infrastructure, but the differences between them and others are often not great.  
Table A9. Composite indexes of electricity infrastructure 
United States 1995 = 100 
 1980 1990 2000 
Australia 90 97 100 
Austria 67 70 75 
Belgium 80 83 84 
Canada 88 96 93 
Czech Republic 76 76 78 
Denmark 74 79 79 
Finland 78 85 89 
France 76 82 84 
Germany 80 81 81 
Greece 86 84 90 
Hungary 76 76 75 
Iceland 87 91 101 
Ireland 70 76 81 
Italy 76 83 83 
Japan 87 93 94 
Korea 81 81 83 
Mexico 79 79 77 
Netherlands 76 78 83 
New Zealand 89 92 92 
Norway 97 105 107 
Poland 73 76 73 
Portugal 77 79 74 
Spain 74 80 82 
Sweden 87 93 94 
Switzerland 78 83 83 
Turkey 77 73 75 
United Kingdom 79 81 81 
United States 93 98 101 
Source: OECD. 
Transport infrastructure  
128. The indicator of transport infrastructure covers the length of motorways per capita and aircraft 
departures per capita. Aircraft departures are from World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). 
                                                     
82. The optimal deviation is assumed to be 15 per cent. For more details see Steiner (2000). 
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Motorways are from the transportation database of the European Council of Ministers of Transportation 
(ECMT), as well as WDI. The number of aircraft departures is an imperfect measure of air transport 
infrastructure, as it reflects the volume of air travel but not necessarily the capacity of a country’s airports 
but no data directly measuring the latter are available, nor is it even clear how to measure it. Alternative 
measures of road adequacy were considered by scaling by land area and number of vehicles (to allow for 
congestion effects) rather than population, but were not used in empirical analysis. Missing data for 
motorways were filled in by assuming that the ratio of motorways to paved roads in missing countries 
varied in the same way as the OECD average. The most complete motorways series are from the World 
Bank, but they begin only in 1990. In order to obtain 1980-89 data, the OECD average for those countries 
that have available data in the 1980s (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Spain, United Kingdom) was computed. For those countries with no data in the 1980s, it was assumed that 
the growth rate in the road network was equal to the average of the countries for which data are available.  
129. There are a few countries with very low levels of transport infrastructure (Table A10). These 
include Turkey, Mexico, Korea and the transition countries. Japan and Italy also have strikingly low levels 
of transport infrastructure. By contrast, Switzerland has the highest level of transport infrastructure 
followed by the United States and the Nordic countries.  
Table A10. Composite indices of transport infrastructure 
United States 1995 = 100 
 1980 1990 2000 
Australia 68 60 70 
Austria 29 34 62 
Belgium 25 34 66 
Canada 101 89 86 
Czech Republic 12 9 14 
Denmark 40 51 79 
Finland 36 45 62 
France 21 31 47 
Germany 17 25 36 
Greece 29 34 37 
Hungary 11 13 21 
Iceland 26 33 74 
Ireland 18 48 83 
Italy 19 21 27 
Japan 18 19 22 
Korea 4 7 12 
Mexico 7 6 8 
Netherlands 29 33 46 
New Zealand 45 57 82 
Norway 40 53 84 
Poland 3 2 3 
Portugal 9 13 41 
Spain 18 28 53 
Sweden 42 63 78 
Switzerland 60 74 110 
Turkey 4 4 7 
United Kingdom 23 31 37 
United States 77 87 102 
Source: OECD. 
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Annex 2. Detailed empirical results 
130. This Annex describes in detail the statistical and computational methods used in the main paper. 
It also provides the complete set of econometric results along with sensitivity analysis aimed at checking 
their robustness. Finally, the procedure followed to simulate the impacts of various policy changes is 
spelled out. 
A2.1 Empirical approach 
131. The aim of the empirical analysis is twofold: to analyse the impact of policies on bilateral 
investment and trade activity among the OECD countries, as well as their impact on the overall ability of 
individual OECD countries to attract foreign direct investment from their partners. For this purpose, two 
types of cross-section time-series data are employed: data where cross-section groups are identified by 
country-partner pairs and data where the groups are identified by countries (see Annex 1). 
Correspondingly, two different models are estimated. The bilateral model describes how policies and other 
factors influence the incentives of home country investors (henceforth country) to invest/export in a partner 
country (henceforth partner). The multilateral model describes how policy and non-policy-related factors 
influence the overall attractiveness of a host country for foreign investors. 
132. Regression results were obtained from single-equation estimation of reduced forms for bilateral 
outward FDI stocks and flows, goods exports and services exports as well as for total inward FDI stocks. 
To appropriately account for both the cross-section and time-series dimensions of the data, panel data 
estimation methods were used. Bilateral models were estimated primarily using the method of transformed 
least squares, with a log-linear specification in FDI equations and a log-log specification in trade equations. 
Total inward FDI equations were estimated using dynamic panel methods. 
A2.1.1 Transformed least squares 
133.  In bilateral equations, panel data methods require controlling for unobserved factors that are 
specific to each country, each partner, each country-partner pair and each period, as well as for shocks that 
are common to all countries over time. Thus, the general model to consider is:  
 ijtjtijittji
p
jtp
c
itc
x
ijtxijt uPCXY +++++++++= ∑∑∑ ααααααβββ  (General) 
where Yijt stands for the logarithm of bilateral FDI outward stocks or flows, export of goods or export of 
services from country i to partner j at time t (with i=1,2,…,I; j=1,2,…,J; and t=1,2,…,T); Xijt are variables 
that are specific to a given country-partner pair; Cit are country-specific variables; and Pjt are partner-
specific variables.83 The α -type variables stand for specific effects and control for all combinations of 
unobserved factors. 
                                                     
83. In the bilateral specifications for goods and services exports variables X, C and P are also expressed in 
logarithms. 
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134. The OLS and fixed-effect (FE) models are special cases of this “General” model. Indeed, if all 
the unobserved factors are equal to a constant α  then the model reduces to a form that can be estimated 
using OLS:84 
 ijt
p
jtp
c
itc
x
ijtxijt uPCXY ++++= ∑∑∑ αβββ  (OLS) 
135. Alternatively, if 0=++ jtijit ααα , the fixed-effect model is obtained:85 
 ijttji
p
jtp
c
itc
x
ijtxijt uPCXY ++++++= ∑∑∑ αααβββ  (FE) 
136. Bilateral data are best represented by the “General” model. However, estimating such a model is 
not trivial: the inclusion of the full set of specific effects results in an excessive loss of degrees of freedom 
and high multicollinearity. Therefore, a “transformed least squares” (TLS) approach (Erkel-Rousse and 
Mirza, 2002) was employed, which simplifies the equation to be estimated, preserving at the same time the 
desirable properties of the relevant coefficient estimates. In this approach, the variables of the “General” 
equation are expressed as deviations from the means across either countries or partners. Specifically, 
defining for any variable Zijt and any t the operators i∆  and j∆  such that: 
 
∑
∑
−=∆
−=∆
j
ijtijtijtj
i
ijtijtijti
Z
J
ZZ
Z
I
ZZ
1
1
 
the following two alternative specifications are obtained: 
 ijtiti
c
itic
x
ijtixijti vCXY +++∆+∆=∆ ∑∑ λλββ  (TLS country) 
and 
 
 ijtijj
p
jtjp
x
ijtjxijtj vPXY '+++∆+∆=∆ ∑∑ λλββ  (TLS partner) 
 
where iii αλ ∆=  and jjj αλ ∆=  are deviations from the mean fixed effects; and itiit αλ ∆= , 
jtjjt αλ ∆=  are country- (resp. partner-) specific deviations that vary over time. The latter have been 
proxied in empirical analysis by a trend variable specific to each country (resp. partner).  
137. It should be stressed that the residuals are defined to include both the random errors and the 
deviations of bilateral fixed effects from their means:  
 ijiijtiijt uv α∆+∆=  
                                                     
84. The OLS equation has been used as a benchmark in the cross-section study of bilateral services exports. 
85. The FE equation has been used as a benchmark in the panel study of bilateral goods exports and bilateral 
FDI. 
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 ijjijtjijt uv α∆+∆='  
The implicit assumption is that the deviations of bilateral fixed effects from their means are i.i.d. random 
errors. This assumption will be made explicit in some model specifications in which the ijiα∆  and ijjα∆  
will be modelled as random effects. The important property of the “TLS country” and “TLS partner” 
equations is that the relevant parameters to be estimated ( cpx βββ ,, ) are the same as in the “General” 
specification.  
138. Thus, the TLS approach expresses all variables as deviations from the mean country or, 
alternatively, the mean partner. Consequently, two equations for bilateral outward FDI and bilateral 
exports are obtained: a “country” equation; and a “partner” equation. The advantage is that in the country 
equations partner-specific unobserved effects (and common time trends) are accounted for prior to 
estimation in a non-parametric way and only country-specific effects have to be estimated, while in the 
partner equations it is the country-specific unobserved effects (and common time trends) that are accounted 
for non-parametrically and the partner-specific effects that are estimated. This reduces the number of 
parameters to be estimated in each equation. The downside is that, due to the transformation of the data, no 
partner-specific variables can be included in the country equations and, symmetrically, no country-specific 
variables can be included in the partner equations. Finally, additional degrees of freedom are gained by 
assuming that, in each of the two equations, the incremental information provided by the unobserved 
country-pair effect over the “pure” country or partner effect is random and can be included in the error 
term. 
139.  For outward FDI stock and flows and goods exports, the “FE” model estimates are presented for 
comparison with the TLS results. For trade in services, the “OLS” estimates are shown, since data for 
services trade are available for a couple of years only, which does not provide enough inter-temporal 
variation for the “FE” model to be estimated. The variation in the services data is mostly driven by the 
cross-sectional dimension making the “FE” method inconsistent, as its estimator captures only inter-
temporal variation. 
A2.1.2 Dynamic panel methods 
140. In contrast to the approach taken in the bilateral analysis, which is static, the analysis of the 
determinants of the total inward FDI positions uses a “partial adjustment” framework (Cheng and Kwan, 
2000) to capture the lack of instantaneous adjustment of the inward FDI position to its equilibrium level. 
The model assumes that the equilibrium stock of foreign direct investment in country i and year t, *itY  is 
determined by both policy and non-policy-related factors as discussed in Section 3 of the main paper: 
 iti
z
itz
x
itxit ZXY ενββ +++= ∑∑*ln  (1) 
where the itX  are non-policy related variables, the itZ  are policy variables, xβ and zβ are parameters to 
be estimated, iν are unobserved country-specific time-invariant effects and itε is a random disturbance that 
is assumed to be i.i.d. The gap between the actual inward position, itY , and the equilibrium stock induces 
foreign direct investment flows that tend to eliminate it:  
 )ln(ln/ln * ititit YYdtYd −=α  (2) 
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However, the adjustment to the equilibrium level is not instantaneous. The parameter α  captures the 
speed of this adjustment: the slower the adjustment (the closer α  is to zero) the higher is persistence, 
reflecting the presence of adjustment costs. In turn, these costs may reflect the role played by 
“agglomeration effects”, i.e. the positive externalities caused by the previous accumulation of foreign 
direct investment in the country.  
141. The discrete version of equation (2) can be rearranged as follows: 
 
*
1 lnln)1(ln ititit YYY αα +−= −
  (3) 
where the current total inward FDI position of country i is a weighted average of its lagged FDI 
position and of the equilibrium FDI position, with 10 <<α  needed for long-run convergence to the 
equilibrium stock.  
142.  Substituting (1) into (3) gives the estimated dynamic panel specification: 
 iti
z
itz
x
itxitit ZXYY ενλδγ ++++= ∑∑−1lnln  (Dynamic) 
where )1( αγ −= , xx αβδ = , and zz αβλ = .  
143. In the presence of the lagged dependent variable and possibly other endogenous variables on the 
right-hand side of the equation, the least-squares dummy-variables (FE) estimator yields inconsistent 
(downward biased) coefficient estimates, as these variables are asymptotically correlated with the error 
term (Nickell, 1981).86 The usual way to solve the problems stemming from endogeneity is to use an 
instrumental variables estimation method. While first differencing and the use of (appropriate) instrumental 
variables eliminates the inconsistency (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981), it does not yield asymptotically 
efficient estimates (Arellano, 1988).  
144. The “Dynamic” model was, therefore, estimated by means of the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) (Arellano and Bond, 1991). As in the Anderson-Hsiao approach, this estimator 
eliminates the country-specific effects by first-differencing the equation and estimates the first-differenced 
model by means of instrumental variables. Under the assumption of no autocorrelation in itε , twice lagged 
levels of the dependent variable and of the predetermined variables can be used as instruments in the 
differenced equation together with the differences of the strictly exogenous variables (if any). The GMM 
estimator is more efficient than the Anderson-Hsiao estimator because it imposes orthogonality restrictions 
between lagged values of endogenous variables and errors and exploits the key identifying assumption that 
there is serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals. The validity of the orthogonality restrictions can 
be checked using the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, while the assumption about the lack of 
serial correlation can be checked by testing for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals. With serially uncorrelated errors, these first differences should follow an MA(1) process 
implying non-zero first-order correlation but no correlation of higher order.87  
                                                     
86. As long as the number of time periods is relatively small. However, Judson and Owen (1999) show that the 
bias can be significant even for T=30. Moreover, the bias increases with the persistence parameter γ . 
87. Bond (2002) provides a simple discussion and some illustrations of these empirical techniques. 
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A2.2 Detailed results 
145. This section presents detailed regression results for bilateral outward FDI positions and flows, 
total inward FDI positions, and bilateral exports of goods and services. For each bilateral specification, 
three sets of results are reported: transformed least squares regressions with country-specific variables 
(TLS country), transformed least squares regressions with partner-specific variables (TLS partner), and 
fixed-effects regressions (OLS regressions for services trade).  
A2.2.1 Bilateral analysis: basic specifications 
146. The results for the “basic” specification in which dependent variables are regressed only on non-
policy-related variables, are reported in Table A11.88 This table also provides details on the specific effects 
included in each specification. Since these remain the same throughout the analysis, the information about 
specific effects is not repeated in the following tables. It should be noted that the FE and OLS 
specifications omit some of these specific effects. Therefore, the corresponding regression estimates may 
be biased. The potential bias stemming from the use of fixed effects or OLS type regressions instead of 
TLS-type specifications is well illustrated by the estimated coefficients of the exchange rate and of the 
human capital dissimilarity in the goods exports equation. These coefficients change sign when switching 
from the FE to TLS methods. Unlike the FE estimates, TLS estimates of the human capital effect appear to 
be in line with theory.89 Despite these shortcomings, the FE and OLS estimates serve as benchmarks for 
assessing the TLS estimates, which by construction can only include either country-specific or partner-
specific variables (see above). Estimation results are generally homogenous across “TLS country” and 
“TLS partner” specifications, with the exception of exchange-rate effects which are not robust to changes 
in TLS specifications in the outward FDI model.  
 
                                                     
88. These results refer to the full sample of countries and partners in the years 1980-2000 as described in 
Annex 1 (Table A1). 
89. Similarly, the coefficient estimates of factor and human capital dissimilarities obtained from OLS in the 
services-trade equation are inconsistent with theory, but they appear to be positive, although insignificant, 
when turning to TLS methods. 
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A2.2.2 The influence of policies 
147. Because of the limited coverage of some of the policy indicators, in regressions using the full set 
of indicators several countries are dropped from the sample. To maximise country coverage, this section 
adopts a “thematic” approach, focusing first on the influence of each group of policies and then on their 
combined influence on trade and FDI. 
 Bilateral outward FDI positions and flows 
148. The influence of openness indicators (participation in free trade areas, tariff and non-tariff 
barriers and FDI restrictions) is summarised in Table A12. The estimated effect of these indicators is 
generally stable across model specifications and, to a lesser extent, across stock and flows regressions. 
Table A13. looks more specifically at the free trade area effects. The variables European Union, NAFTA 
and EFTA take a unit value if both the country and its partner participate in one of these agreements, while 
the variables “Partner in…” are unity if the partner only participates in the agreement.90 The reference case 
is when the partner is not a member of any of these free-trade agreements. The estimated effects of these 
variables are not robust across TLS and FE estimators, suggesting that the latter may suffer from omitted 
variables bias. Moreover, while the effects on FDI among the free-trade agreement members are 
unambiguously positive, the effects on FDI from third-party countries is less clear. Stock estimates suggest 
a positive effect only in the EU, while flow estimates suggest an effect only in NAFTA. 
 
                                                     
90. The free trade area variables vary over time as new countries join the agreements. In 2000, the members of 
the European Union were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; the members of the 
European Free Trade Association were Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland; and the members 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement were Canada, Mexico and the United States. 
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Countryb Partnerc Countryb Partnerc
A B C D E F
Total GDP 2.043 1.76 1.219 1.939 1.485 1.889
[5.33]** [4.93]** [8.91]** [4.84]** [3.64]** [12.63]**
Size similarity 1.495 1.172 0.864 1.453 1.184 1.264
[8.07]** [6.73]** [12.05]** [7.48]** [6.04]** [15.61]**
Factor dissimilarity -0.205 -0.519 -0.235 -0.107 -0.485 -0.229
[3.25]** [5.90]** [2.25]* [1.53] [4.89]** [2.28]*
Human capital dissimilarity -1.73 -1.831 -1.565 -1.555 -1.334 -1.986
[7.70]** [7.97]** [7.04]** [7.16]** [5.87]** [8.69]**
Transport costs -0.562 -0.629 -0.956 -1.068 -1.357 -1.645
[4.80]** [5.51]** [9.66]** [8.20]** [9.99]** [11.75]**
Bilateral exchange rate 0.704 -0.953 -0.493 0.324 -0.95 -0.237
[4.23]** [5.70]** [4.63]** [1.96]* [5.25]** [2.00]*
Exchange rate variabilityd -0.003 -0.004 -0.362 -0.002 -0.004 0.394
[1.55] [0.95] [1.85] [1.49] [0.69] [1.57]
Free trade area 0.47 0.579 0.565 0.483 0.351 0.455
[7.59]** [6.80]** [6.43]** [8.04]** [3.73]** [4.60]**
Bilateral tariff barriers -0.09 -0.125 -0.148 -0.098 -0.127 -0.134
[7.62]** [9.85]** [11.98]** [8.08]** [8.60]** [8.91]**
FDI restrictions -0.011 -0.013 -0.015 -0.003
[1.70] [2.66]** [2.17]* [0.53]
Non-tariff barriers 0.017 0.016 -0.008 0.008
[2.95]** [3.05]** [1.14] [1.20]
Constant -2.12 -1.11 -10.65 -0.38 -1.21 -30.05
[4.48]** [2.88]** [2.94]** [0.82] [2.77]** [7.57]**
Observations 4521 3987 3964 4984 4493 4464
R-squared 0.73 0.68 0.85 0.59 0.54 0.73
a)  Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. 
     * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level.
b)  All 28 home and host countries included.
c)  All 28 home countries and 23 hosts included (excluded: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
     Switzerland and Turkey).
d)  Coefficients multiplied by 100.
Outward FDI stock 1980-2000 Outward FDI flow 1980-2000
Table A12. Bilateral foreign direct investment: Opennessa
TLS
FEc
TLS
FEc
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Country Partner Country Partner
A B C D E F
Total GDP 1.89 1.918 1.128 1.728 1.57 1.751
[4.86]** [5.42]** [8.04]** [4.28]** [3.99]** [11.78]**
Size similarity 1.414 1.255 0.788 1.342 1.21 1.174
[7.51]** [7.25]** [10.54]** [6.86]** [6.34]** [14.62]**
Factor dissimilarity -0.176 -0.395 -0.253 -0.053 -0.323 -0.214
[2.79]** [6.41]** [3.76]** [0.77] [4.40]** [2.63]**
Human capital dissimilarity -1.906 -1.934 -1.622 -1.743 -1.57 -1.904
[8.56]** [9.34]** [7.99]** [8.14]** [7.66]** [9.00]**
Transport costs -0.693 -0.479 -0.879 -1.221 -1.346 -1.46
[5.75]** [3.74]** [8.08]** [9.26]** [10.39]** [11.09]**
Bilateral exchange rate 0.711 -0.718 -0.234 0.361 -0.85 -0.04
[4.26]** [4.47]** [2.78]** [2.18]* [4.94]** [0.44]
Exchange rate variabilityc -0.003 -0.002 0.0006 -0.002 -0.002 0
[1.50] [1.26] [0.57] [1.43] [1.22] [0.07]
European Union 0.529 0.808 -0.082 0.615 0.643 0.009
[7.73]** [3.89]** [0.58] [8.84]** [2.22]* [0.05]
NAFTA 1.578 1.754 1.32 1.519 2.119 1.515
[7.37]** [7.69]** [7.75]** [6.58]** [6.30]** [6.48]**
EFTA 0.466 0.5 -0.229 0.519 0.731 0.449
[2.53]* [1.49] [0.93] [3.17]** [1.95] [1.84]
Partner in:
   European Union 0.376 -0.488 0.147 -0.415
[1.79] [3.51]** [0.49] [2.31]*
   NAFTA -0.048 -0.334 0.744 -0.179
[0.27] [3.88]** [3.76]** [1.63]
   EFTA 0.264 -0.801 0.223 -0.408
[0.98] [4.88]** [0.65] [1.93]
Constant -2.21 -0.85 -10.42 -0.52 -1.51 -28.16
[4.53]** [2.05]* [2.81]** [1.09] [3.26]** [7.15]**
Observations 4521 4517 4480 4984 5014 4991
R-squared 0.73 0.66 0.84 0.58 0.52 0.71
a)  Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. 
     * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level.
b)  All 28 home and host countries included.
c)  Coefficients multiplied by 100.
Outward FDI stock 1980-2000b Outward FDI flow 1980-2000b
Table A13. Bilateral foreign direct investment: Free trade agreementsa
TLS
FE
TLS
FE
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149. Table A14 summarises the effects of infrastructure on bilateral foreign direct investment. A 
significant and positive effect of infrastructure on FDI was found only in the FE specifications, with a 
stronger impact in transition countries. However, as mentioned above, these estimates are not reliable 
because they may suffer from omitted variables bias. 
 
 
A B C D E F G H
Total GDP 1.886 1.928 1.272 1.291 1.725 1.719 1.802 1.845
[5.34]** [5.42]** [8.65]** [8.79]** [4.36]** [4.35]** [11.98]** [12.27]**
Size similarity 1.239 1.258 0.874 0.887 1.286 1.283 1.223 1.246
[7.19]** [7.25]** [11.41]** [11.59]** [6.71]** [6.69]** [15.12]** [15.39]**
Factor dissimilarity -0.433 -0.429 -0.276 -0.264 -0.332 -0.331 -0.252 -0.23
[7.04]** [7.01]** [4.09]** [4.01]** [4.55]** [4.51]** [3.05]** [2.76]**
Human capital dissimilarity -2.127 -2.131 -1.831 -1.861 -1.729 -1.729 -2.003 -2.028
[10.17]** [10.19]** [9.10]** [9.23]** [8.24]** [8.23]** [9.31]** [9.41]**
Transport costs -0.502 -0.501 -0.952 -0.999 -1.42 -1.421 -1.573 -1.646
[3.84]** [3.84]** [8.62]** [8.92]** [10.94]** [10.92]** [11.76]** [12.07]**
Bilateral exchange rate -0.687 -0.643 -0.179 -0.285 -0.794 -0.797 -0.033 -0.155
[4.19]** [3.84]** [2.68]** [4.01]** [4.58]** [4.59]** [0.45] [1.96]
Infrastructurec 0.014 0.014 0.024 0.019 0.011 0.011 0.004 -0.002
[1.24] [1.25] [3.42]** [2.65]** [0.90] [0.84] [0.55] [0.22]
Infrastructured -0.033 0.054 0.014 0.073
(transition countries) [1.19] [3.97]** [0.43] [4.58]**
Constant -1.21 -1.32 -15.55 -15.73 -1.71 -1.62 -29.77 -30.52
[3.09]** [3.26]** [3.84]** [3.89]** [3.92]** [3.34]** [7.23]** [7.42]**
Observations 4517 4517 4480 4480 5014 5014 4991 4991
R-squared 0.65 0.65 0.84 0.84 0.5 0.5 0.71 0.71
a)  Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. 
     * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level.
b)  All 28 home and host countries included.
c)  Increases with the level and quantity of infrastructure.
d)  Increases with the level and quantity of infrastructure for Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Mexico, 
     Poland and Turkey but is zero for all the other partners.
Outward FDI flow 1980-2000bOutward FDI stock 1980-2000b
Table A14. Bilateral foreign direct investment: Infrastructurea
FETLS Partner TLS Partner FE
 
150. The negative and significant effects of product market regulation and labour market arrangements 
indicators are remarkably stable across model specifications in both the FDI stocks and flows equations 
(Tables A15 and A16.). 
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Country Partner Country Partner
A B C D E F
Total GDP 2.089 1.811 1.178 1.982 1.631 1.879
[5.11]** [5.05]** [8.60]** [4.52]** [3.99]** [12.69]**
Size similarity 1.554 1.21 0.858 1.486 1.263 1.29
[7.87]** [6.92]** [11.99]** [7.00]** [6.41]** [16.01]**
Factor dissimilarity -0.214 -0.69 -0.585 0.044 -0.39 -0.243
[2.26]* [6.24]** [5.44]** [0.44] [3.60]** [2.24]*
Human capital dissimilarity -1.404 -1.689 -1.557 -2.121 -1.687 -2.078
[5.93]** [7.61]** [7.25]** [8.51]** [6.96]** [8.84]**
Transport costs -0.887 -0.772 -1.156 -1.427 -1.581 -1.902
[7.10]** [6.31]** [10.69]** [10.04]** [10.58]** [12.43]**
Bilateral exchange rate 0.441 -0.863 -0.317 0.11 -0.888 -0.138
[2.41]* [5.02]** [2.92]** [0.60] [4.81]** [1.18]
Regulation ratioc -0.154 -0.16 -0.152 -0.095 -0.107 -0.108
[8.64]** [8.62]** [9.39]** [5.05]** [5.42]** [5.58]**
Constant -1.92 -1.49 -11.80 -0.29 -1.84 -31.55
[3.65]** [3.76]** [3.24]** [0.57] [4.22]** [8.01]**
Observations 3792 3784 3752 4440 4435 4418
R-squared 0.68 0.67 0.84 0.56 0.51 0.71
a)  Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. 
     * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level.
b)  21 home and host countries included (excluded: Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Korea, Mexico, 
     Poland and Turkey).
c)  Ratio of indicators of lack of liberalisation in the host and home countries. The ratio increases as product
     market regulation in the host country becomes relatively more restrictive. 
Outward FDI flow 1980-2000b
Table A15. Bilateral foreign direct investment: Product market regulationa
Outward FDI stock 1980-2000b
TLS
FE
TLS
FE
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Country Partner Country Partner
A B C D E F
Total GDP 3.227 1.614 0.931 2.528 1.14 1.66
[7.90]** [4.64]** [7.08]** [5.83]** [2.82]** [11.52]**
Size similarity 2.099 1.087 0.683 1.754 1.028 1.18
[10.65]** [6.39]** [9.83]** [8.35]** [5.25]** [15.05]**
Factor dissimilarity -0.078 -0.465 -0.257 0.048 -0.371 -0.133
[1.05] [5.86]** [2.88]** [0.58] [4.00]** [1.34]
Human capital dissimilarity -1.46 -1.717 -1.261 -2.012 -1.724 -2.082
[6.20]** [7.93]** [6.12]** [8.39]** [7.36]** [9.06]**
Transport costs -0.996 -0.786 -1.206 -1.333 -1.412 -1.655
[7.93]** [6.86]** [11.57]** [9.59]** [10.31]** [11.30]**
Bilateral exchange rate 0.133 -0.683 -0.05 -0.156 -0.763 0.03
[0.75] [4.12]** [0.45] [0.87] [4.29]** [0.27]
EPL ratioc -0.098 -0.09 -0.103 -0.094 -0.076 -0.088
[8.54]** [10.42]** [11.55]** [6.56]** [5.83]** [6.44]**
Wedge ratioc -1.181 -2.255 -1.837 -0.788 -1.834 -1.726
[12.40]** [13.93]** [15.68]** [8.50]** [9.47]** [11.60]**
Constant -0.15 -2.93 -1.49 1.15 -2.83 -22.28
[0.29] [7.77]** [0.42] [2.26]* [6.57]** [5.78]**
Observations 4148 4134 4105 4726 4727 4711
R-squared 0.72 0.68 0.85 0.57 0.51 0.71
a)  Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. 
     * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level.
b)  26 home and host countries included (excluded: Iceland and Mexico).
c) Ratio of the EPL and labour wedge indicators in the host and home countries. The ratios increase as EPL 
     or the labour tax wedge in the host country becomes relatively more restrictive.
Outward FDI flow 1980-2000b
Table A16. Bilateral foreign direct investment: Labour market regulationa
Outward FDI stock 1980-2000b
TLS
FE
TLS
FE
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151. The estimation of the model including all policy indicators is presented in Tables A17. The 
coefficient estimates of equation B from Table A17 were used to compute the contributions of policies to 
the deviation of outward FDI positions from OECD average (Figures 21 and 22 in the main text), as well 
as the policy simulations related to FDI restrictions (Table 5 and Figure 24 in the main text). 
152. The time invariance of some variables of interest (namely, the bilateral customs tariffs and the 
lack of intellectual property rights protection) might artificially shrink the standard errors of the 
corresponding estimates. To check for this potential source of error, Table A17 (columns D-E and I-J) 
includes adjusted estimates, based on both clustering and random-effects procedures. Clustering involves 
relaxing the assumption that the observations within specified groups (clusters) are independent. This 
procedure affects the estimated standard errors and variance-covariance matrix of the estimators, but not 
the estimated coefficients. The other option is to use an estimator which is asymptotically equivalent to a 
random-effects estimator.91 These estimators make it possible to estimate valid standard errors given the 
true nature of within-group correlation. The results suggest that the significance of IPR protection in the 
equation for outward FDI positions is not robust to these adjustments, while the significance of bilateral 
tariff barriers remains unchanged. Therefore, intellectual property rights (IPR) protection was omitted from 
the preferred equations. At the same time, both IPR protection and bilateral tariffs remain significant across 
different estimators in the equations for outward FDI flows.  
                                                     
91. The generalized linear model (Liang and Zeger, 1986), where the dependent variable is normally 
distributed and the link function is identity, allows to adjust for heteroscedasticity (using the 
Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance). The procedure used by this estimator is different from the 
one used by the random effects estimator and thus may lead to different results in unbalanced panels. 
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Countryb Partnerc Countryb Partnerc
A B C D E F G H I J
Total GDP 3.342 1.328 1.011 0.866 1.669 2.764 1.344 1.785 0.782 1.147
[8.39]** [3.78]** [7.71]** [1.53] [3.46]** [6.34]** [3.24]** [12.03]** [1.22] [2.26]*
Size similarity 2.187 0.968 0.751 0.729 1.033 1.883 1.127 1.227 0.818 0.923
[11.43]** [5.64]** [10.99]** [2.58]* [4.35]** [8.92]** [5.64]** [15.20]** [2.64]** [3.69]**
Factor dissimilarity -0.059 -0.794 -0.623 -0.763 -0.417 0.07 -0.464 -0.296 -0.402 0.101
[0.63] [6.90]** [5.40]** [3.43]** [2.45]* [0.71] [4.16]** [2.67]** [2.12]* [0.60]
Human capital dissimilarity -0.844 -1.383 -1.152 -1.378 -1.552 -1.608 -1.173 -1.757 -1.282 -1.239
[3.57]** [6.08]** [5.08]** [2.82]** [2.43]* [6.36]** [4.78]** [7.24]** [2.34]* [2.12]*
Transport costs -0.662 -0.743 -1.136 -0.744 -0.42 -1.192 -1.477 -1.836 -1.462 -0.795
[5.39]** [6.14]** [11.08]** [3.13]** [1.82] [8.42]** [10.37]** [12.45]** [6.27]** [3.82]**
Bilateral exchange rate 0.283 -0.97 -0.095 -1.094 -0.049 -0.033 -0.945 -0.021 -1.065 -0.691
[1.61] [5.70]** [0.84] [3.08]** [0.19] [0.18] [5.08]** [0.18] [3.27]** [2.62]**
Exchange rate variabilityd 0.024 -0.0001 0.038 -0.006 -0.001 0.003 0.00002 0.012 0.002 0.005
[5.45]** [1.23] [2.09]* [0.91] [0.15] [0.57] [0.34] [0.57] [0.23] [0.78]
Free trade area 0.366 0.482 0.421 0.489 0.243 0.392 0.254 0.353 0.303 0.104
[5.22]** [5.84]** [4.99]** [3.18]** [1.93] [5.83]** [2.71]** [3.57]** [1.60] [0.74]
FDI restrictions -0.019 -0.015 -0.019 -0.012 -0.02 -0.005 -0.018 -0.017
[3.06]** [3.08]** [2.23]* [1.82] [2.76]** [1.02] [2.22]* [2.36]*
Bilateral tariff barriers -0.1 -0.059 -0.111 -0.06 -0.159 -0.107 -0.077 -0.094 -0.076 -0.162
[6.08]** [4.07]** [8.03]** [1.84] [4.04]** [6.14]** [4.52]** [5.40]** [2.05]* [4.13]**
Non-tariff barriers 0.011 0.011 0.01 0.016 -0.013 0.003 -0.013 -0.006
[1.89] [2.09]* [0.95] [1.66] [1.95] [0.40] [1.12] [0.67]
EPL ratioe -0.032 -0.053 -0.048 -0.046 -0.027 -0.042 -0.043 -0.043 -0.032 -0.051
[2.62]** [5.37]** [4.83]** [1.78] [1.21] [2.56]* [2.77]** [2.66]** [0.85] [1.47]
Wedge ratioe -0.925 -2.297 -1.657 -2.328 -0.783 -0.546 -1.653 -1.54 -1.685 -0.43
[9.20]** [11.65]** [11.49]** [5.84]** [2.26]* [5.51]** [6.54]** [8.72]** [3.60]** [1.14]
Regulation ratiof -0.142 -0.1 -0.118 -0.102 -0.035 -0.077 -0.064 -0.08 -0.067 -0.026
[8.25]** [6.11]** [7.88]** [2.94]** [1.10] [4.17]** [3.46]** [4.09]** [1.72] [0.87]
IPR -0.239 -0.217 -0.398 -0.545
[1.76] [1.36] [2.95]** [4.23]**
Constant -0.87 -3.29 -2.12 -4.56 -0.92 0.58 -2.69 -24.43 -4.67 -3.41
[1.75] [7.97]** [0.60] [4.18]** [0.89] [1.16] [5.54]** [6.16]** [4.25]** [3.59]**
Observations 3792 3601 3576 3601 3601 4440 4235 4223 4235 4235
R-squared 0.71 0.72 0.86 0.72 0.58 0.55 0.73 0.55
a)  Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. 
     * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level.
b)  21 home and host countries included (excluded: Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Korea, Mexico, Poland and Turkey).
c)  21 home countries (excluded: Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Korea, Mexico, Poland and Turkey), 20 host countries 
    (excluded: the same countries plus Switzerland).
d)  Coefficients multiplied by 100.
e) Ratio of the EPL and labour wedge indicators in the host and home countries. The ratios increase as EPL 
     or the labour tax wedge in the host country becomes relatively more restrictive.
f)  Ratio of indicators of lack of liberalisation in the host and home countries. The ratio increases as product
     market regulation in the host country becomes relatively more restrictive.
Table A17.  Bilateral foreign direct investment: Full specification - years 1980-2000a7
Outward FDI flow 1980-2000
TLS
FEc Clusteringc
Random 
effectsc
TLS
FEc Clusteringc
Random 
effectsc
Outward FDI stock 1980-2000
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 Total inward FDI stock 
153. Table A18 presents the results obtained for total inward positions using the GMM estimation 
approach. The “basic” specification is adapted to the multilateral nature of the data. The non-policy 
variables include domestic absorption, human capital, and business expenditures on research and 
development. The number of countries covered is lower due to limitations of data on inward positions. First 
differencing, instrumenting and introducing policy variables further restricts the number of countries 
covered to 10 in the full specification. The number of countries included in the analysis can be increased 
by making assumptions about missing values for some variables (primarily, the R&D variable, which is for 
some countries available only biannually). Results in columns A-F of Table A18 are based on this 
modified data set. Column G presents the results without making these assumptions, which are reported in 
the main text. The analyses of the samples with 14 countries (column F) and 10 countries (column G) yield 
similar results with the exception of the estimated effects of human capital and regulation, which gain 
significance in the latter specification. FDI restrictions are significant in the largest sample, when neither 
regulation variables nor tariff barriers are included (columns D and E).  
 Bilateral trade in goods 
154. In Tables A19 and A20, indicators of openness, product market regulation and labour market 
arrangements are progressively added to the basic specification for bilateral goods exports. Some variables 
are either partner-specific (e.g., FDI restrictions, non-tariff barriers) or country-specific (e.g., R&D). Thus, 
they only appear in one of the TLS specifications. Equations D and E in Table A20 contain all the 
variables of interest. The coefficients of equation D were used to compute the contributions of policies to 
the deviation of goods exports from the OECD average (Figure 23 in the main text), and coefficients from 
equations D and E were used to compute the simulations related to goods exports (Figure 26 in the main 
text). 
155. Save for FDI restrictions, whose significance vanishes as new policy variables are included, the 
significance and coefficients of both non-policy-related and policy variables are robust to changes in model 
specification.92 However, the effects of certain policy variables (such as non-tariff barriers, regulation in 
the partner and labour tax wedges) are not robust across TLS and FE estimation procedures, suggesting an 
omitted variable bias in the latter procedure. Equations F-H in Table A19 replace the single free-trade area 
variable by the indicators of membership in the European Union, NAFTA and EFTA. The “TLS partner” 
and “FE” specifications (columns G and H) also include indicators that take a unit value only when the 
partner belongs to one of these free-trade areas. While the three agreements appear to increase internal 
trade, only the European Union has a significant effect on exports from third-party countries. 
 
                                                     
92. A few coefficients are significant only at the 10 per cent level (e.g., tariff barriers in the TLS country 
specification in Table A19). 
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A B C D E F G
Domestic absorption 0.305 0.135 0.185 0.283 0.265 0.389 0.363
[5.45]** [2.02]* [2.68]** [3.76]** [3.42]** [5.01]** [4.56]**
Human capital endowment 1.382 1.873 1.629 1.248 1.631 0.658 1.219
[3.32]** [4.38]** [3.80]** [2.83]** [3.49]** [1.42] [2.67]**
R&D intensity 0.218 0.360 0.311 0.323 0.3919 0.403 0.485
[3.67]** [5.42]** [4.63]** [4.93]** [5.33]** [5.71]** [6.66]**
Effective exchange rate 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004
[4.70]** [5.07]** [4.15]** [4.03]** [3.33]** [3.70]**
Exchange rate variability -0.006 -0.008 -0.012 -0.008 -0.011
[0.97] [1.33] [1.99]* [1.47] [1.80]
FDI restrictions -0.006 -0.007 -0.003 -0.002 0.006
[2.64]** [2.62]** [0.91] [0.50] [1.58]
Non-tariff barriers 0.112 0.107 0.143 0.166
[3.55]** [3.32]** [4.44]** [4.89]**
Tariff barriers 0.013
[3.38]**
Infrastructure 0.008 0.005 0.013 0.006
[2.12]* [1.15] [2.92]** [1.35]
Regulation -0.006 -0.010
[1.53] [2.53]*
Employment protection -0.007 -0.007
[2.91]** [2.46]*
Labour tax wedge -0.005 -0.008
[1.10] [1.75]
Lagged dependent variable 0.704 0.688 0.675 0.626 0.627 0.558 0.519
[17.50]** [17.11]** [17.06]** [15.19]** [15.16]** [12.42]** [10.98]**
Constant 0.006 0.002 -0.004 -0.008 0.001 -0.007 0.009
[1.32] [0.34] [0.79] [1.07] [0.13] [0.88] [1.04]
Observations 174 174 174 169 169 163 134
Countries 19b 19b 19b 16c 16c 14d 10e
Sargan testf 244 (340) 224 (340) 227 (509) 223 (340) 210 (509) 205 (693) 151 (338)
Autocorrelation in first-differenced residuals
    First-orderg -3.98 -3.94 -3.87 -3.45 -3.68 -3.30 -3.30
    Second-orderg -1.97 -2.16 -1.96 -1.93 -1.91 -1.94 -1.73
a)  Absolute value of Z-statistics in brackets. 
     * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level.
b)  Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, 
     Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States.
c)  Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, 
    New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States.
d)  Same countries as in note c), except Iceland and Mexico.
e)  Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States.
f) The Sargan test tests the null hypothesis that all moment conditions are satisfied. The test statistics has €€
    distribution, number of degrees of freedom that apply is provided in parenthesses.
g)  These tests check the assumption that residuals are serially uncorrelated. This assumption implies that their first 
    differences follow an MA(1) process having non-zero first-order correlation but no higher-order correlation. 
    Reported statistics, both distributed N(0,1), test the null  hypothesis of zero first-order and second-order
    autocorrelation, respectively. 
Dynamic instrumental variable, GMM estimationa
Table A18. Foreign direct investment: Total inward FDI stock
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Countryb Partnerc Countryb Partnerc
A B C D E F G H
Total GDP 1.326 0.69 0.889 0.653 0.89 1.33 0.662 0.852
[15.23]** [8.06]** [21.05]** [7.92]** [20.87]** [14.59]** [7.74]** [19.54]**
Size similarity 0.675 0.364 0.496 0.345 0.496 0.702 0.369 0.467
[12.78]** [7.02]** [21.47]** [6.84]** [21.35]** [12.94]** [6.98]** [19.76]**
Factor dissimilarity 0.175 0.098 0.139 0.099 0.139 0.164 0.12 0.142
[4.89]** [2.80]** [5.61]** [2.83]** [5.62]** [4.36]** [3.27]** [5.85]**
Human capital dissimilarity 0.335 0.25 -0.508 0.249 -0.508 0.216 0.093 -0.47
[1.87] [1.64] [7.97]** [1.63] [7.98]** [1.26] [0.62] [7.44]**
Distance -1.024 -1.022 -0.995 -1.022 -0.995 -1.042 -1.058 -0.997
[20.85]** [22.67]** [75.65]** [22.75]** [75.48]** [20.97]** [22.14]** [75.81]**
R&D intensity 0.121 0.095 0.096 0.119 0.141
[4.15]** [1.51] [1.51] [4.12]** [2.21]*
Transport costs -0.755 -0.732 -1.013 -0.732 -1.013 -0.749 -0.72 -0.964
[13.84]** [14.13]** [24.05]** [14.15]** [23.97]** [13.74]** [14.16]** [23.58]**
Bilateral exchange rate -0.621 -0.279 -0.055 -0.324 -0.055 -0.58 -0.346 -0.075
[11.07]** [4.98]** [1.76] [6.07]** [1.75] [10.20]** [6.39]** [2.35]*
Free trade area 0.097 0.113 0.083 0.106 0.083
[4.28]** [4.23]** [4.66]** [3.96]** [4.59]**
Bilateral tariff barriers -0.066 -0.093 -0.082 -0.095 -0.083 -0.097 -0.105 -0.137
[1.80] [2.90]** [7.58]** [2.97]** [7.59]** [2.31]* [2.69]** [12.16]**
Non-tariff barriers -0.065 0.103 -0.056 0.103 -0.074 0.085
[3.11]** [5.43]** [2.72]** [5.41]** [3.78]** [4.30]**
FDI restrictions -0.106 -0.003 -0.107 -0.041
[2.31]* [0.09] [2.33]* [1.01]
European Union 0.058 0.163 0.405
[1.85] [3.34]** [8.86]**
EFTA 0.183 0.239 0.794
[3.12]** [3.12]** [13.45]**
NAFTA 0.485 0.495 0.038
[2.43]* [3.58]** [0.45]
Partner in:
   European Union 0.144 0.585
[3.16]** [12.65]**
   EFTA 0.027 0.365
[0.46] [7.10]**
   NAFTA 0.033 -0.011
[0.64] [0.27]
Constant 2.03 0.89 6.21 0.80 6.21 2.08 0.82 7.63
[9.28]** [5.30]** [5.50]** [4.90]** [5.51]** [9.94]** [4.76]** [6.71]**
Observations 6943 6929 6950 6929 6950 6958 6945 6950
R-squared n.a. n.a. 0.95 n.a. 0.95 n.a. n.a. 0.95
a)  Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. 
     * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level; n.a. = not applicable.
b)  All 28 home and host countries included.
c)  All 28 home countries and 23 hosts included (excluded: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Switzerland and Turkey).
Free trade area
FEc
TLS
Table A19. Bilateral goods exports: Opennessa
Trade openness FDI restrictions
TLS
FEc TLS Partnerc FEc
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Countryb Partnerc Countryb Partnerc
A B C D E F
Total GDP 1.297 0.626 0.857 1.006 0.747 0.867
[14.86]** [7.41]** [19.53]** [11.15]** [8.77]** [17.57]**
Size similarity 0.695 0.378 0.497 0.539 0.44 0.502
[12.58]** [7.21]** [20.80]** [9.52]** [8.19]** [18.95]**
Factor dissimilarity 0.168 0.102 0.126 0.153 0.112 0.128
[4.25]** [2.51]* [4.63]** [3.87]** [2.72]** [4.72]**
Human capital dissimilarity 0.571 0.465 -0.434 0.54 0.46 -0.443
[2.89]** [2.74]** [6.67]** [2.80]** [2.69]** [6.82]**
Distance -0.976 -0.991 -0.977 -0.972 -0.991 -0.976
[18.03]** [20.82]** [73.24]** [18.18]** [20.63]** [73.14]**
R&D intensity 0.161 0.157 0.208 0.144
[5.47]** [2.36]* [7.89]** [2.06]*
Transport costs -0.703 -0.682 -1.012 -0.71 -0.683 -1.015
[11.31]** [11.55]** [25.58]** [11.37]** [11.75]** [25.43]**
Bilateral exchange rate -0.611 -0.327 -0.029 -0.489 -0.285 -0.041
[10.37]** [6.27]** [0.88] [8.33]** [5.53]** [1.20]
Free trade area 0.101 0.128 0.116 0.109 0.134 0.12
[4.45]** [4.80]** [6.38]** [4.77]** [4.96]** [6.60]**
Bilateral tariff barriers -0.137 -0.146 -0.1 -0.137 -0.145 -0.1
[3.67]** [4.12]** [9.04]** [3.69]** [4.08]** [8.99]**
Non-tariff barriers -0.074 0.026 -0.08 0.026
[3.93]** [1.15] [4.23]** [1.13]
FDI restrictions -0.071 0.09 -0.039 0.049
[1.59] [2.41]* [0.84] [1.17]
Country-specific variables
      Regulation -0.212 -0.191 -0.253 -0.23
[3.27]** [2.07]* [3.85]** [2.25]*
      Labour tax wedge -0.399 0.061
[5.54]** [0.48]
      Employment protection
            With high-level  corporatism 0.002 0.006
[1.85] [2.47]*
            With mid-level corporatism -0.003 0.002
[2.52]* [0.57]
            With low-level corporatism 0.001 0.006
[0.60] [2.77]**
Partner-specific variables
      Regulation -0.11 0.161 -0.118 0.172
[1.90] [3.02]** [2.06]* [3.16]**
      Labour tax wedge 0.194 -0.031
[2.94]** [0.39]
      Employment protection
            With high-level  corporatism 0.001 0.005
[0.92] [2.95]**
            With mid-level corporatism -0.002 0.003
[1.43] [1.86]
            With low-level corporatism -0.001 0.005
[0.80] [3.44]**
Constant 2.07 1.01 7.07 1.50 1.21 7.07
[9.62]** [6.33]** [6.15]** [6.20]** [6.98]** [4.77]**
Observations 6107 6107 6195 6107 6119 6195
R-squared n.a. n.a. 0.95 n.a. n.a. 0.95
a)  Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. 
     * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level; n.a. = not applicable.
b)  21 home countries (excluded: Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Korea, Mexico, Poland and Turkey), all 28 host countries.
c)  All 28 home countries and 20 hosts included (excluded: Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Korea, Mexico,  Poland, 
     Switzerland and Turkey),
d)  21 home countries (excluded: Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Korea, Mexico, Poland and Turkey),
      20 host countries (excluded: the same countries plus Switzerland).
Table A20.
 Bilateral goods exports: All policiesa
Product market regulation Labour market regulation
TLS
FEd
TLS
FEd
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156. Table A21 presents variants of equations D-F in Table A20 to check for the robustness of the 
results. For simplicity, however, only the ‘basic’ variables are presented along with the variables of interest 
for the robustness check.93 In columns A and C, product market regulation is defined in the same way as in 
the FDI equations (i.e., the product of economy-wide regulation and the summary indicator of regulatory 
reform in 7 non-manufacturing industries). The related coefficients appear with the same sign but the effect 
of regulation in the partner country appears to be less significant than in Table A20, where regulation is 
defined as in the main text. All other coefficients remain robust to this change. Column D looks at the 
effect of exchange-rate variability which turns out to be insignificant. Finally, column E omits the bilateral 
distance variable. To the extent that distance captures transport costs, its presence along with the transport 
cost proxy could be redundant. However, the results show that excluding distance would result in a fall in 
the R-squared suggesting that distance might provide additional information on differences in cultures or 
networks among trade partners. 
 Bilateral trade in services 
157. Tables A22 and A23 show detailed regression results for bilateral services exports. Estimates in 
column D of Table A23 were used to compute the contributions of policies to explaining deviation of 
services exports from the OECD average (Figure 22 in main text). Estimates in columns D and E of 
Table A23 were used in the simulations reported in Figure 27 of the main text. Progressively extending the 
basic specification for services with policy variables generally does not change the values and the 
significance of the estimated coefficients. However, some policy variables show a high degree of 
multicollinearity in the data underlying this set of regressions and, therefore, only subsets of them can be 
included simultaneously in the estimated equations. Multicollinearity is particularly strong between FDI 
restrictions and infrastructure (see Table A22) as well as between labour tax wedges and employment 
protection legislation (see Table A23).94 Table A22 shows that free trade agreements have no significant 
effect on services trade. Thus, this variable has been removed from the equations shown in Table A23.  
 
                                                     
93. Complete results are available upon request. 
94. Columns J-L of Table A23 illustrate why it is preferable not to introduce simultaneously tax wedges and 
employment protection. Although the R-squared appears to be similar or even somewhat higher when 
comparing the equations J-L to their counterparts D-F and G-I, respectively, the estimated coefficient for 
the labour tax wedge and barriers to entry are insignificant. This outcome is typical for multicollinearity, 
where the whole set of variables explains a large share of the variance while a subset of variables becomes 
insignificant, though it is significant in alternative specifications. 
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FEd
A B C D E
Total GDP 1.026 0.989 0.785 0.773 0.833
[11.30]** [10.97]** [9.44]** [9.23]** [11.63]**
Size similarity 0.548 0.533 0.455 0.451 0.452
[9.58]** [9.41]** [8.59]** [8.51]** [11.83]**
Factor dissimilarity 0.163 0.162 0.119 0.118 -0.051
[3.89]** [3.89]** [2.89]** [2.87]** [1.24]
Human capital dissimilarity 0.538 0.532 0.46 0.453 -0.804
[2.80]** [2.76]** [2.70]** [2.66]** [7.53]**
Distance -0.971 -0.972 -0.992 -0.992
[18.02]** [18.11]** [20.81]** [20.82]**
R&D intensity 0.206 0.207 0.063
[7.80]** [7.81]** [0.59]
Transport costs -0.71 -0.713 -0.69 -0.691 -1.538
[11.38]** [11.48]** [11.77]** [11.84]** [25.63]**
Bilateral exchange rate -0.494 -0.489 -0.262 -0.269 -0.04
[8.46]** [8.36]** [5.13]** [5.22]** [0.88]
Bilateral tariff barriers -0.138 -0.144 -0.472
[3.70]** [4.08]** [24.97]**
Country-specific variable
   Regulation -0.077
[2.01]*
Partner-specific variable
   Regulation -0.056
[1.67]
Exchange rate variabilitye 0.006 0.003
[1.59] [0.93]
Constant 1.485 1.526 1.243 1.253 -2.586
[6.16]** [6.33]** [7.23]** [7.25]** [1.21]
Observations 6112 6109 6099 6096 6195
R-squared n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.89
a)  Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. 
     * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level; n.a. = not applicable.
b)  21 home countries (excluded: Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Korea, Mexico, Poland and Turkey),
     all 28 host countries.
c)  All 28 home countries and 20 hosts included (excluded: Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Korea, Mexico,
      Poland, Switzerland and Turkey),
d)  21 home countries (excluded: Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Korea, Mexico, Poland and Turkey),
     20 host countries (excluded: the same countries plus Switzerland).
e)  Coefficients multiplied by 100.
Table A21. Bilateral goods exports: Variantsa
TLS PartnercTLS Countryb
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Country Partner Country Partner Countryc Partnerd Country Partner
A B C D E F G H I J K L
Total GDP 1.914 1.671 1.857 1.759 1.614 1.755 1.569 1.464 1.594 1.571 1.467 1.577
[33.46]** [35.60]** [46.92]** [29.53]** [31.88]** [41.58]** [27.51]** [27.22]** [36.01]** [27.54]** [26.41]** [35.02]**
Size similarity 0.977 0.708 0.912 0.897 0.676 0.87 0.803 0.571 0.772 0.787 0.569 0.752
[15.14]** [13.13]** [16.60]** [13.31]** [11.94]** [15.71]** [13.41]** [9.97]** [14.92]** [13.08]** [9.65]** [14.10]**
Factor dissimilarity 0.372 0.315 0.145 0.26 0.193 0.05 0.137 0.198 0.31 0.076 0.251 0.188
[2.99]** [2.76]** [1.25] [1.93] [1.67] [0.44] [0.97] [1.36] [2.36]* [0.52] [1.41] [1.19]
Human capital dissimilarity -0.331 -0.725 -1.056 -0.788 -0.852 -1.471 -0.415 0.31 -0.967 -0.42 0.31 -1.038
[1.03] [2.43]* [3.78]** [2.24]* [2.21]* [5.05]** [1.08] [0.70] [2.86]** [1.07] [0.69] [2.97]**
Distance -0.874 -0.654 -0.793 -0.928 -0.806 -0.958 -0.895 -0.795 -0.916 -0.912 -0.794 -0.947
[21.75]** [16.17]** [22.64]** [19.44]** [18.81]** [22.90]** [23.42]** [19.36]** [24.38]** [20.28]** [16.88]** [21.40]**
FDI restrictions -0.132 -0.075
[1.79] [1.09]
Transport infrastructuree 0.262 0.43 0.343 0.212 0.365 0.324
[3.23]** [7.16]** [6.89]** [2.39]* [5.70]** [6.21]**
Regulationf -0.359 -0.184 -0.292 -0.258 -0.241 -0.244 -0.236 -0.258 -0.235 -0.181 -0.248 -0.22
[3.82]** [2.03]* [3.91]** [2.57]* [2.26]* [2.97]** [2.18]* [2.18]* [2.66]** [1.57] [2.08]* [2.46]*
Country-specific variables
      Labour tax wedge -0.608 -0.761 -0.208 -0.22
[3.83]** [5.09]** [0.93] [1.00]
     Employment protection -0.011 -0.013 -0.01 -0.012
[4.85]** [5.88]** [3.16]** [3.62]**
        With high-level corporatism 0.034 0.028 0.031 0.027
[4.34]** [3.18]** [3.61]** [2.92]**
        With mid-level corporatism -0.011 -0.002 -0.013 -0.004
[1.47] [0.22] [1.55] [0.50]
Partner-specific variables
      Labour tax wedge -0.726 -0.904 0.041 -0.274
[4.70]** [6.05]** [0.21] [1.46]
     Employment protection -0.022 -0.018 -0.022 -0.016
[8.10]** [7.47]** [7.36]** [5.98]**
        With high-level  corporatism 0.01 0.003 0.006 0.006
[1.86] [0.58] [1.03] [1.01]
        With mid-level corporatism -0.003 0.002 -0.004 -0.001
[0.32] [0.20] [0.36] [0.10]
Constant -0.66 -0.08 -28.10 -0.63 -0.06 -17.48 -0.53 0.09 -15.74 -0.52 0.11 -13.28
[11.85]** [2.14]* [23.60]** [10.39]** [1.57] [10.18]** [11.02]** [1.88] [12.09]** [10.87]** [2.15]* [6.74]**
Observations 512 508 505 480 477 460 435 432 416 420 417 416
R-squared 0.79 0.77 0.87 0.79 0.76 0.88 0.79 0.76 0.88 0.8 0.77 0.88
a)  Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. 
     * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level.
b)  The random effects specification is rejected in these regressions. 
c)  All 20 exporter countries and 26 importer countries (excluded: Iceland).
d)  All 20 exporter countries and 25 importer countries (excluded: Iceland and Mexico).
e)  Sum of the infrastructure indicators in country and partner. The indicators increase with the quality and quantity of infrastructure.
f)  Regulation is the sum of the logs of country and partner-specific indicators. The indicators summarise regulatory barriers to entry
     in 12 non-manufacturing industries and are increasing with the intensity of restrictions.
Table A23. Bilateral services exports: All policiesa,b
TLS
OLS
TLS
OLS
TLS
OLSd
TLS
OLS
Tax wedge and EPL togetherdProduct marketc Wedgec
Employment protection legislation
(EPL)
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A2.3 Other computations 
A2.3.1 Contributions 
158. The empirical estimates were used to compute the “contributions” of the policy and non-policy-
related variables to the overall variation in the dependent variables.  
 Foreign direct investment 
159. The “TLS partner” specification was used to evaluate the contributions of all variables of interest 
to the deviation of bilateral inward FDI positions from the OECD average (Figure 21 in the main text). The 
transformed data set95 was further collapsed in order to obtain average values for every variable and 
partner. For variables with bilateral dimension, these values are simple averages over investors and years, 
∑ ∑∆=∆
i t
ijtjijtj YTI
Y 11  and ∑ ∑∆=∆
i t
ijtjijtj XTI
X 11 , for partner-specific variables (and dummies) 
these values are simple period averages, ∑∆=∆
t
jtjjtj PT
P 1 . Policy contributions are then computed as 
the product of the value of the transformed variable and the corresponding estimated coefficients ( px bb ˆ,ˆ ), 
to yield the following equivalence: 
 ijtjjtj
p
jtjp
x
ijtjxijtj ellPbXbY ˆˆˆ ∆+++∆+∆=∆ ∑∑ , 
where l are the estimated partner-specific and partner-time-specific effects and ijtj eˆ∆ are regression 
residuals.  
 Trade in goods and trade in services 
160. The TLS country specification was used to compute the contributions of policy and non-policy-
related variables to the deviation of countries’ bilateral goods and services exports from the OECD average 
(Figures 22 and 23 in the main text). The transformed data set96 was further collapsed in order to obtain 
average values for every variable and country. For variables with bilateral dimension, these values are 
simple averages over importers and years, ∑ ∑∆=∆
j t
ijtiijti YTJ
Y 11  and ∑ ∑∆=∆
j t
ijtiijti XTJ
X 11 , 
for country-specific variables (and dummies) these values are simple period averages, ∑∆=∆
t
itiiti PT
P 1 . 
                                                     
95. The transformed variables are expressed as the deviations of their bilateral values from the averages taken 
over all host countries: ∑−=∆
j
ijtijtijtj ZJ
ZZ 1  (see section 2.1, TLS partner).  
96. The transformed variables are expressed as the deviations of their bilateral values from the averages taken 
over all exporters: ∑−=∆
i
ijtijtijti ZI
ZZ 1  (see section 2.1, TLS country).  
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Policy contributions are then computed as the product of the value of the transformed variable and the 
corresponding estimated coefficients ( px bb ˆ,ˆ ), to yield the following equivalence: 
ijtiiti
p
itip
x
ijtixijti ellPbXbY ˆˆˆ ∆+++∆+∆=∆ ∑∑ , 
where are l the estimated country-specific and country-time-specific effects and ijti eˆ∆  are regression 
residuals.  
A2.3.2 Simulations 
161. The purpose of the simulation exercise is to assess the change in bilateral FDI or exports 
prompted by changes in policies, using the estimated regression coefficients of the relevant policy 
indicators.  
 Foreign direct investment 
162. Bilateral outward FDI positions and flows are expressed in the following log-linear specification: 
 
ijtjtijittji
p
jtp
c
itc
x
ijtxijt
u+++++++
++= ∑∑∑
αααααα
βββ
                                     
PCXY ln
 
where symbols should be interpreted as in the “General” equation above.  
163. Discrete changes of Yij from its baseline level Yij0 can be expressed as: 
 00
0
1
*)exp(ln ijij
ij
ij
ij YYY
Y
Y −=∆   (4) 
and, ceteris paribus, changes in any policy indicator Z XZ ∈( , C or P) imply ZY zij ∆=∆ *ln β . 
Therefore: 
 00*)*exp( ijijzij YYZY −∆=∆ β   (5) 
The change in total inward FDI of country j implied by this policy change is then computed as the sum 
over all investors i of bilateral changes in FDI. 
 Trade in goods and services 
164. Bilateral exports of goods and services are expressed in the following log-log specification: 
 
ijtjtijittji
p
jtp
c
itc
x
ijtxijt
u+++++++
++= ∑∑∑
αααααα
βββ
                                     
P lnC lnX lnY ln
 
Ceteris paribus, the growth in exports implied by the (percentage) change in policy Z is: 
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 ZY zijt ln*ln ∆=∆ β   (6) 
The percentage change in policy Z from its baseline level Z0 can be approximated as follows:  
 
0
01
0
ln
Z
ZZ
Z
ZZ
−
=
∆
≈∆   (7) 
Substituting (7) into (6) and the resulting expression into (4) yields the following change in trade 
expected from change in the policy Z: 
 00
0
exp ijijcij YYZ
ZY −




 ∆
=∆ β  (8) 
The change in total exports in country i implied by this change in policy is then the sum of bilateral export 
changes over all importers j.  
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